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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to explain the crucial decisions of the Chinese government on democratic 
reforms in Hong Kong in Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue from 1979 to 1997. I seek 
answers to the following research question: why did China make concessions to the British on democratic 
reforms in Hong Kong some of the times, while it decided to take measures to prevent democratic reforms 
in Hong Kong from going too fast in other cases? 
I argue that in the Deng era, Chinese decisions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong were the 
outcome of debates within the Communist Party on the implications of the negotiations with the British, 
especially with regard to Chinese domestic politics. The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong played a crucial 
role in the negotiations by making reports on Hong Kong’s political situation to Beijing and tailoring their 
positions in Hong Kong to the decisions at the top. When the Chinese decided to take measures to intervene 
in British reforms in Hong Kong, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong often voiced harsh criticisms on 
British reforms. When the negotiations were going smoothly, they often toned down their criticisms of 
British reforms in Hong Kong.   
The dissertation makes an in-depth analysis of four cases during the negotiations and tries to interpret 
these critical shifts in Chinese positions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The first case is the Chinese 
agreement to the insertion of the clause on elections into the Joint Declaration during the negotiations on 
the transfer of sovereignty. The second case is the Chinese demands that British reforms should converge 
with the Basic Law after the 1985 British electoral reforms in Hong Kong. The third case is the Chinese 
decision to accept a steady increase in the number of directly elected seats in Hong Kong’s legislature 
during the consultations with the British on the Basic Law. The fourth case is the Chinese decision to 
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disband the Legislative Council after the breakup of Sino-British negotiations on electoral reforms in Hong 
Kong.  
This dissertation matters for four reasons. First of all, it examines the intriguing process of how 
Britain tapped into Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s political system in almost two decades of 
Sino-British negotiations. Secondly, it sheds light on the intricacies of Chinese politics by looking into 
debates within the Communist Party on the Hong Kong issue before the final decisions were made. Thirdly, 
this is the first study of the role of directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in Sino-British negotiations on 
democratic reforms in Hong Kong. Fourthly, it is the first systematic analysis of the newly emergent 
primary sources which have not been fully utilized by scholars.    
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Glossary of Chinese Names 
 
*Note: Mainland China and Hong Kong have different writing and pronunciations systems. Mainland 
China use mandarin and simplified Chinese characters, while Hong Kong use a combination of mandarin, 
Shanghai pronunciation and local dialectics in the pronunciations and traditional Chinese characters. The 
following is a glossary of Chinese names which includes the people in the dissertation. From left to right 
are their names in mandarin Chinese, simplified Chinese, names frequently used in English, and traditional 
Chinese characters. In the dissertation, I use mandarin for all mainlanders, and the frequently used names in 
English for Hong Kong people. Special thanks to Professor Tanigaki Mariko at Tokyo University for her 
insights. 
 
An Zijie ??? Ann Tse-kai ??? 
Bao Yugang ??? Pao Yue-Kong ??? 
Cha Jimin ??? Cha Chi-ming ??? 
Cha Liangyong ??? Louis Cha Leung-yung ?良? 
Chen Xitong ???  ??? 
Chen Yi ??  ?? 
Chen Yun ??  ?? 
Chen Zuoer ???  ??? 
Cheng Jienan ??? Gary Cheng Kai-nam ??? 
Deng Lianru ??? Lydia Dunn ?蓮? 
Deng Pufang ???  ??? 
Deng Xiaoping ???  ??? 
Duanmu Zheng ???  ??? 
Fei Xiaotong ???  ??? 
Fei Yimin ??? Fei Yi-ming ??? 
Geng Biao ??  ?? 
Hu Sheng  ??  ?? 
Hu Yaobang  ???  ??? 
Hua Guofeng ???  ??? 
Huan Xiang ??  ?? 
Huang Hua ??  ?? 
Huang Lisong ??? Rayson Huang ?麗? 
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Huang Wenfang  ??? Wong Man-fong ??? 
Huang Zuomei  ???  ??? 
Huo Yingdong ??? Henry Fok Ying-tun ??? 
Ji Pengfei ???  ??? 
Jiang Enzhu ???  ??? 
Jiang Zemin ???  ??? 
Jin Yaoru  ??? Kam Yiu-yu 金?? 
Kuan Guangjie ??? Peter Kwong Kong-kit ??? 
Lei Jieqiong ???  雷?? 
Li Chuwen ???  李?? 
Li Fushan ??? Simon Li Fook-sean  李?? 
Li Guobao ??? David Li Kowk-po 李?? 
Li Guowei  ??? Lee Quo-wei  
Li Hou ??  李? 
Li Jiacheng ??? Li Ka-shing 李?? 
Li Jusheng ???  李?? 
Li Peng ??  李? 
Li Pengfei ??? Allen Lee Peng-fei 李?? 
Li Qiang ??  李? 
Li Ruihuan  ???  李?? 
Li Ximing ???  李?? 
Li Xiannian ???  李?念 
Li Yi ?? Lee Yee 李? 
Li Zhuming ??? Martin Lee Chu-ming 李?? 
Liang Weilin  ???  梁?林 
Liao Chengzhi ???  ??? 
Liu Yiu-chu ??? Liu Yiu-chu ??? 
Liu Huaqing ???  劉?? 
Liu Huiqing ??? Emily Lau Wai-hing 劉?? 
Liu Shaoqi ???  劉?? 
Lu Keng ??  陸? 
Lu Ping ??  魯? 
Luo Decheng ??? Lo Tak-shing 羅?? 
Luo Kangrui ??? Vincent Lo Hong-shui  羅?? 
Ma Yuzhen  ???  ??? 
Mao Junnian ??? Mo Kwan-nin ??年 
Mao Zedong ???  ??? 
Peng Zhen ??  ?? 
Qian Qichen  ???  ??? 
Qiao Guanhua  ???  ??? 
Qiao Shi ??  ?? 
Shao Tianren ???  ??? 
Situ Hua ??? Szeto Wah ??? 
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Tan Huizhu ??? Maria Tam Wai-chu ??? 
Tan Yaozong ??? Tam Yiu-chung ??? 
Wang Hanbin ???  ??? 
Wang Kuang ??  ?? 
Wang Tieya ???  ??? 
Wang Zhen  ??  ?? 
Wu Jianmin ???  ??? 
Wu Weiyong ??? Raymond Wu Wai-yong  ??? 
Wu Xueqian ???  ??? 
Xi Zhongxun ???  ??? 
Xiang Chunyi ???  ??? 
Xiao Weiyun  ???  ??? 
Xu Chongde  ???  ??? 
Xu Jiatun  ???  ??? 
Yang Baibing ???  ??? 
Yang Sen ?? Yeung Sum ?? 
Yang Shangkun  ???  ??? 
Ye Jianying ???  葉?? 
Zeng Yucheng ??? Jasper Tsang Yok-sing ??? 
Zhang Gong ??  ?? 
Zhang Junsheng  ???  ??? 
Zhang Youyu ???  ??? 
Zhang Wenjin ???  ??? 
Zhao Ziyang ???  ??? 
Zheng Weirong ???  ??? 
Zheng Yushuo  ??? Joseph Cheng Yu-shek ??? 
Zhong Shiyuan ??? Chung Sze-yuen ??? 
Zhou Enlai ???  ??來 
Zhou Nan ??  ?? 
Zhu Rongji ???  ??? 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I. The Puzzle   
This dissertation seeks to explain the crucial decisions of the Chinese government on democratization 
in Hong Kong during the Sino-British negotiations on the handover of Hong Kong from 1979 to 1997. I 
seek answers to the following research question: why did the Chinese make concessions to the British on 
democratic reforms in Hong Kong some of the times, while they decided to take measures to prevent 
democratic reforms in Hong Kong from going too fast in other cases? 
The negotiations started at a time of great transformation of China when the country was recovering 
from the Cultural Revolution and was embarking on the course of reforms and opening up. The handover 
of Hong Kong from Britain to China was a landmark event in world history. The coexistence of the 
socialist system and capitalist system within a single sovereign country was unprecedented in history. The 
Chinese government had to take the risks of the absorption of a capitalist Hong Kong to the socialist 
country. The democratic reforms in Hong Kong added to the challenge facing the Chinese government by 
making the future of the territory more unpredictable.    
Among the numerous issues that needed to be settled to ensure a smooth transition, the future 
political system of Hong Kong was the thorniest and the most controversial issue in the negotiations. In 
over a century’s time, Britain maintained an authoritarian system in Hong Kong with a concentration of 
power on the Governor. After the start of Sino-British negotiations, the British implemented reforms at the 
district level in the Green Paper of June 1980 and the White Paper of January 1981 entitled A Patten of 
District Administration. The Green Paper of July 1984 on the Further Development of Representative 
Government clarified the aim of developing a system of government “which is more directly accountable to 
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the people of Hong Kong”.1 Democratic reforms introduced at the eleventh hour of British rule aroused 
Chinese suspicions on British secret agenda and gave rise to continuous arguments between the two 
countries.  
Four cases in the negotiations were selected for comparative study. They were the biggest shifts in 
Chinese positions in the period under research. The first case was from the start of Sino-British negotiations 
in March 1979 to the signature of the draft Sino-British Joint Declaration in September 1984. In this case, 
the innovative concept of “one country, two systems” gradually took shape in China and was written into 
the bilateral agreement. The Chinese made concessions to the British in granting the other side the full 
power to administer Hong Kong before 1997. The British skillfully inserted the clause that the legislature 
of Hong Kong be constituted by elections to the final agreement, paving the way for their reforms in Hong 
Kong afterwards.  
The second case was the Sino-British negotiations from the publication of the White Paper of 
November 1984 that sketched out British plans for electoral reforms to January 1986 when the British 
declared their concessions to the Chinese that British reforms should converge with the Hong Kong Basic 
Law. In this case, the Chinese were concerned that the British had a secret agenda in the democratic 
reforms of 1985 in Hong Kong. The Chinese toughened their stance and demanded that reforms in Hong 
Kong should converge with the Basic Law. After months of discussions, the British pronounced in January 
1986 that they agreed to the Chinese principle that reforms would converge with the Basic Law.  
The third case was from the meeting of the political small group of the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee in November 1988 which tried to build a consensus on the future political structure to the 
completion of the law in 1990. In this case, the British were able to influence the Hong Kong Basic Law 
                                                        
1 Hong Kong Government, Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984, p. 4.  
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drafting process through patience and keeping their consultations with the Chinese through private channels. 
The Tiananmen incident led to formal suspension of bilateral relations. The British engaged in serious 
discussions with the Chinese on the Basic Law in late 1989. In the end, the Chinese made concessions to 
the British by accepting a steady increase in directly elected seats in the Hong Kong legislature. The 
agreement was reflected in the Hong Kong Basic Law.  
The fourth case was from the last Governor Chris Patten’s unveiling of his electoral reform proposals 
to the Legislative Council in October 1992 to August 1994 when the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress decided to dissolve Hong Kong’s existing political structures on 1 July 1997. Chris 
Patten’s reform proposals were perceived as a violation of earlier understandings between the two countries 
by the Chinese side. It led to a deterioration of bilateral relations. The two sides failed to reach any 
agreement in the 17 rounds of negotiations on electoral reforms in 1993. After the breakup of the 
negotiations, the Chinese government decided to disband the 1995 elected Legislative Council in 1997.  
The two sides had unequal bargaining power at the negotiating table. In all the four cases, the 
Chinese could simply brush aside British demands. British Foreign Policy Adviser Percy Cradock pointed 
out that the Chinese “possessed overwhelming military force, in addition to the capacity to cut off essential 
supplies”.2 If the British overstepped in democratic reforms in Hong Kong, the options were open for the 
Chinese to take over Hong Kong by force ahead of schedule or smash up whatever democratic institutions 
the British had set up after China’s resumption of sovereignty. In a nutshell, Chinese consent was essential 
for democratic reforms of the British to pass the threshold of 1997. 
The story is puzzling. It is always believed that the Chinese were extremely unyielding on issues like 
democracy. Democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity were solemn words in the vocabulary of 
                                                        
2 Percy Cradock, Experiences of China, London: John Murray Ltd, 1994, p. 211. 
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Chinese negotiators. They belong to the same category of issues of essential principles that brook no 
foreign interference and must be defended vigorously. The golden rule is that the positions of the Chinese 
on these issues are unshakable, unwavering, and firm as rock. However, in such a weak position in the 
negotiations, the British successfully won substantial concessions from the Chinese on this impossible issue. 
The British also had failures in the negotiations, the biggest of which happened in the breakup of 
negotiations in 1993 after which the Chinese decided to disband the 1995 elected Legislative Council after 
1997. 
The puzzle can only be solved by looking into the Chinese domestic politics and reconstructing how 
the crucial decisions were made. In all the cases, the pace of democratization in Hong Kong led to fierce 
debates within the Chinese Communist Party. Among the Chinese officials, Directors of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong, whose official titles within the CCP were the Secretary of the Hong Kong and Macao Work 
Committee, played a crucial role in the negotiations as they were the top Chinese officials based in Hong 
Kong interacting between Beijing, London and Hong Kong. Chinese decisions on democratization in Hong 
Kong can be best explained through assessing the role of these “Chinese shadow governors” in Sino-British 
negotiations. 
 
II. The Argument 
1. My Argument 
I argue that in the Deng era, Chinese decisions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong were the 
outcome of debates within the Communist Party on the implications of the negotiations with the British, 
especially with regard to Chinese domestic politics. As the top officials of the Communist Party in Hong 
Kong the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong played a crucial role in the Chinese policy-making process by 
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making reports on Hong Kong’s political situation to Beijing and tailoring their positions in Hong Kong to 
the decisions at the top. When the Chinese decided to take measures to intervene in British reforms in Hong 
Kong, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong often voiced harsh criticisms on British reforms. When the 
negotiations were going smoothly, they often toned down their criticisms of British reforms in Hong Kong. 
 (1) Sino-British Negotiations in the Deng Era 
The Sino-British negotiations on the handover of Hong Kong took place in the Deng era. The 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was very interested in the Hong Kong issue and held the final say on 
Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization in the four cases under research. On 26 October 1992, 
a vice-President of the Central Military Commission, Liu Huaqing, recalled that after the resignation of 
Deng as President of the Central Military Commission, the theme of the first meeting of the new military 
leading group was to study Deng Xiaoping’s instructions on the Hong Kong issue.3 The Chronicle of Deng 
Xiaoping’s Life kept a record of the important instructions of Deng on the Hong Kong issue to Chinese 
officials all the way to 1993.4 The paramount leader faded from the Chinese political scene only with the 
deterioration of his health in 1994. Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s Hong Kong policies steadily 
carried out Deng’s blueprint through to the end. 
(2) Debates within the Communist Party 
Chinese decisions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong were the outcome of debates within the 
Communist Party on the implications of the negotiations with the British, especially with regard to Chinese 
domestic politics. It is difficult to pinpoint the hardliners or the moderates in the debates within the CCP, as 
the officials’ stances on the Hong Kong’s democratization varied with time and circumstances. The debates 
                                                        
o
3 Liu Huaqing, “Renmin Jiefangjun Jinzhu Xianggang De Juece Neimu” (The Inside Story of the Decision to 
Station the PLA to Hong Kong”), Zhongguo Zuojia (Chinese Writers), vol. 19, 2006, p. 17. 
4 Deng Xia ping Nianpu (Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life), Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2004.  
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went on throughout the negotiations as the Chinese government did not have a clear vision on how to put 
the idea of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” into practice. The outcomes reflected the prevailing 
judgment of the key decision-makers. 
(3) Chinese Positions at the Negotiating Table   
The Chinese government believed that the democratic reforms initiated at the eleventh hour of the 
British rule were designed to increase the leverage of the British at the negotiating table. The British had a 
better chance of winning Chinese concessions at the negotiating table if their reforms were smaller and if 
they communicated more skillfully with the Chinese. However, whether the British reforms in Hong Kong 
were acceptable to the Chinese was not determined by the nature of the British reforms, but by Chinese 
assessments of the implications of the negotiations, especially with regard to the domestic situation in 
China. The British were more likely to win concessions from the Chinese if they could better grasp the 
Chinese political scene at the time. 
(4) The Role of the Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong 
As the top CCP officials in Hong Kong, Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong actively participated in the 
negotiations by making reports to Beijing and tailoring their positions in Hong Kong to the decisions at the 
top. Their post was a crucial position in China, as they had large room of maneuver through their reports to 
Beijing and united front work in Hong Kong. When the Chinese decided to take measures to intervene in 
British reforms in Hong Kong, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong often voiced harsh criticisms on British 
reforms. When the negotiations were going smoothly, they often toned down their criticisms of British 
reforms in Hong Kong. Shifts Chinese positions on democratization in Hong Kong can be best explained 
through assessing the role of these “Chinese shadow governors” in Hong Kong.  
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2. Competing Explanations  
Ever since Prime Minister Thatcher’s visit to Beijing in September 1982, Sino-British negotiations 
had been in the spotlight of world media and academic research. Many scholars try to solve the mystery 
surrounding Chinese policy-making on the Hong Kong issue. Scholars from Japan, China and the West use 
the following four approaches to interpret the crucial Chinese decisions during the negotiations with the 
British on the future of Hong Kong.  
(1) Personalities over Institutions Approach 
The personalities over institutions approach stresses the role of certain officials within the Chinese 
policy-making process. In “Decision-Making and Implementation of Policy toward Hong Kong”, a senior 
Chinese official from Xinhua-Hong Kong, Kam Yiu-yu offers an insider’s observations of the intricacies of 
Chinese politics.5 He highlights that the Chinese decision-making has the distinct characteristic of 
personalities over institutions. His assumption was shared by many Chinese scholars who try to shed light 
on the role of the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the negotiations with the British.6 Their 
analysis combines the instructions of Deng with descriptions of the Sino-British negotiation process. 
Morita reveals the power rivalries within the Chinese government after the Tiananmen incident, especially 
focusing on the experience of the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun.7 These scholars focus on the 
power struggle within China but pay little attention to how the decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization 
                                                        
s
t
i
o f
5 Kam Yiu-yu, “Decision-Making and Implementation of Policy toward Hong Kong,” in Carol Lee Hamrin and 
Zhao Suisheng, eds., Decision-Making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1996, pp. 101-110.  
6 Qi Pengfei, Deng Xiaoping Yu Xianggang Huigui (Deng Xiaoping and Hong Kong’  Handover), Beijing: 
Huaxia Press, 2004. Qi Pengfei, “Deng Xiaoping Yu Xianggang “Hou Guodu Shiqi” De Zhong Ying Waijiao 
Douzheng” (Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-British Diplomatic Disputes in the “Post-transition Period”), 
Dangdai Zhongguo Shi Yanjiu (Contemporary Chinese History), vol. 4, 2004, pp. 59-71. Wang Hongxu, Da 
Zhanlue: Deng Xiaoping Yu Zuguo Tongyi (Grand S rategy: Deng Xiaoping and National Reunification), 
Jiuzhou Press, 2004. Ye Zicheng, Xin Zhongguo Waijiao S xiang: Cong MaoZedong Dao Deng Xiaoping 
(Diplomatic Thoughts of New China: From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping), Beijing: Peking University Press, 
2001. Zhong Wen and Wen Fu, Deng Xia ping Waijiao Fengcai Shilu (The Cra t of Deng Xiaoping’s 
Diplomacy), Beijing: People’s Press, 2004. 
7 ????????????????????1997?? 
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were made. In addition, such research exaggerates the importance of certain officials and loses the whole 
picture of the policy-making process.  
(2) The Bureaucratic Politics Approach  
The bureaucratic politics approach focuses on the role of certain agencies and bureaucrats in the 
Chinese policy-making process. Some scholars stressed the significant role of the military or the Hong 
Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency in the policy-making on the Hong Kong issue.8 Their analysis on 
the role of these agencies does not try to spell out the role of these institutions in the negotiations on Hong 
Kong’s democratization. Zheng Yongnian and Tok Sow Keat argue that China’s top leaders have more 
tolerance for Hong Kong’s democracy than bureaucrats. They blame the little progress in Hong Kong’s 
democratization from 1997 to 2003 on the bureaucrats and predict that after Hong Kong affairs were 
handled by top leaders again in 2003, China will allow more democracy in Hong Kong.9 The bureaucratic 
politics approach only sketches the role of certain institutions and bureaucrats, but fails to shed light on 
how these institutions influenced the important Chinese decisions on democratization in Hong Kong.  
(3) The Central-Local Relationships Approach  
The central-local relationships approach does not try to trace how the crucial decisions were made by 
the Chinese government, but aims at interpreting the Chinese assessments of the implications of Hong 
Kong’s democratization to Chinese domestic politics. They highlight that the Chinese government was 
concerned about the domino effects of the democratization of Hong Kong to the mainland, worried that 
democratization was likely to turn Hong Kong into an independent state within China, and anxious about 
                                                        
8 David Wen-wei Chang, and Richard Y. Chuang, The Politics of Hong Kong’s Reversion to China, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1998. Jamie Allen, Seeing Red: China’s Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong, Singapore: B-H 
Asia, 1997. ????????????????―????????????????????????????
????? 1996? 3??139?180?? 
9 Zheng Yongnian and Tok Sow Keat, “Beijing Responds to Hong Kong’s Democratization Movement: from 
Bureaucratic Control to Political Leadership”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Winter 2007, vol. 33, iss. 4, 
pp. 235-255.  
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the risks in not satisfying the democratic needs of the Hong Kong people.10 By assessing the relationships 
between Beijing and Hong Kong, this approach tends to depict China as a unitary actor, and tries to reveal 
the thinking behind the Chinese policies. Such an approach is taken because limited information on 
Chinese policy-making was available at the time of their research. This approach is insufficient in 
explaining Chinese policy-making on Hong Kong’s democratization as they do not look into how the 
decisions were made by the Chinese government.  
 (4) The Psychological Approach  
The psychological approach stresses the impact of perceptual errors like misperceptions on Chinese 
decision-making. In “Hong Kong’s Future: Sino-British Negotiations, Perceptions, Organization and 
Political Culture”, Michael Yahuda identifies how Chinese officials misperceived their British counterparts’ 
purposes and analyzes how Chinese suspicions persisted throughout the negotiations.11 Joseph Cheng 
Yu-shek also interprets Chinese policies by assessing the prevailing “conspiracies theories” of the Chinese 
against the British.12 The psychological approach assumes that Chinese suspicions of the British persisted 
throughout the negotiations. They raise the important question of the misreading of the British intentions by 
the Chinese. However, these scholars did not examine the origins of Chinese suspicions, especially in the 
context of Chinese domestic scene. 
                                                        
er
r
10 ????????????????????????????????????? 3??1998??85?98??
???????????―???????????????1998???????????????????????
???????2005? 1??14?30?????????―???????????????1985? 4? 16??29
??Jae Ho Chung and Shiu-hing Lo, “Beijing’s Relations with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
An Inferential Framework for the Post-1997 Arrangement”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 
167-186. Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge”, International Affairs, vol. 63, no. 2, 
Spring 1987, pp. 271-283. Liang Yü-ying, “Peking’s Hong Kong Policy after Tiananmen”, Issues & Studies, 
vol. 26, no. 10, December 1990, pp.71-84. Lo Shiu-hing, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong, 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997. Ming K. Chan, “Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law, 1985-90”, in Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark ed., The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for 
“stability and Prosperity” under Chinese Sov eignty?, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1991.  
11 Michael Yahuda, “Hong Kong’s Future: Sino-British Negotiations, Perceptions, Organization and Political 
Culture”, International Affai s, vol. 69, no. 2, April 1993, pp. 245-266. 
12 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Sino-British Negotiations on Hong Kong During Chris Patten’s Governorship”, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2, November 1994, pp. 229-245.  
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In sum, the current literature on Chinese decision-making on democratization in Hong Kong is 
limited by the materials available. No research focuses on the debates within the Communist Party which is 
an original approach to shed light on the dynamics of Chinese policy-making. From this review, it is clear 
that no research has been done to trace China’s change of positions on Hong Kong’s democratic reforms 
and examine the roles of directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the negotiations. This dissertation is going to 
fill this gap and shed light on this important question.  
 
III. Academic Significance    
     This dissertation matters for four reasons. First of all, it examines how Britain tapped into Chinese 
positions on the political systems of Hong Kong over the two decades of Sino-British negotiations. 
Secondly, it sheds light on the intricacies of Chinese politics by looking into debates within the Communist 
Party before the final decisions were made. Thirdly, this is the first study of the role of directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong in the negotiations on democratic reforms. Fourthly, it is the first systematic analysis of 
the newly emergent primary sources which have not been fully utilized by scholars.    
1. Analysis of How Britain Tapped into Chinese Policy-making Process 
This dissertation examines how Britain tapped into Chinese Hong Kong policies on the political 
systems of Hong Kong over the two decades of Sino-British negotiations. The British are well-known for 
being skillful negotiators. For nearly two decades’ time, British politicians left no means untried in their 
persistent efforts to influence Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s political system. They exhausted all 
possible channels, informing China of how to run Hong Kong through piles of documents, paying frequent 
top level public and secret visits, and using direct communications between the top leaders to break 
deadlocks. On the one hand, the British exhausted the tough approaches of exerting international pressure, 
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threatening to stop the negotiations and not shrinking from their demand. On the other hand, they used the 
soft approaches of working within the parameters set by the Chinese side and retreating from their original 
demands when necessary.  
During the negotiations, the British successfully tapped into the Chinese policy-making process and 
exerted some influence on Hong Kong’s political system. Traces of British influence are clearly discernible 
in the bilateral agreements reached over these years. The British inserted many ideas into the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration to ensure the high autonomy enjoyed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
after China’s resumption of sovereignty. The British also influenced the whole Basic Law Drafting process 
through various channels. As most of these intriguing interactions have been disclosed by the participants, 
Sino-British negotiations on democratization in Hong Kong were crucial for understanding how a Western 
country tapped into Chinese policy-making on such an important issue. 
2. Shedding Light on the Intricacies of Chinese Politics    
This dissertation sheds light on the intricacies of Chinese politics by looking into debates within the 
Communist Party on democratic reforms in Hong Kong before the final decisions were made by the 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. It reveals that contrary to the stereotype idea that holds that all the 
Chinese officials were against democratization in Hong Kong, the Chinese officials at different levels of the 
bureaucracy held different views on the pace of democratization in Hong Kong. It also discovered that 
officials from key decision-making organs in China like Xinhua-Hong Kong, the Hong Kong and Macao 
Office of the State Council and the Foreign Ministry held different opinions on the pace of democratization 
in Hong Kong.  
The past research on Chinese decision-making on the Hong Kong issue focuses on the role of Deng 
Xiaoping. This dissertation adopts an original approach to interpret Chinese decision by looking into the 
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debates within the Communist Party before the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping made the final decision 
on the issue. Focusing on the role of Deng Xiaoping was an easy way to analyze Chinese decision-making, 
as all the crucial instructions of Deng Xiaoping during the negotiations were revealed, offering a whole 
picture of the evolution of Chinese negotiation strategy in different periods. However, Deng’s instructions 
always came at the very end of the discussions on Hong Kong’s future. By looking at the instructions of 
Deng Xiaoping, we usually get the policy outcome but lose sight of the policy-making process, especially 
the intriguing discussions among the Chinese officials before the final decisions were made.  
3. Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong as a Crucial Position in the Policy-making Process 
This dissertation examines the role of directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the Chinese Hong Kong 
policy-making process on the pace of democratization in Hong Kong. The directors of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong’s official titles within the CCP were directors of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee of the 
Communist Party. They were the top CCP officials in Hong Kong who followed the evolving political 
situation in Hong Kong every day. Their reports to Beijing were important sources of Chinese 
policy-making on Hong Kong’s democratization. They were also able to influence the political situation in 
Hong Kong by directly interacting with key Hong Kong and British politicians to implement the 
instructions from the top.  
The case studies reveal an interesting pattern in the negotiations on democratic reforms in Hong 
Kong. When the Chinese decided to take measures to intervene in British reforms in Hong Kong, the 
directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong often voiced harsh criticisms on British reforms. When the negotiations 
were going smoothly, they often toned down their criticisms of British reforms in Hong Kong. Chinese 
decisions on democratization in Hong Kong can be best explained through assessing the role of these 
“Chinese shadow governors” in Hong Kong. 
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4. Systematic Analysis of Newly Emergent Primary Sources 
This dissertation is the first systematic analysis of the newly emergent primary sources on 
Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue. The Sino-British negotiations coincided with some 
major events taking place within China which had significant impacts on the negotiations with the British. 
These events led to the early publication of classified documents of the two countries, unreserved 
disclosure of the participants in the Sino-British negotiations, and reflections on the negotiations by people 
with different viewpoints from Beijing, Hong Kong and London. 
The Tiananmen Incident of 1989 led to great divisions within China, making it possible to hear the 
criticisms of top Chinese officials on Chinese polices and unreserved disclosure of Chinese 
decision-making. Director of Xinhua-Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun fled to the Unite States in 1990, his memoirs 
are the most valuable source on Chinese decision-making from 1983 to 1989. He accepted a series 
interviews in 2008 at the age of 92, which may probably be his last.13 Chief Editor of Wen Wei Po, Kam 
Yu-yiu renounced his CCP membership and came to the United States in 1989. His books and articles had a 
little critical tone of the Chinese policies.14 Deputy Secretary of Xinhua-Hong Kong, Wong Man-fong held 
a public service to mourn the dead in 1989.15 Wong gave a detailed account of the Chinese decision-making 
process.  
The democratic reform proposals of Chris Patten in October 1992 led to great conflicts between the 
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two countries. During this unprecedented mutual names-calling and confrontation, two sides published the 
secret letters exchanged between the Foreign Ministers in early 1990. After the breakup of negotiations in 
1993, the British published a White Paper with detailed analysis of the exchanges of positions of the two 
sides in every round. These publications forced the Chinese to publish their White Papers.  
The handover of Hong Kong in 1997 and the tenth anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong in 
2007 led to intensive media coverage. Interview transcripts of participants in the Sino-British negotiations 
were available in newspapers, magazines and on TV stations. There were also oral histories of the key 
policy-makers in Britain and China. The release of these new materials coupled with the fashion of 
memoirs writing and its snowballing effects led to the emergence of more first-hand materials. It was a 
perfect time to take stock and analyze the latest materials on this important issue.   
 
IV. Methodology  
This dissertation is a qualitative study of political science. It tries to interpret Chinese decisions on 
Hong Kong’s democratization through in-depth analysis of the newly emergent materials on Chinese 
policy-making. Four case studies are the main components of the dissertation. Each case study will spell 
out the background for Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong’s democratic reforms, a description of the 
negotiation process, an analysis of the debates within the Communist Party and specification of the role of 
the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the negotiations. A controlled comparison of the four cases reveals 
the dynamics of Chinese decision-making on Hong Kong’s democratization.  
1. “Theory-based” Archival Approach  
In “Sources and Methods in Cold War History”, Deborah Larson elaborates on how political 
scientists can use a “theory-based archival approach” to contribute to knowledge accumulation. In this 
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approach, political scientists read through primary sources to reconstruct the world as perceived by 
policy-makers at the time. Then they search through contemporary public sources, including daily media 
accounts to supplement archival sources and establish context.16 By carrying out their own historical 
research, political scientists can reconstruct the world as perceived by policy-makers at the time, untainted 
by hindsight. This dissertation uses official documents and archives, reminiscences of the participants and 
accounts in newspapers and magazines to shed light on Chinese decision-making on Hong Kong’s 
democratization.  
2. Critical Textual Analysis  
Politicians from Beijing, Hong Kong and London held divergent views on democratization in Hong 
Kong. The community of Hong Kong was split between those who preferred a slower pace of political 
reforms and those who wanted more democracy. The British officials also had different visions on the pace 
of democratization in Hong Kong. Even the politicians in Beijing disagreed on the pace of democratization 
in Hong Kong. As this issue was so sensitive and controversial, the reflections of the politicians and the 
documents and archives on these issues were bound to be influenced by the bias of the officials. As a result, 
critical textual analysis is an important method to avoid bias in the primary sources.  
I will use critical textual analysis to reconstruct the past through assessing the different accounts of 
the same event by different people from Beijing, Hong Kong, and London. This comparison can reveal a 
more balanced picture of what really happened at the time. I also referred to the reports of newspapers and 
magazines with different opinions, including Japanese sources like Newsweek, Economist and Seikai Shuho, 
Chinese journals and newspapers like the People’s Daily, Ta Kung Pao, Ming Pao and Jiushi Niandian 
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(The Ninetieth), and English sources like Beijing Review, China Daily, South China Morning Post, The 
Standard, Asian Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, Economist, Financial Times, etc.  
3. Comparative Case Studies 
Comparative case studies are effective methods to generalize the finding in the cases. The four cases 
in the dissertation were all crucial shifts in Chinese decisions on democratization in Hong Kong. These 
shifts in policy were all evident in the later statements of Chinese officials which had great implications for 
the democratization of Hong Kong.  
I will use both the method of process tracing and the method of controlled comparison to gain 
insights into Chinese decision-making on democratization in Hong Kong. I will first look into the Chinese 
policy-making process in each case, by describing the exchanges between the British and the Chinese on 
Hong Kong’s democratization, revealing the debates within the Communist Party on whether to be tougher 
or softer to the British, and shed light on the role of directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the Chinese 
policy-making process. Controlled comparison will be used to generalize the findings in the four cases.   
In the two failure cases, democratic reforms in Hong Kong were all interpreted as British efforts to 
create troubles for the Chinese governments during the debates within the Communist Party and measures 
were taken to prevent democratic reforms from going too fast. In these cases, both Xu Jiatun and Zhou Nan 
made harsh criticisms of British democratic reforms in Hong Kong. In the two success cases, the Chinese 
government was willing to make concessions to the British based on assessments of the Chinese domestic 
situation. The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong did not exert much pressure on the British government on 
democratization in Hong Kong.  
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V. Road Map of the Dissertation  
The rest of the dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter two is an overview of Chinese 
policy on Hong Kong’s democratization, which examined the evolution of the Hong Kong policy of the 
Communist Party, Chinese perspectives on democratization of Hong Kong, the role of the Hong Kong 
Branch of the Xinhua News Agency in the Chinese Hong Kong policy-making apparatus, and the role of 
the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the negotiations with the British.    
     Chapter three to chapter six is four cases studies on Chinese decision-making. The cases studies 
include five parts: the first part is a sketch of the background for the case study. The second part is a 
description of the Sino-British negotiation process. The third part is an analysis of debates within the 
Communist Party on democratization in Hong Kong. The fourth part is specification of the role of the 
directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the case. The fifth part wraps up the findings in the case. Chapter seven 
is the concluding chapter.   
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Chapter Two: Chinese Stance on Democratic 
Reforms in Hong Kong 
 
I. Evolution of the CCP’s Hong Kong Policy    
     The Hong Kong issue was a matter of great strategic importance for the Chinese government. The 
Communist Party’s policies on Hong Kong were based on pragmatism. The Chinese government was 
willing to tolerance British existence on the territory to make the best of the great strategic importance of 
Hong Kong. The CCP decided to maintain the status quo before the liberation of the country. Such a policy 
was called “planning on a long term basis and full utilization” in 1960. The policy of “one country, two 
systems” was formulated for peaceful reunification of the country.   
1. Keeping the Status Quo in Hong Kong  
The Hong Kong issue was a legacy of the colonial era. In the Qing dynasty, China was defeated in 
two wars with Britain, and signed the Treaty of Nanking of 1842, the Convention of Beijing of 1860, and 
the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong of 1898. The Hong Kong Island and the Tsim Sha Tsui 
area at the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula were ceded to Britain, while the “New Territories” was 
leased to Britain for a period of 99 years. China’s defeat under British gunboat diplomacy marked the 
beginning of over a century of humiliation when China was up for grasps for the imperialist powers.  
The Communist Party never recognized the three unequal treaties on Hong Kong, claiming that they 
were invalid because they had been imposed by force. To make the best of Hong Kong’s status as an 
international financial center, leaders of the CCP decided to keep the status quo of Hong Kong in early 
1949. China’s policy to keep the status quo in Hong Kong was decided well before the liberation of the 
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whole country. According to Michael Yahuda, “Evidence from Soviet Archives suggests that as early as 
January 1949 Mao Zedong had already decided to defer the seizure of the two remaining Western colonies 
of Hong Kong and Macao.”17  
A veteran CCP member, Mr Kam Yiu-yu had been dealing with the Hong Kong issue since the 1940s. 
He argued that the Communist Party considered the Hong Kong issue “very big and complex, left over by 
the history of Sino-British relations, a focal point of East-West struggle with extensive repercussions”.18 
Hong Kong was an issue on the top of the policy agenda of the Chinese leaders, and only the top Chinese 
leaders like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were able to make instructions on the issue. Foreign Affairs office 
director Chen Yi and deputy director Liao Chengzhi were executive officers implementing the instructions 
of the top leaders. Kam recalled that “the names of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others were never 
mentioned in briefings on important decisions on the Hong Kong question in the Mao period to my 
knowledge”. 19
Before the liberation of the country, the famous Hong Kong hand Liao Chengzhi made an insightful 
suggestion to the CCP leaders. Liao’s suggestions showed that the Chinese government wanted to keep the 
status quo of Hong Kong for two considerations. One is to keep Hong Kong in British hands to break the 
blockade of the United States on the new Communist Regime in China; the other is to keep Hong Kong’s 
present status as a channel to the outside world:   
 
Hong Kong is one of the biggest free trade ports in the world, if we temporarily leave Hong Kong in 
the hands of the British, then we will open a breach in the overall blockade of the United States: We 
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can import the sources we needed, we can also use Hong Kong as a pathway to the world, the 
comrades from other communist parties from around the world could come in from here, other 
friendly people from other countries could come in here. Besides, Hong Kong can also become a 
window for us to understand the situation of other countries. These far-reaching strategic 
implications will be accepted and understood by people as time goes by.20
 
In 1949 Mao Zedong explained the domestic and foreign policies of China to a Soviet envoy sent by 
Stalin. Mao evaluated the situation in China and explained that there were still half the territories in China 
that had not been liberated by People’s Liberation Army. He said China did not want to liberate Hong Kong 
and Macao at the time. Mao said:  
 
In the current situation, it does not make sense for us to rush to solve the issues of Hong Kong and 
Macao. On the contrary, maintaining their original status, especially Hong Kong to develop 
connections with the overseas and expand our export and import trade is more advantageous for us.21   
 
The flexibility in Chinese Hong Kong policy was evident in an insightful instruction drafted by 
Premier Zhou Enlai and revised by Chairman Mao Zedong in January 1949. Hong Kong belonged to the 
issue to be shelved on the agenda of the Communist Party: 
 
In principle, we should terminate all the privileges of the Imperialists to China, and achieve the 
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independence and liberation of the Chinese people. This position is firm as rock. However, we 
should distinguish between different situations in its implementation…If the solution of the issue has 
not been found or if the timing is not ripe, we should all the more not rush to solve it.22
 
On 2 February 1949, the CCP sent a clear message to Britain that China would not solve the Hong 
Kong issue by force. In an editorial entitled “New China and Hong Kong”, Wen Wei Pao argued that the 
British government was being too allergic to the situation in Hong Kong. It said:  
 
Judging from the attitudes of the British government and the authorities in Hong Kong, they seem to 
be very much concerned about security problems in Hong Kong…The Chinese are undergoing a 
vigorous new-democratic revolution. Till now this revolution do not involve a single word or action 
on Hong Kong, or include “Hong Kong” on the list [of villains] that needs to be exposed and 
criticized like the Four Big Families in Taiwan. It is clear that the illusionary security threats will not 
lead to serious disputes, even if things need to be settled, the diplomatic channel will be the best 
option.23  
 
The People’s Liberation Army did not cross the Shenzhen River in its sweeping victory to liberate the 
whole country in 1949. In the memoirs of Zhou Nan, he revealed that a leader of the Central Military 
Committee told him taking back Hong Kong by force was an easy task for the military. When General 
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Chen Yi was the major of Shanghai, he received a note in a speech asking him how to resume sovereignty 
over Hong Kong. Chen said, “If we want to settle it by force, we don’t even need our formal army, the 
public security troops and policemen in Guangdong province will be sufficient. But this method will leave 
some side effects.”24  
2. Planning on a Long-term Basis and Full Utilization  
By employing the strategy of using Hong Kong to divide Britain and the United States, the PRC 
successfully disrupted the United State’s plan to isolate the newly emergent communist regime. On 5 
January 1950, the British government withdrew recognition from the Nationalist government, and the next 
day it accorded de jure recognition to the Communist regime. Britain’s move prompted a flurry of 
recognition of the PRC between January 6 and January 18 by Norway, Ceylon, Denmark, Israel, 
Afghanistan, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.  
In spring 1951, when director of Xinhua-Hong Kong Huang Zuomei came to Beijing for instructions, 
Premier Zhou Enlai explained to him the Chinese special policy for Hong Kong. Zhou Enlai put the Hong 
Kong issue into the context of the conflict between the East and West and shed light on Chinese policy on 
the Hong Kong issue:  
 
Hong Kong is a symbol of the sphere of British political and economic influence in the Far East. On 
this issue, the United State and Britain had conflicts and struggles. Hence they had big divergence 
and discord on their China policies. The United States wanted to encroach upon the political and 
economic sphere of influence of Britain while Britain wanted to maintain the remaining glory of the 
British Empire. As a result, keeping Hong Kong within the hands of the British are better than 
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recovering it, and much better than making it fall into the hands of the Americans…Hong Kong was 
our window to the South East Asia, Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Western World. It will be 
our overlooking platform, observatory and bridgehead. It will be our frontier to break through the 
blockade and sanctions of the Western camp led by the United States. The two years of development 
proved that leaving Hong Kong alone when we liberated the country was correct.25
 
In 1960, the Chinese government called this Hong Kong policy based on pragmatism as “planning on 
a long-term basis and full utilization”. As this time, the rudimentary form of the idea of “one country, two 
systems” was taking shape but with another name labeled as “one outline, four details” (yi gang si mu). 
Such a policy was formed in the early 1960s. In Zhou Nan’s memoirs, he disclosed that at that time a friend 
of Chairman Mao, Zhang Shizhao went as a secret envoy of the CCP to Taiwan to discuss the peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue. The idea of the “one outline, four details” was that diplomatically China 
should only be represented by the Communist Party, but the social and economic system of Taiwan would 
be maintained.26
In 1963, during the heated debates between China and the Soviet Union on the right path for 
socialism, the American Communist Party accused the Chinese Communist Party for “tolerating the 
presence of a colony in a socialist country”. In response, Chairman Mao Zedong himself drafted an 
editorial in the People’s Daily, which refuted:  
 
To be frank, the Chinese people have no need to use force to show our courage and steadiness in 
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fighting Imperialism. The imperialists, especially the American imperialists know with their own 
experience how courageous and steady we are against imperialism.27
  
Mao’s instructions were based on the basic judgment that the Communist Party had full control over 
the situation in Hong Kong. It was always believed that China had the power to dictate Hong Kong’s future. 
There was a saying in Hong Kong that China could take back the territory simply by a phone call from 
Beijing to London. The title of the book Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time captured the 
prevailing judgment that Hong Kong’s future was always at the mercy of China.  
The Chinese government maintained food, water and other basic supplies to Hong Kong. This policy 
was unshaken even in the worst of times. According to a famous journalist, Lu Keng, all the foreign 
currencies the PRC got from Hong Kong were traded by food and supplies from the mainland with very 
low prices. He revealed that during the three years of famines when people were starving, the CCP were 
still keeping their supplies of food and facilities to Hong Kong. At that time, the CCP passed a guideline 
that meat could only be imported, not exported, and they put Hong Kong on the import list.28   
Even when the foreign affairs system was gravely damaged during the Cultural Revolution, the status 
of Hong Kong was still unharmed. When the red guards were to rush in Hong Kong to drive away the 
British and liberate Hong Kong, Premier Zhou Enlai managed to win Chairman Mao’s consent for using the 
border guards to settle down the situation.29 Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Office of the State 
Council Lu Ping revealed that Zhou Enlai stopped the red guards from rushing into Hong Kong only at the 
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last minute in 1967.30
3. One Country, Two Systems 
Generations of Chinese leaders show great tolerance for the British presence in Hong Kong and 
worked against all odds to preserve the status quo. The legacy of the decades of hard work to preserve 
Hong Kong as it really is was best reflected in the ingenious idea of “one country, two systems”. The 
concept secured a smooth transition of Hong Kong from a capitalist to a socialist country, and successfully 
preserved the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong after China’s resumption of sovereignty in 1997.  
The Third Plenum of the CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 marked Deng 
Xiaoping’s ascension to the top of the Chinese leadership and the PRC’s embarkation on a path of 
economic reform and cooperation with the West. The plenum established modernization as the nation’s 
primary goal. In order to achieve the Four Modernizations in agriculture, industry, science and technology, 
and national defense by the end of the century, the PRC would maintain an “open door”.31
The PRC had started to build up a new bureaucratic infrastructure to deal with Hong Kong in late 
1978 when Deng planned to make the most of Hong Kong for the modernization of the country. He 
entrusted this matter to a close colleague and veteran “Hong Kong hand”, Liao Chengzhi. Liao had headed 
the communist organization in Hong Kong before the war and had for a long time handled overseas 
Chinese affairs.32  
 The Hong Kong issue was a matter of great strategic importance for China. In January 1980, Deng 
Xiaoping gave a speech in a central CCP meeting in which he spelled out that China’s three goals were to 
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fight hegemonism and safeguard world peace, unify the country, and work for economic construction.33 
Hong Kong was the key to two strategic goals of China: as a showcase of the idea of “one country, two 
systems” to lure Taiwan back, and as a catalyst for Chinese economic revival. 
As Deng Xiaoping explained in 1984, the idea of “one country, two systems” was formulated to 
“solve the Taiwan and the Hong Kong issue peacefully”.34 On 30 September 1981, the eve of Chinese 
National Day, Chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress Marshal Ye Jianying 
published the “Nine points” on the issue of Taiwan. Ye’s Nine Points were the guiding principle for the 
peaceful reunification of the mainland. The formula proved to be an effective method to solve the Hong 
Kong issue.  
In a talk given on 11 January 1982, Deng Xiaoping first summarized the concept of resolving the 
Taiwan question as “one country, two systems”. He said:  
 
The Nine Principles are put forward by Vice-chairman Ye Jianying. In essence, they boil down to 
“one country, two systems”. Two systems can be permitted. That is, they should not try to undermine 
the system of the mainland and we shall not try to undermine theirs. By and large, these principles 
may be applied not just to the Taiwan question, but to the Hong Kong question, too.35
     
In March 1995, Li Ruihuan, head of the united front organization, told a remarkable story in his 
address to a visiting delegation from Hong Kong. A lady had agreed to sell a hundred-year old Yi Xing 
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teapot that was famous for the quality of tea that it poured. Unbeknown to her, its quality derived from the 
residual that had accumulated on the inside of the pot. In her eagerness to prepare the pot for the purchaser 
she polished and removed the said residue. When the purchaser came to redeem it he pronounced the pot 
valueless.36 At the end of the story Li Ruihuan warned that “taking Hong Kong back is an unusually 
complicated job” with “many issues and difficulties” and that “it is inevitable that we shall fail to manage 
some things appropriately and well”.37 
Li’s insightful remark captures the special value of Hong Kong to China and the great challenge to 
the Chinese policy-makers to preserve the essential elements that make Hong Kong a prosperous 
international financial center after its return to China. Over a decade after China’s resumption of 
sovereignty, a thriving Hong Kong broke all the pessimistic predictions that Hong Kong was doomed after 
China’s resumption of sovereignty. The prosperity and stability of Hong Kong were preserved through 
decades of hard work of the Communist Party. 
 
II. Democratic Reforms in Chinese Perspective 
     Throughout the Sino-British negotiations, the Chinese were deeply concerned that the British were 
trying to create troubles for the Chinese government in the interim period of British rule before China’s 
resumption of sovereignty. Democratic reforms in Hong Kong introduced at the eleventh hour of the British 
rule were perceived as British efforts to maintain their influence on Hong Kong before their retreat from the 
colony.  
Democratic reforms in Hong Kong were just a marginal issue when the two sides signed the Joint 
Declaration of 1984. The issue gradually became a dominating theme in the negotiations between the two 
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countries. During Sino-British dispute on electoral reforms under the last Governor Chris Patten’s 
governorship, democratic reforms in Hong Kong overshadowed all other issues for months and led to the 
most abrasive quarrels between the two countries and made headlines from around the world.  
To understand Chinese perspectives on Hong Kong’s democratization, it is necessary to trace China’s 
definition of the “high level of autonomy” of Hong Kong, and its visions for the future political system of 
Hong Kong. The dominant consideration of the Chinese government on democratic reforms in Hong Kong 
was to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. From the start of Sino-British negotiations on 
Hong Kong’s future, China’s policy on the pace of democratization in Hong Kong went through four stages. 
The Chinese grand design for Hong Kong never contained an element of “constitutional democracy” in the 
Western sense.  
The first stage is from the formation of the idea of “one country, two systems” to the signature of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration. Before the signature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the 
Chinese leaders had been trying to find a political leader in Hong Kong like the Prime Minister of 
Singapore Lee Kuan Yew. Chinese vision for the constitution of the future political structure of Hong Kong 
since the beginning of Sino-British negotiations was that politicians with different tendencies should each 
take up a third of the Hong Kong legislature. In the early 1980s the Chinese government even believed that 
to ensure the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, the future Chief Executive of Hong Kong should be 
pro-British. 
In this stage, China had a vague plan to maintain the “social and economic” system of Hong Kong 
unchanged for 50 years, without a clear vision for the outlook of Hong Kong’s political system. When 
Deng Xiaoping met delegations from Hong Kong on 22 and 23 June 1984, he explained: “After China’s 
resumption of sovereignty, Hong Kong’s social and economic systems would remain unchanged. It would 
 28
remain a free port and a financial centre.”38 Though China agreed to add a clause that the future legislature 
of Hong Kong should be “constituted by elections” in the final few days before the signature of the 
Declaration39, what China really meant was not direct elections in the Western sense. The plural form of 
elections means that the elections may include various forms.    
The former British ambassador from 1984 to 1988, Sir Richard Evans recalled that the Chinese 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping never wanted too much change in the political system of Hong Kong in 
the early 1980s. Evans said:  
 
Indeed I heard Deng Xiaoping make precisely this point, or rather develop this line of argument to 
Mr Edward Heath when he visited China just two years ago. We cannot go too fast, he said, with 
political reform until the standard of living and the standard of education in this country are both 
higher, perhaps a good deal higher than they are today.40  
 
The colonial system of Hong Kong was established under British rule. Changes needed to be made 
after China’s resumption of sovereignty. The Communist Party was concerned that the British would mess 
up Hong Kong before leaving the territory. In a meeting with a delegation from Hong Kong on 25 May 
1984, Deng Xiaoping instructed that the Chinese officials should be alert to British traps in Hong Kong. He 
said:  
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In sum, we should not close our eyes and allow the British to do whatever they want, in that case 
Hong Kong’s stability will not be guaranteed and we could fail to recover sovereignty over Hong 
Kong.41
 
In 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang wrote a letter to college students in Hong Kong promising that Hong 
Kong would enjoy full democracy after China’s resumption of sovereignty. The Chinese government did 
not voice strong objections to the Green Paper and White Papers of the British government which were 
designed to introduce a representative government in Hong Kong.  
The second stage is from 1985 to 1989 when China demanded the democratic reforms of Britain 
should converge with the Hong Kong Basic Law. Chinese leaders were deeply suspicious of British efforts 
to develop democracy in Hong Kong at the eleventh hour of its rule and spotted a conspiracy behind that. 
As early as November 1985 Beijing expressed the view that representative government was being 
introduced not for the purpose of preserving the framework needed for a capitalist system, but in order “to 
use democracy to resist communism”.42  
The establishment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee 
were efforts of the Chinese government to include Hong Kong people in drafting the most important law 
for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Chinese government did its best to include 
members from all sectors of society into the two committees.  
Hong Kong Governor David Wilson pointed out that the Chinese side believed that the British were 
trying to introduce democratic reforms in Hong Kong to preempt the Basic Law. He conceded that China 
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had the right to intervene in British plans and explained the line of Chinese thinking: 
 
The Chinese found it particularly difficult to accept that we should make a move on something as 
significant to them as direct elections at that time...They felt that they, as the future sovereign power, 
should have a say in these developments more directly because they were then discussing a thing 
called the Basic Law, which was to be the constitution of Hong Kong post 1997 and in which a key 
bit would be the structural Government, that is what the Legislative Council would look like. So they 
said, not unreasonably, look, what are you doing pre-empting this in a way that makes it difficult for 
us in drafting the Basic Law? Why should we agree?43  
  
    The Chinese were suspicious of the British intention in the democratic reforms in Hong Kong. They 
discuss the issue with the British through diplomatic channels. Official of the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Office Lu Ping sketched out that the Chinese officials adopted a tough stance to the British. The 
Chinese warned: “If you want to implement reforms unilaterally, and if your reforms would not converge 
with the Basic Law. Then we are sorry that after 1997, we would overthrow your reforms.” 44
China agreed that it did not object to the idea of democracy itself, but wanted gradual 
democratization. The bottom line was the political systems in Hong Kong should not copy the West, 
especially the “checks and balances” of the legislative, executive and judiciary systems. Deng Xiaoping 
argued: “I’m afraid it won’t suit Hong Kong to copy all this Western stuff.”45 According to the 
reminiscence of the Director of Xinhua-Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun, the official line at this time is that direct 
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elections should “take one step at a time” and evolve gradually.46
The third stage is after the Tiananmen incident. During this stage, China was sensitive about the 
British conspiracy to turn Hong Kong into a base against the mainland. This makes the development of 
democratization in Hong Kong all the more difficult. The worry for Hong Kong’s potential to be a Trojan 
Horse at China’s doorsteps was present well before the Tiananmen incident. As Deng remarked, “We 
permit voices in Hong Kong to call China and the CCP names. But if they take actions, and turn Hong 
Kong into a base against the mainland in the name of democracy, what shall we do? Then we must 
interfere.”47   
It was crystal clear through this process of evolution that the development of representative 
government was never part of China’s blueprint for Hong Kong. China is deeply concerned about the 
domino effects of the developments of democracy in Hong Kong on mainland China and was hesitant to 
permit more directly elected seats in the Legislative Council. In his testimony before the Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee, Hong Kong democrat and drafter of the Basic Law Szeto Wah reflected on his 
experience as head of a delegation to Beijing in September 1988. He met Chinese top leaders and asked for 
more directly elected seats in the Legislative Council.  
Szeto Wah’s offer was declined by Premier Li Peng. The Chinese leaders argued that if they allowed 
25 percent of the seats in the Legislative Council to be directly elected in 1988, then the Basic Law to be 
promulgated in 1990 would need a proportion bigger than 25 percent by direct election, and then they 
would be led by the nose. Li Peng replied, “We are not objecting to democracy; we want democracy as you 
do but we object to direct elections in 1988 which because of Hong Kong’s political system would lead the 
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Basic Law by the nose.”48 Zhao Ziyang echoed Li’s comment by informing the delegation that he was 
afraid of a snowball effect. 
The Tiananmen incident raised Chinese concerns that Hong Kong may get out of control and be 
turned into a base of subversion. Despite Chinese concerns about the growth of the influence of democrats 
in Hong Kong, the surging demands for democracy in Hong Kong and the need to break international 
isolation by reaching an agreement with the British made the Chinese willing to make concessions on the 
number of directly elected seats to the Legislative Council to the British in 1990. The two countries also 
reached a through train agreement that if the British reforms converge with the Basic Law, the legislature of 
Hong Kong elected in 1995 would pass the threshold of 1997.  
The fourth stage was the Sino-British negotiations after the arrival of Chris Patten. Chris Patten’s 
new style of governorship raised deep concerns of the Chinese government. His reform proposals were 
perceived as a violation of the earlier understandings between the two countries. The Chinese government 
was also concerned that Patten’s reform proposals would lead to the growth of the influence of democrats 
in Hong Kong. Since the start of the negotiations with the British, the Chinese had been warning the British 
that the Chinese would set up a new stove if the two countries failed to reach any agreement on future 
political system of Hong Kong. The Chinese government decided to disband the legislatures elected under 
the Patten proposal in 1997 after the breakup of bilateral negotiations in November 1993.  
Even since the Green Paper set the goal to develop a representative government “which is more 
directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong”49, Britain had been working on increasing Hong Kong’s 
democracy at the eleventh hour of its rule, and making efforts to persuade China to accept more democracy 
                                                        
48 Mr Szeto Wah, Minutes of Evidence, Foreign Affairs Select Committee: Hong Kong, 21 April 1989, p. 213. 
49 Hong Kong Government, Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong 
Kong, p. 4.  
 33
in Hong Kong. The British efforts to introduce democratic reforms in Hong Kong raised Chinese suspicions 
for three reasons.  
First of all, the Chinese were suspicious about the timing of the British reforms in Hong Kong and 
believed that the British government was introducing democratic reforms in Hong Kong only to create 
problems for the Chinese after 1997. For over a century of its colonial rule, Britain maintained an 
authoritarian system in Hong Kong with a concentration of power in the governor. Though efforts to 
change Hong Kong’s political systems started before the signature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 
1984, the landmark reforms of 1985 happened after the British wanted to retreat from the colony.   
The timing of the British reforms that they took place only after British decisions to retreat from the 
colony added to Chinese suspicions of British reforms in Hong Kong. A famous politician in Hong Kong, 
Elsie Tu questioned why British decided to change Hong Kong’s political system at the time. She argued: 
“The fact is that the situation did remain static for a further thirteen years: The question on everyone’s lips 
is, ‘Why now, after being denied democracy by the British for so long?’” 50
John Walden, a retired civil servant turned critic, called the democratization process “the grand 
illusion” a “Trojan Horse” to appease the people of Hong Kong, maintaining that the reforms amounted to 
little more than cosmetic democracy. He suggested that the purpose of the proposals was to ensure that the 
British Parliament would endorse the Joint Declaration, but not truly to introduce a democratic system for 
Hong Kong.51
Secondly, the Chinese government was concerned about the domino effects of the British reforms in 
Hong Kong. The best explanations of the Chinese leaders on the idea of democracy were made by Deng 
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Xiaoping. He made this point most forcefully to a senior Yugoslav communist Stefan Korosec:  
 
The democracy in capitalist societies is bourgeois democracy – in fact, it is the democracy of 
monopoly capitalists. It is no more than a system of multi-party elections and a balance of the three 
powers. Can we adopt this system? Ours is the system of the people’s congresses and people’s 
democracy under the leadership of the communist party. The greatest advantage of the socialist 
system is that when the central leadership makes a decision it is promptly implemented without 
interference from any other quarters.52
 
An article published in one of China’s leading newspapers in 1985 showed Chinese government’s 
concern on democratization in Hong Kong. It argued:  
 
Hong Kong’s economy is rather fragile and cannot stand much turbulence. If there is a sudden 
change in the political system in Hong Kong, accomplished by a violent upheaval in its social 
structure, the international society will lose faith in Hong Kong and refrain from making investment 
and engaging in commerce and finance in Hong Kong, and the city will soon suffer from an 
economic depression.53
 
China has apparently viewed these developments with concern; if too much “Western-style 
democracy” is seen to develop in Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s political style will be perceived as drifting 
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from that of China. China had a clear vision of the boundaries for the high autonomy of Hong Kong, which 
was never to allow Hong Kong to become a semi-autonomous state under Chinese rule.  
 The Chinese government believed that the highly efficient civil servant system of Hong Kong, its 
rule of law and its executive-led system were the key to the economic miracles of Hong Kong. These 
crucial ingredients to Hong Kong’s success should all be kept in place. The idea that a stable authoritarian 
political system of Hong Kong was good for its prosperity was also shared by British officials. In a House 
of Commons Debate in Hong Kong on 20 January 1988, British Conservative Member of Parliament 
Robert Adley argued that “Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability are based firmly and simply on autocracy, 
not democracy”.54
Thirdly, the Chinese government suspected that the British government’s arrangements would put the 
British in a much more advantageous situation in Hong Kong after China’s resumption of sovereignty. By 
introducing democracy to Hong Kong, the British wanted to win the hearts and minds of the people of 
Hong Kong, increase the de facto autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the 
Chinese government, and to keep some of the pro-British politicians in power.  
Lu Ping pointed out that according to the Joint Declaration the British were to transfer both 
sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong to China. They should not transfer the power directly to the 
Hong Kong people. The Chinese believed that the Chinese government was responsible for administering 
Hong Kong, afterwards the central government would entrust the power to the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. 
      Lu Ping revealed that the British government was introducing democratic reforms to Hong Kong in 
efforts to control the territory after 1997:  
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 You should not transfer the power directly to Hong Kong in private. It wanted to do it to create a fait 
accompli to undermine the power of the central government. The idea of the British was to extend 
British influence in Hong Kong to the maximum after 1997.”55  
 
Even within the transition period, the negative impacts of British reforms were shown. The limited 
democracy, through indirect Legco elections, was by 1989 having an impact. A senior official remarked: 
“Legco members are getting sharper, more critical. Unfortunately, they are also getting involved in details, 
which should not be their business. For example, they want a say in not only whether to buy a computer for 
a department, but which brand of computer should be bought.”56 He pointed out that this detailed 
supervision opened the door to corruption. 
      
III. Special Status of Xinhua-Hong Kong   
1. The History of Xinhua-Hong Kong  
Within the Chinese policy-making process, the Hong Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency was 
an important institution in Hong Kong which played a crucial role in Chinese decisions on democratization 
in Hong Kong. In an interview with CCTV on 27 December 2008, former Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou 
Nan, former director of Xinhua-Hong Kong explained the function of Xinhua-Hong Kong in the Chinese 
policy-making apparatus. He said: “The status of Xinhua-Hong Kong was similar to a provincial Party 
Committee.”57 The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong were also the directors of the Hong Kong and Macao 
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Work Committee of the Communist Party, under the direct leadership of the central government.   
The Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency was established in 1947. The CCP used this 
branch as its vehicle of liaison with the local authorities. On 16 January 1947, the Central Committee 
decided to establish a Hong Kong Central Branch Bureau (zhonggong zhongyang xianggang fenju) directly 
under its leadership. Formally set up that June, the Branch Bureau came under the operational control of the 
Shanghai Central Bureau. The Branch Bureau established a Hong Kong Work Committee (xiganggang 
gongzuo weiyuanhui).58  
After the founding of the PRC, the Hong Kong branch had a quasi-consular role in liaising between 
the Beijing and Hong Kong governments, it supervised the operations and operatives of PRC state organs 
and united front organizations in the colony, it controlled major pro-Beijing newspapers and attempted to 
control state trading corporations and mainland-based companies.59  
Because Britain rejected the Chinese demand to set up an official mission in Hong Kong, the local 
branch of Xinhua acted as China’s de facto envoy since 1949. The first director of Xinhua-Hong Kong is 
the famous Chinese diplomat Qiao Guanhuan, his successor was Huang Zuomei. In the mid-1950s, the 
Hong Kong-Macao Work Team again reorganized into the CCP Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee, a 
further promotion organizationally and politically, for the institution, with an expanded setup and staff. Its 
responsibilities, however, remained the same.  
By this time, the Politburo had closed down its regional branches, so the new Hong Kong-Macao 
Work Committee was put under the direct leadership of the Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) of the Central 
Committee headed by Chen Yi, concurrently vice premier and foreign minister, with Liao Chengzhi as 
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deputy head. The FAO had a Hong Kong-Macao Department, which established direct connections with 
Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee in Hong Kong. Above the FAO was the Central Foreign Affairs 
Leading Group, led by Premier Zhou Enlai, with Chen Yi as one of its members. Henceforth, as the Hong 
Kong-Macao Work Committee was transformed into a party organ stationed in Hong Kong by the FAO, all 
policy instructions and briefings on international and domestic issues were handed down directly from the 
central FAO Working Committee. 60  
In 1955 China sought permission to set up a Foreign Affairs Envoy’s Office (waijiao tepaiyuan 
banshiju) in Hong Kong, and when the British turned down their request, the CCP turned to the Hong Kong 
branch of the Xinhua News Agency. Although the party headquartered its newly created Hong Kong and 
Macao Work Committee in Guangzhou, this committee dispatched a Work Group to Hong Kong and 
located it inside the Xinhua Branch. 61
In 1957, probably in response to the 1956 riots in Hong Kong and the CCP’s perception that Hong 
Kong was being used as a base for KMT activities, the CCP began to exercise more direct control over 
Hong Kong affairs. Under a new secretary, Liang Weilin, the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee 
moved to Hong Kong where it continued to operate inside the Xinhua branch. 62
At the height of the Cultural Revolution, radicals in Beijing used the Cultural Revolution Small 
Group to take power from the Politburo. They abolished the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office and 
replaced it with a Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Leading Small Group. Most of the original Hong Kong 
and Macao Group within the Staff Office were transferred to the Western Europe Bureau of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which took on more of the work of handling Hong Kong matters. Even as late as 1997, this 
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bureau was still charged with handling Hong Kong and Macao “masses and visits” work. 63
In 1977, the CCP established at first secretly, a new State Council Kong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office. Five years later, the CCP upgraded the Work Committee in Hong Kong to provincial level status, 
and established a Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with 
the foreign governments involved.64
 
Chart 2.1 Chinese Hong Kong Policy Apparatus after 1978 
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Before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the Chinese Hong Kong decision-making making 
structure had three major deficiencies, Beijing’s lack of understanding of the situation in Hong Kong, 
confusing chain of command and disordered information channels. These flaws in the Chinese Hong Kong 
policy-making apparatus hindered effective policy-making and left loopholes for the directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong to explore to influence the final policy output.  
  
2. Deficiency in the Decision-making Structure 
     The Hong Kong policy-making apparatus has three major deficiencies. First of all, as the political 
scene of the colony was ever changing, it was difficult for the central government to assess the political 
situation in Hong Kong. Secondly, the Chinese government did not have a single organ overseeing Hong 
                                                        
63 Ibid., p. 751.  
64 Ibid..  
 40
Kong affairs, resulting in a confusing chain of command in the policy-making apparatus. Thirdly, the 
information received in Beijing on the Hong Kong issue sometimes came from disordered channels of 
communication.  
(1) Difficulty for Beijing to Assess the Political Situation    
After the British initiated democratic reforms in Hong Kong, the political scene of the colony was 
ever changing, making it difficult for the central government to assess the political situation in Hong Kong. 
The Hong Kong issue was a matter of great strategic importance for China. As a result, there can be no 
major policy decisions or changes over Hong Kong without the top leaders’ approval. In structural terms, 
this means the approval of Communist Party Politburo’s Standing Committee. In practice, questions about 
Hong Kong policy are usually first referred to the party’s Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. 
This is the main organization for collecting, collating and coordinating the views of the principal party and 
government leaders involved in the conduct of foreign relations.65  
As it is impossible for the top Chinese leaders to follow the new developments in Hong Kong politics 
far away in Beijing, they were heavily reliant on the reports by the organs in charge of the Hong Kong issue. 
To make situations worse, some of the top leaders had little understandings of what makes Hong Kong an 
economic miracle. Even Deng Xiaoping, the initiator of the reforms and opening up policy and father of 
“one country, two systems” was really ignorant of how capitalist systems work. In his meeting with 
Thatcher in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping asked Thatcher to take measures to stop money leaving Hong 
Kong. Thatcher found that Deng had little understanding of the legal and political conditions of capitalism 
and tried to explain to Deng that measures of economic control would undermine investors’ confidence and 
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that would be the end of Hong Kong.66 It was clear that Deng still perceived Britain as an imperialist power 
which plundered the wealth of the Old Summer Place in the Second Opium War of 1860s. And his biggest 
concern was that Britain may take away all the investments in Hong Kong, which was impossible in a free 
market. 
The discrepancy between Beijing’s assessment and the real situation in Hong Kong had been present 
ever since the beginning of the negotiations. During the negotiations on the transfer of sovereignty, the 
leaders in Beijing believed all the Hong Kong people were great supporters of “one country, two systems”, 
which was far from the real picture. In June 1984, three senior Hong Kong Legislators, Chung Sze-yuen, 
Lydia Dunn, and Lee Quo-wei went to Beijing to discuss the Hong Kong issue with Deng Xiaoping. Chung 
told Deng that the Hong Kong people were deeply worried about Hong Kong’s future. Deng brushed aside 
their arguments. Back in Hong Kong the three prominent Hong Kong officials gave a press conference in 
Hong Kong to express their frustration. They declared, “Director Deng does not believe we are expressing 
the views of the Hong Kong people. Director Deng does not believe there is a crisis of confidence in Hong 
Kong.”67  
Deng Xiaoping had a keen interest in the Hong Kong issue. He once said that it was one of the only 
two things which were undertaken by him throughout 1984.68 If Deng’s understanding of Hong Kong 
lagged so much behind the reality in Hong Kong, then the understandings of other leaders without such 
concentrated attention on the issue would be even less. Some of members of the Politburo like Chen Yun 
never set their foot on Hong Kong in their lives. In 1988, Xu Jiatun admitted that had he not lived and 
worked in Hong Kong for four years, he would have had the same ignorant views of capitalism as his 
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comrades on the mainland.69
This problem of the central government’s limited understanding of Hong Kong had been found out 
by the British negotiators as well. In a testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1989, British 
ambassador Richard Evans revealed that his was impressed by the understandings of the lesser Chinese 
officials in charge of the Hong Kong issue on the situation in Hong Kong. He said he was impressed by Li 
Hou and Lu Ping’s deep understanding of Hong Kong and continued, “What I have said about Li Hou, Lu 
Ping, I would extend to Zhou Nan and Ji Pengfei and many others, but it is perhaps not so true of some of 
the Central Committee.”70  
As the top leaders in the Politburo were ill-informed of the situation in Hong Kong, they were 
heavily reliant on the reports by the policy organs in charge of the Hong Kong issue to understand what 
was happening in Hong Kong, a key policy organ among them was Xinhua-Hong Kong. If the reports by 
the directors do not reflect accurately the situation in Hong Kong, it was likely for the top leaders to make 
erroneous assessments of the situation in Hong Kong. In this way the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong had 
the power to make little twists in their reports on the situation in Hong Kong to sway the final decisions on 
Hong Kong’s democracy.   
(2) Confusing Chain of Command   
The Chinese government did not have a single organ overseeing Hong Kong affairs, resulting in a 
confusing chain of command in the policy-making apparatus. Before the handover of Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong is neither a wholly foreign nor a wholly domestic matter for China. The successive Chinese 
governments after the Qing Dynasty always held that Hong Kong was part of Chinese territory. As a result, 
the Chinese government did not create an organ that deal with it directly. The issue was left to a very small 
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group of officials from the Hong Kong and Macao Office of the State Council, Xinhua-Hong Kong and the 
Foreign Ministry. Some of the Chinese officials in charge of the Hong Kong issue like Zhou Nan from the 
Foreign Ministry and Lu Ping from the State Council stayed on the scene throughout the negotiations 
process.   
From the perspective of the Central Government in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping’s personal control of 
Hong Kong question meant that other bureaucracies did not become directly involved. It also had the effect 
of limiting the initiative that those charged with administering the policy would display. The only official to 
display initiative was Xu Jiatun, head of Xinhua-Hong Kong from 1983 until 1989. As a former Party 
secretary of Jiangsu Province, he was a senior member of the Central Committee and was trusted by the 
Party hierarchy. His initiative took the form of cultivating the different groups in Hong Kong, while at the 
same time holding Beijing’s interests in limiting the democratization in Hong Kong to the constraints of the 
yet to be completed Basic Law.71  
Because of the lack of an organ directly in charge of the Hong Kong issue, the separation of powers 
between the government and party organs led to rivalries of power between the directors of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong and directors of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council. The Hong Kong and 
Macao Office enjoys ministerial status and its director is in effect a minister, but the Office is not directly 
connected with any of the major bureaucratic systems centered on the State Council. It is in practice under 
the authority of the Prime Minister. The Director of the Office is not a member of the important Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Party and States.72  
The Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong is the 
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real CCP organ under the cover of Xinhua-Hong Kong. Xinhua-Hong Kong attained full provincial status 
in 1983, and thus holds the same bureaucratic rank as a ministry. Its head or secretary holds the pubic office 
of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency and is the PRC’s de facto representative in Hong Kong. 
Although the three institutions have the same bureaucratic rank, their relative importance in the 
policy-making process has varied. This is partly because a department’s political clout also depends on the 
personal standing of its head. 73  
Since 1978, Liao Chengzhi had been in charge of the Hong Kong issue and headed both the party and 
government organs. After his death, bureaucratic conflict emerged when Ji Pengfei and Xu Jiatun headed 
two coequal organs using different channels of communicating with the center. Hong Kong University 
Professor John Burns, citing an unspecified internal source, writes:  
 
According to what was probably the Hong Kong Macao office’s 1987 submission to the State 
Organization and Establishment Committee in preparation for the 1980-1990 reorganization of the 
State Council: relations between the Hong Kong and Macao Office and the Work Committee are not 
smooth. The Work Committee is a provincial-level organization that comes directly under the 
General Office of the Central Committee. The General Office also has given the Hong Kong Macao 
Affairs Office [certain tasks] to manage, [which results in] informally beating around the bush. The 
Work Committee is dispatched to Hong Kong by the Central Committee…while the Hong Kong and 
Macao Affairs Office is an organ of the State Council. Much of the work of the Work Committee 
depends on government departments to be accomplished. [Of course], the major policies on Hong 
Kong questions are determined by the center [Politburo]. This is a problem of relations between 
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party and government (unpublished manuscript, 1993). 74
 
The proliferation of PRC organizations in Hong Kong and their practice of reporting directly to 
Beijing mean that the Work Committee cannot always function effectively as the coordinating umbrella 
body. This lack of a clear chain of command has created confusion, friction and often rivalries among 
various agencies and officials at different levels. In his memoirs, Xu recalls that his deputy secretary, Li 
Jusheng, who belonged to a different Xitong but officially represented the Work Committee in the 
Sino-British negotiations of 1982-1984, kept him in the dark about the negotiations. Xu had to get the 
information from meetings in Beijing and through his own xitong. His memoirs confirm that rivalries 
among cadres responsible for Hong Kong could be intense, bitter and, in his case, actually instrumental in 
bringing about his own downfall in 1990. Policy recommendations for Hong Kong thus sometimes reflect 
the senior cadres’ rivalries and power struggles rather than their best advice.75  
(3) Disordered Channels of Information  
The information received in Beijing on the Hong Kong issue sometimes came from disordered 
channels of communication. The lack of an effective central coordinating body in Hong Kong makes it 
possible for individual cadres to work for several agencies separately without informing their superiors in 
Beijing. Thus, what the PRC government believes to be collaborative evidence from different intelligence 
sources sometimes comes from the same informant who “supplies intelligence to different offices and takes 
money from them” separately.” Competition and rivalries among various agencies and senior cadres mean 
that they are reluctant to contradict views held by their superiors unless their own interests were at stake. 
With little first-hand experience of present-day Hong Kong, the top leaders are generally a lot less well 
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informed than they realize. Given the concentration of decision-making power in their hands, top leaders 
with an insufficient or poor understanding of the situation in Hong Kong sometimes make policies on the 
basis of patchy information. 76
In February 1990, Xu Jiatun was replaced by Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, indicating that 
Beijing may wish to downgrade the Work Committee to reassert more central control.77 The party has 
continued to exercise leadership over the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office through the party’s Central 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, headed by Premier Li Peng (who in 1990 was concurrently a 
Politburo Standing Committee member.) 78 It was revealed that there was a rivalry between Zhou Nan and 
Lu Ping.  
Due to the three key deficiencies in the decision-making structure, directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong 
occupied a key position in the Chinese Hong Kong policy-making apparatus. At they were the main 
supplier of the situation in Hong Kong to help the central government evaluate how to balance the pace of 
democratization in Hong Kong and the priority of maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. This 
made it possible for them to influence crucial Chinese decision on Hong Kong’s democratization through 
their reports to Beijing and their interactions with different political groups in Hong Kong.  
 
IV. Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong’s Room of Maneuver 
Within the Chinese Hong Kong policy-making process, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong had large 
room of maneuver through interacting between Beijing and Hong Kong. Their British conspiracy theories, 
reports on the political situation in Hong Kong and control of the party mouthpiece were three important 
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means for them to influence Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization. British success or failure 
can only be explained through analyzing the role of these officials in the Chinese Hong Kong 
policy-making process.    
1. Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong’s Room of Maneuver   
As the top CCP officials in Hong Kong, directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong played a crucial role in the 
policy-making process, both at the policy-making and the policy-implementation levels. At the 
policy-making level, directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong actively participated in the debates on Hong Kong’s 
democratization by providing Beijing reports on the latest political situation in Hong Kong, which was an 
important source of decision-making at the top. At the policy-implementation level, directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong were the loyal implementers of orders from the top.  
In Chinese Hong Kong policy-making, the role of the directors of Xinhua Hong Kong changed with 
their personal status within the CCP and their connections with top leaders. Known to the public as 
directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong, these officials were actually the director of the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Work Committee of the Communist Party. As the top CCP officials in Hong Kong, they were called 
the Chinese “shadow governors” by the media. These shadow governors were at the top of the pyramid in 
Hong Kong as nominally all of the CCP agencies in Hong Kong were under the direction of the Hong Kong 
and Macao Work Committee of the Communist Party before China’s resumption of sovereignty in 1997.  
The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong played a crucial role in shaping Chinese positions on Hong 
Kong’s democratization as they were in charge of reporting their assessment of the political situation in 
Hong Kong, while in Hong Kong they were the implementers of the guidelines from Beijing and interacted 
with different political groups in Hong Kong. In the period under study, the Chinese officials in charge of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong were Wang Kuang from 1979 to 1983, Xu Jiatun from 1983 to 1990 and Zhou Nan 
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from 1990 to 1997. 
(1) Reports to Beijing  
From the hierarchies of the Communist Party’s Hong Kong policy-making apparatus, the directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong were ranks lower below the CCP Politburo to make direct reports to top leaders. Direct 
communications with top leaders was possible through informal channels and at a time when Deng 
Xiaoping was very interested in the Hong Kong issue and willing to hear reports from officials dealing with 
the issue. Xu Jiatun was able to report to members of the Politburo at the famous seaside resort of Beidahe. 
Xu Jiatun recorded in his memoirs several times when he reported directly to Deng.  
The most efficient way for the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong to change Chinese decisions is 
through reporting directly to the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. In all the four cases the paramount 
leader Deng had the final say on the Hong Kong issue. Xu Jiatun was the first secretary of Jiangsu Province 
and had passed retirement age before his nomination as the director of Xinhua-Hong Kong. Due to his high 
status in the Communist Party, Xu Jiatun could directly report to the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, 
Chinese Party Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. He also had access to Yang Shangkun.  
Xu Jiatun could reach out directly to the top leaders because of his high personal status within the 
CCP. Neither Xu’s predecessor Wang Kuang nor his successor Zhou Nan had the same direct access to top 
Chinese leaders. Zhou Nan was a career diplomat who was an aid to the Liao Chengzhi when the small 
group headed by Liao was in charge of drafting the idea of “one country, two systems” before the formal 
negotiations started in 1982. Though he had the position of a deputy Foreign Minister, he could not report 
directly to Deng Xiaoping.  
Another way to reach to the top leaders is through making reports to the Foreign Affairs Leading 
Small Group. In his memoirs, Xu wrote about one of his reports to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
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Group. In 1983, the Chinese government decided to upgrade Xinhua-Hong Kong to make the best of Hong 
Kong for China’s modernization drive. This was at a time when the Working Committee on Hong Kong 
and Macao Affairs, the party organ under the cover of Xinhua-Hong Kong CCP was under the direct 
leadership of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of China. After Xu fled to the United States, 
Xinhua-Hong Kong was downgraded and put under the leadership of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office of the State Council, which was roughly equal in status to Xinhua-Hong Kong in Xu’s time.  
Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong could also influence Chinese decision-making through making 
reports at meetings on the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs. The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs meetings 
were irregular meetings held between the heads of different institutions in the CCP, like Directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong and Directors of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council. These 
meetings were held to inform the top officials from different systems in China in charge of the Hong Kong 
issue the instructions from the top and to discuss the latest developments in Hong Kong.   
A senior official in Xinhua-Hong Kong, Wong Man-fong revealed, in many other countries, a policy 
decision is made after thorough discussions and examinations, but in China the most democratic process for 
reaching a decision is when “the heads of the heads come together”, i.e. when the leaders sit together and 
come up with a decision. Only after the decision is made will the heads instruct their people to examine its 
feasibility.79 Such a decision-making mechanism made it possible for an official actively advocating an idea 
to win the consent from others and change the directions of policy.  
In sum, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong shaped Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s 
democratization mainly through their reports to Beijing, including reports to top leaders, reports to the 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group and reports at the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Work Meeting. As 
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they were the top Chinese officials based in Hong Kong who were really informed of the situation there 
and in close contacts with different political groups, how they select information and their personal ideas on 
Hong Kong’s democratization could shape the assessment of the central government on the situation in 
Hong Kong. 
(2) United Front Work in Hong Kong   
A major task for all the shadow governors in Hong Kong is to conduct united front work. The term 
was coined by Chairman Mao Zedong, who argued that the communist party should unite all the people 
who can be united to achieve the final liberation of the country. Later on such a word was imbued with 
some negative meaning as a method to cheat people to support the Communist Party. United Front Work is 
one of the major tasks for the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong, as winning the hearts and minds of the Hong 
Kong people was so important for the Communist Party. Through establishing good relations with famous 
people in Hong Kong, the directors could further convince the Chinese government by quoting the names 
of these well-renowned people in Beijing to substantiate their points.  
     As the top representative of the Chinese government in Hong Kong, the directors of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong were heavy weight political figures with great influence on the politics of Hong Kong. Both Xu 
Jiatun and Zhou Nan, the two key politicians during the period under study had ministerial status in the 
CCP. Xu was the former Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province. Xinhua-Hong Kong was upgraded to 
ministerial level after his nomination. Zhou Nan was the deputy Foreign Minister of China when he was 
nominated as the director of Xinhua-Hong Kong in 1990.  
     The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong had the mission to explain the policy of the central government 
to Hong Kong. They were able to manipulate the politics in Hong Kong through explaining Beijing’s 
instructions to politicians in Hong Kong. As politicians by nature like to veer with the wind, sometimes the 
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directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong were able to exert great influence on the decisions of key politicians in 
Hong Kong. Since the start of the negotiations, Hong Kong people had different opinions on the issue of 
democratization. The society gradually passed through a stage which started with dominating political 
apathy to a time when the society fragmented into three groups, the conservatives, moderates and 
democrats. How the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong handled their relations with the different political 
groups in Hong had an impact on China’s policy of Hong Kong’s democratization. During the drafting of 
the Basic Law, the central government left the business to be settled by votes in the drafting committee. Xu 
Jiatun was able to shape the final output in the Draft Basic Law on the political structure of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region through interacting with Hong Kong drafters.   
     The key to understand the united front work of the shadow governors is to evaluate how they reach 
out to people with different views on Hong Kong’s democratization in Hong Kong. At the time when Xu 
Jiatun was nominated, the Chinese government divided the society of Hong Kong into the proletariat and 
the bourgeois. At the time of the negotiations of the Joint Declaration, most of the business people 
supported the system under British rule, as the system was an “elite democracy” that guarantees the best 
interests of the upper class of the society. Xu was instructed by Liao Chengzhi that to maintain the capitalist 
system in Hong Kong, the future Hong Kong SAR should be ruled by the bourgeois. After Zhou Nan’s 
nomination, class would not be the best criterion to distinguish among the different groups in Hong Kong. 
With the further development of democratic movement in Hong Kong, Hong Kong society further 
fragmented into different groups according to their idea on the pace of democratization.  
    
2. Effective Means to Influence Policy-making     
The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong had three effective means to influence policy-making at their 
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disposal: British conspiracy theories, reports from Hong Kong and the party mouthpiece. As senior cadres 
who had emerged to a high status in the intricacies of Chinese politics, the shadow governors were highly 
intelligent Chinese officials and masters of communications with the top leadership. They knew the deepest 
fears of Beijing on the situation in Hong Kong, and they knew how to make compelling cases so that their 
ideas could be accepted by their superiors in Beijing.  
It was interesting that though Xu Jiatun was labeled the “ultra-rightist’ after he fled to the United 
States in 1990 and Zhou Nan was called the “ultra-leftist” in the Hong Kong media, both of them held a 
conservative view on democratization in Hong Kong. In the case studies both of them were arguing for a 
much slower pace of democratization in Hong Kong than the officials from the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Office of the State Council like Ji Pengfei and Lu Ping. They effectively used three means to 
influence Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization.  
(1) British Conspiracy Theories   
Conspiracy theories were the most effective means for the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong to sway 
Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization. The overwhelming concerns of the Chinese 
government on Hong Kong’s democratization were that changes to the political system in Hong Kong 
should not harm its prosperity and stability. In addition, Hong Kong should not become a base to spread the 
virus of democracy to the mainland and threaten the communist regime. With decades of experience in 
Chinese politics, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong were good at using British conspiracies theories to 
persuade other Chinese officials through their analysis of the situation in Hong Kong and change Chinese 
decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization. 
Conspiracy theories sell as the Chinese top leaders were suspicious of intentions of the British in 
Hong Kong throughout the negotiations. They perceived Britain as a crafty imperialist power whose record 
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of retreats from the colonies always planted seeds of chaos in its former colonies. In such an environment, 
those who could spot British conspiracies earlier than their peers would be perceived as alert and insightful 
by their superiors. While others stressing cooperation with the British may risk the danger of being 
criticized for being too soft. Through seeing through a British conspiracy, the cookers of conspiracy 
theories could win the appreciation from the top for defending the Chinese interests to the utmost and 
saving the Chinese government from falling into the traps of the British.  
 Both Xu Jiatun and Zhou Nan were good at preaching British conspiracies theories in their reports 
to the central government. And interestingly they were arguing along the same lines, the following three 
conspiracy theories reflected the important concerns of the Chinese government:  
● Messing up Hong Kong conspiracy: The Chinese decision-makers were suspicious that Britain 
may mess up Hong Kong by and leave China an empty shell that is worthless.  
● Peaceful evolution conspiracy: The Chinese decision-makers were suspicious that Britain may 
turn Hong Kong into a base of subversion against China and spread the virus of democracy 
into the mainland. 
● Hong Kong independence conspiracy: Britain’s democratic reforms in Hong Kong were 
characterized as a dirty British scheme to maintain its influence on Hong Kong politics. 
Through spreading democracy, the British could increase the autonomy of Hong Kong, 
maintain their influence on Hong Kong politics after their retreat and make Hong Kong too 
autonomous that it may became a de facto independent state.  
The triumph of conspiracies theories would lead to Chinese intervention in Hong Kong’s 
democratization, and a failure for the British to win Chinese concessions at the negotiating table.  
(2) Reports from Hong Kong  
 54
A second means of the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong to influence the decisions on democratic 
reforms in Hong Kong was through their reports from Hong Kong. A rival organ in charge of the Hong 
Kong issue of Xinhua-Hong Kong in Beijing is the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State 
Council. In Xu’s time the Office was on a par with the status of Xinhua-Hong Kong while in Zhou Nan’s 
time it was above the Xinhua-Hong Kong. In the competitions for the ears of top leaders, directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong enjoyed a great advantage due to its status as the only organ in the Hong Kong 
policy-making apparatus that was based in Hong Kong.  
The best way for directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong to convince top leaders to accept their suggestions 
is to combine their suggestions with their fresh accounts from Hong Kong. As the big business in Hong 
Kong had always held a negative view of the democratization in Hong Kong, they could easily quote the 
views of these well-renowned figures in Beijing. They came to Hong Kong to observe the political situation 
in Hong Kong and to win support by most of the political groups in Beijing. Their best way to convince the 
Chinese leaders is through their reports from Hong Kong. By beautifully weaving together the evidence 
that was so easy for them to collect through their massive bureaucratic organ in Hong Kong with these 
sensational conspiracy theories that arouse the worst fears of the Chinese government, the directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong could easily persuade their superiors in Beijing into believing their conspiracy theories.   
A good example of the power of reports from Hong Kong was during the negotiations in 1993 on 
Hong Kong’s electoral reforms in 1994-1995. The two sides were both committed to the talks. The talks 
lasted 170 hours in 17 rounds from April to November 1993.80 The two sides were on the verge of signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding in November. After the British added one more point to the Memorandum, 
Zhou Nan’s reports that more concessions would mean the British would control all the grassroots political 
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structures in Hong Kong convinced the Chinese leaders that they should end the negotiations with Britain. 
So an account by Zhou Nan which exaggerated the influence of democrats in Hong Kong led to the 
breakup of Sino-British negotiations.  
(3) The Party Mouthpiece 
The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong were in charge of the party mouthpiece in Hong Kong. The 
Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch can be divided into the small branch and the big branch. The 
small branch belongs to the Xinhua News Agency in Beijing, which was purely a new agency. The big 
branch was the official Chinese presentation in Hong Kong, which was the Hong Kong and Macao Work 
Committee of the CCP. The most important title of directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong was directors of the 
Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee of the CCP.  
The big branch of Xinhua-Hong Kong under the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong was in charge of 
the major leftwing newspapers in Hong Kong. The chief editor of the famous leftwing newspaper, Wei Wei 
Po, Kam Yiu-yu, was the party secretary of the Press and Publicity Division of Xinhua-Hong Kong from 
1950 till the 1980s. He revealed that under his direction were newspapers and periodicals which took a 
political stand favouring the CCP, such as Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao, Xin Wan Pao, Shang Pao, Zhou Mu 
Pao, and later Jin Pao. His chief responsibilities were to relay to these institutions guidelines and policies 
for propaganda work in Hong Kong and overseas set by the party central authorities and to supervise their 
implementation.81  
With so many influential newspapers under his direct control, it was all too convenient for the 
directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong to wage propaganda wars against any people designated as the enemies of 
the CCP, like democrats Martin Lee Chu-ming and Szeto Wah for their “subversive” actions in the 
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Tiananmen incident or the last Governor Chris Patten when he was labeled “sinner of a millennium” in 
1993. It was not hard to imagine these witty politicians asking their staffs to write up articles that reflected 
his own political ideas in these influential newspapers and quote them as evidence that reflected the public 
opinion in Hong Kong to back up their ideas in reports to Beijing.  
 
V. Conclusion  
     This chapter tries to put Chinese decisions on democratization in Hong Kong in perspective. It first 
traces past policies of the communist party on Hong Kong’s democratization from the decision to maintain 
the status quo before the liberation of the country in 1949, to the policy of making the best of Hong Kong 
as a strategic asset in the East-West conflict, an economic asset for acquiring foreign currency and a 
window toward the world.  
     The chapter then shed light on Chinese perspectives on Hong Kong’s democratization. It shows the 
changes in Chinese stance on Hong Kong’s democratization and the reasons for Chinese suspicions on 
British democratic reforms, including the Chinese concern about the secret agenda of the British and the 
Chinese worries about the repercussions of democratization in Hong Kong to the mainland. The chapter 
concludes by specifying the role of the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong on the Chinese policies on 
democratization in Hong Kong.   
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Chapter Three: Sino-British Negotiations on the 
Transfer of Sovereignty  
 
I. Background  
At the start of Sino-British negotiations, there were very limited demands for democratic reforms in 
Hong Kong. At that time, Hong Kong was viewed as an anomaly to the third wave of democratization, with 
economic affluence but limited calls for democracy. The British maintained an authoritarian system in 
Hong Kong for over a century. The successive governors in Hong Kong took a very cautious attitude 
towards developing Hong Kong’s democracy for three reasons.  
The first is the concern about Chinese intervention in the reforms. Introduction of democracy usually 
leads to independence after Britain’s retreat from its colonies. Such a model did not suit Hong Kong as the 
Chinese government always perceived Hong Kong as part of its territory and would never tolerate Hong 
Kong to be separated from the mainland. As the British minister of state Judith Hart explained in February 
1967:  
 
Hong Kong is in a completely different position from any of our other Colonies. For international 
reasons alone, there are problems in planning for the usual orderly progress towards self-government. 
Because of Hong Kong’s particular relationship with China, it would not be possible to think of the 
normal self government and not possible, therefore, to consider an elected Legislative Council.82
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Facing criticism that he did not work hard enough in promoting Hong Kong’s democratization in his 
governorship from 1971 to 1982, Governor MacLehose stressed that the negative response from China was 
the overwhelming concern. He argued that “somehow the democratic process would insulate Hong Kong 
against China”.83  
Another consideration was that introducing democracy would aggravate the discords between the 
pro-Communist Party and pro-Kuomintang groups in Hong Kong. Before the 1980s, the dominant 
ideological cleavage in Hong Kong was between the pro-Chinese Communist Party groups and the 
pro-Kuomintang groups. The most serous social conflicts in Hong Kong in postwar Hong Kong, like the 
1956 and 1967 riots, were instigated by pro-Kuomintang and pro-CCP masses.84 In the circumstances at the 
time, democratic reforms could only cause instability in Hong Kong and undermine its prosperity.  
The third consideration was the political systems in Hong Kong were well-functioning, and the 
demands for democracy were relatively low. Most people in Hong Kong arrived as refugees to escape the 
political turbulence in the mainland. They did not have a passion for politics and wanted only to live a 
serene and happy life. The British established a highly-efficient executive-led political system in Hong 
Kong, which guaranteed the rule of law, freedom and laissez-faire capitalism. Britain’s successful running 
of Hong Kong was one of the factors for Hong Kong’s economic miracle. The political apathy of the people 
of Hong Kong was best characterized by a legislative councilor, “China is the sea, and Hong Kong is a life 
boat. Those who have climbed into the life boat don’t want to rock it.”85
Since the early 1980s Hong Kong’s political and institutional reforms had begun at the district level. 
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According to the White Paper entitled A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong, issued in January 
1981, Hong Kong was divided into 18 districts and 122 constituencies.86 The White Paper stipulated that 
directly elected District Board (DB) members would advise officials on government policy in order “to 
provide a better forum for public consultation and participation at the district level”.87
Britain set up District Boards in 1982 as a laboratory for democratization. The franchise was 
extended to all Hong Kong residents aged 21 or above. Elections was held in March 1982 in the New 
Territories and in the following September in the urban areas.88 But these small steps did not effect overall 
change in Hong Kong’s political system. Until 1982 the only elections held in Hong Kong were those for 
the Urban Council, and the franchise was open only to those qualified by education, wealth or membership 
of one of the professions.89 As of 1984, there were no elected members in the legislative or executive 
council, the two key policy-making organs in Hong Kong. At the time all appointees to these councils have 
been directly nominated by the governor.  
     During the Sino-British negotiations, the Hong Kong people had little faith in the Communist regime 
in the mainland. In May 1983, legislator in both the Executive and Legislative Councils Allen Lee Peng-fei 
led a delegation to Beijing. Their petition stated frankly, “We believe that keeping the status quo in Hong 
Kong is the best guarantee to maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.”90 At the beginning 
Hong Kong people had little faith on whether the formula of “one country, two systems” would work. 
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In July 1984, the Hong Kong government published a Green Paper on the Further Development of 
Representative Government in Hong Kong. The Green Paper which clarified the British goal to develop a 
representative government in Hong Kong. It set the goal “to develop progressively a system of government 
the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the views 
of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong”.91
The Green Paper assessed that it would be too early to introduce direct elections to Hong Kong. It 
stated: “Direct elections [to the Legco] would run the risk of a swift introduction adversarial politics, and 
would introduce an element of instability at a crucial time”.92 After the release of the Green paper in July 
1984, some business leaders openly opposed the direct elections to the Legislative Council which the Green 
Paper had proposed. A few even went so far as to indicate that they would prefer Beijing’s appointees to 
those directly elected to administer Hong Kong.93 A Moderate Legislative Councilor Chan Yin-lun argued 
that a gradual approach was the right thing: “As Hong Kong has already entered the transitional period, the 
Government can not afford to commit any mistakes. Therefore, its ‘conservative’ and ‘cautious’ proposals 
are well justified.”94
Against the background of little demands for democracy in Hong Kong, the Chinese and the British 
started their discussions on Hong Kong’s future, the case traces how the Chinese government made the 
important decision to practice “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong after its resumption of sovereignty, 
how it decided to confer the British the full power to administer Hong Kong before 1997 and how the 
British skillfully inserted the clause on elections in the Joint Declaration and revealed how the Chinese 
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government made these crucial decisions on Hong Kong’s future.  
 
II. Birth of One Country, Two Systems 
1. Initial Contacts between China and Britain 
Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong started with the meeting of the Hong Kong 
Governor MacLehose with the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in March 1979. The British were 
trying to seize the opportunity of the reforms and opening up of China to force the Chinese to sign an 
agreement to allow continued British rule of the territory after 1997. The pushy attitude of the British 
forced the Chinese to apply the concept of “one country, two systems” to Hong Kong, which was designed 
originally for peaceful reunification of Taiwan.  
Before 1979 Hong Kong’s future was not on the agenda of either Britain or China. In the words of 
British Foreign Secretary Howe, “in both places the problem had been set aside for being too difficult”.95 
With the approaching of the expiry of the lease in 1997, the issue was pushed on the British agenda by 
Hong Kong business people who worried about the prospects for their investments. The political adviser 
for Hong Kong Stewart revealed that Governor MacLehose realized that he had to “do something as 1997 
approached, otherwise confidence could just evaporate and the whole thing would collapse”.96  
In March 1979, MacLehose visited Beijing at the invitation of Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang. 
Chinese officials expressed their hope to the Governor that Hong Kong would play a major role in China’s 
modernization and that trade relations would expand. Li was direct: “I will say what I said last year: I hope 
that our friends in Hong Kong will invest in China.”97  
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In a meeting with Deng Xiaoping, the Hong Kong Governor discussed the future of the territory to 
the Chinese paramount leader. MacLehose was given a chance to meet Deng Xiaoping. MacLehose told 
Deng that, purely as a commercial matter, the approach of 1997 might soon begin to cause problems for 
investors in the New Territories by virtue of the diminishing term of the land leases which Britain was able 
to offer.98 The Chinese government had no concrete plans for Hong Kong at the time. Deng Xiaoping 
simply asked MacLehose to tell investors to “put their hearts at ease”.99 It was later reported that Deng 
Xiaoping told MacLehose in private that the PRC would announce its intention to recover Hong Kong if 
the issue were raised publicly.100
When the party returned to the British Embassy, a telegram from London was awaiting them. The 
Labour government had lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, and an election would 
ensue.101 The change of government meant that the Foreign Secretary David Owen, who was planning to 
pay a visit to Beijing to discuss Hong Kong’s future had to step down. In his memoirs, Owen argued that he 
had a clear view in mind on how to deal with the Chinese. He reflected that he had been wondering how the 
issue would be settled “if I had been able to engage Deng Xiaoping’s mind over the problem that April. If 
so, I would have been ready to move with him into uncharted waters.”102  
Owen’s appraisal of the situation ignored the fact that the Chinese officials considered the Hong 
Kong issue as a matter of national dignity. The following British persistent efforts to persuade the Chinese 
to permit continued British rule of the territory all ended in failure. In an effort to reach for a solution of the 
Hong Kong issue, British officials paid a series of visits to Beijing to make the Chinese government clarify 
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its stance on the Hong Kong issue. Their initial efforts ended up in vain. In May 1980, James Callaghan, 
Thatcher’s predecessor as Prime Minster, returned from Beijing with the view that China had put the Hong 
Kong question “on the back burner”.103 After Callaghan, Foreign Secretary Carrington, Lord Atkins, and 
former Prime Minister Heath all visited Beijing consecutively from 1980 to 1981, without getting any 
affirmative answer to the British demand to extend British rule over the colony.  
The Chinese government had no concrete plans for Hong Kong at the time. On 1 April 1981, Deng 
Xiaoping did not clarify Chinese plans for Hong Kong for British Foreign Secretary Carrington. According 
to Head of the Hong Kong and Macao Office at the State Council, Liao Chengzhi, this gesture 
demonstrated that “China shall never give in and be forced to declare its stance on this issue.”104
China’s first clear elaboration on its Hong Kong policy was made to the Former British Prime 
Minister Edward Heath a few days before the outbreak of the Falklands War in 1982. According to Foreign 
Secretary Howe, Deng’s message to Heath had been straightforward. Deng made the first explanation of the 
idea of “one country, two systems”: China intended to assert and safeguard her sovereignty over the whole 
of Hong Kong. All the unequal treaties would be abrogated. Britain should withdraw completely. Special 
arrangements would be put in place to enable “Hong Kong people” to maintain the prosperity of Hong 
Kong; its social and economic system would remain unchanged. Heath had no doubt that it was “intended 
as a deliberate high-level message”.105  
British Ambassador to Beijing Cradock was with Heath in the meeting. As an experienced China 
hand, Cradock saw this “as a high-level message which called for an official answer”.106 Unfortunately, 
London and Hong Kong thought Deng’s message, not being addressed to the government, required no 
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formal acknowledgement. 
In mid-1982 China revealed its plan for Hong Kong, according to the slogan that became known as 
the “sixteen character solution”: Recover sovereignty. No change in social systems. Hong Kong people 
ruling Hong Kong. Preserve stability. The unilateral declaration of the Chinese policy was a message to the 
British that the Chinese side had the power to dictate Hong Kong’s future. After the declaration of Chinese 
policy, the situations at the negotiating table changed. British Ambassador Cradock pointed out: “In 1979 it 
was the British who were pressing, the Chinese who were reluctant. Now, in 1982, it was the Chinese who 
were voluble, the British who were silent and constrained.”107
 
2. Debates on the Concept of “One Country, Two Systems”   
The idea of “one country, two systems” was born at a time of a great transformation in China when 
the country was embarking on the path of reforms and opening up in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. 
“One country, two systems” was a model designed to ensure the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong 
after China’s resumption of sovereignty. The prospect of the incorporation of a capitalist Hong Kong within 
a socialist China led to fierce debates within the Chinese government. In the end, Deng Xiaoping triumphed 
over other Chinese officials in this debate.   
Initially the Chinese government put the Taiwan issue on the top of the reunification agenda. They 
wanted to settle the Hong Kong issue after the resolution of the Taiwan issue, when the time was ripe. As 
former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen revealed:  
 
Actually, the concept of “one country, two systems” was first initiated with regard to the question of 
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Taiwan. The question posed was whether we should pursue here, and gobble up Taiwan, or under the 
so-called democracy and freedom of Taiwan and so gobble up the mainland. We believe neither is a 
desirable choice. We believe that this method is not right because it is not a matter of me swallowing 
you, or you swallowing me. Instead we chose the concept of “one country, two systems”.108
 
Before discussions between the two countries on the future of Hong Kong, the Chinese government 
expressed their wish to keep the status quo of Hong Kong. In 1977, Chairman Hua Guofeng delivered 
“Report on the World Situation” to the Communist Party. The report argued that the recovery of both Hong 
Kong and Macao should not even be mentioned for the “next ten or twenty years or even a considerably 
longer time so that Hong Kong and Macao may enjoy a period of relative stability for development”.109
In May 1978, the State Council established its own Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, 
organizationally distinct from the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, with the primary task of working on Hong Kong policy.110 The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office of the State Council was established with a Central Committee member, a Hong Kong hand, Liao 
Chengzhi as its director. The Office was given ministerial status.  
In the initial contacts with the Chinese government, the British changed the reunification agenda of 
China. After the third session of the eleventh national people’s congress, the Chinese government wanted to 
solve the Taiwan issue first, and solve the Hong Kong issue after Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. 
From the official statements of top Chinese leaders, it was clear that a shift on Chinese Hong Kong policy 
occurred in 1982, from keeping the status quo of Hong Kong to the resumption of sovereignty.  
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The idea of “one country, two systems” was formulated under serious field work and investigation. 
The team in charge of the Hong Kong issue was led by Liao Chengzhi. In 1982, a five man group under the 
direction Liao Chengzhi went to Hong Kong to conduct field work. The small group included two people 
from the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council and three people from the Xinhua 
Branch in Hong Kong, the head of the group was Lu Ping.111
Lu Ping revealed that at the beginning the Office had only five staffs. During their field work in 
Hong Kong, the five man group drafted over twenty reports. These reports accurately reflected the opinions 
of the Hong Kong people. Lu Ping revealed that most Hong Kong people were not active supporters of 
China’s resumption of sovereignty. He revealed: “We never told the Central Government that Hong Kong 
people were supportive of China’s resumption of sovereignty. We were frank about the public opinion 
there.”112
Liao’s two principal assistants were Li Hou and Lu Ping, who later became closely involved in the 
formal negotiations between the PRC and Britain, and in the drafting of a Basic Law for Hong Kong. Until 
1981, the focus of Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office’s work seems to have been on building up a broad 
united front with the people of Hong Kong rather than on working out a scheme for its return.113  
Former British Ambassador Richard Evans pointed out that China was ruled during the 1980s by a 
leaderships composed of a group of veteran revolutionaries who saw themselves as having the right to 
oversee policy-making; and a smaller group of younger men who had been chosen by Deng for the most 
important executive posts. Among the veterans, the men who mattered most were Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Li 
Xiannian and Wang Zhen. Executive responsibility was chiefly in the hands of two men, chairman of the 
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party Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang.114
A member of the five man group led by Liao Chengzhi, Wong Man-fong revealed that that China had 
no intention to take back Hong Kong at the time. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping told Hong Kong Governor 
MacLehose: There may be two possibilities: one, for China to resume sovereignty; two, to retain the 
status-quo. Wong disclosed that Murray MacLehose was tight-lipped about this incident, and even today 
Chinese officials still delete Deng’s first two phrases when quoting his remarks.115
Wong Man-fong argued that the British were using the wrong maneuver to force the Chinese to take 
a stance. They did not realize that the Chinese officials would never sign another treaty with the British, as 
a renewal of the lease would be perceived as surrendering Chinese territory to the British. They failed to 
take into consideration the great symbolic meaning of Hong Kong in Chinese history. China’s defeat under 
British gunboat diplomacy in the 19th century marked the beginning of over a century of humiliation when 
China was up for grasps for the imperialist powers.  
The recovery of Hong Kong had a symbolic meaning in Chinese history, as an end to past 
humiliations by the imperialist powers on China. It was a historic mission that the Chinese had to fulfill at 
any cost. Wong revealed: 
 
I had an opportunity to talk with some of the British, and I pointed out to them that they should 
understand the Chinese people better. Under many circumstances, an ambiguous or equivocal 
approach offers the best possible solution to certain problems. If they continued to push China into a 
corner, they were only forcing her to resume Hong Kong’s sovereignty.116   
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 The British did not listen to Wong. After meeting Carrington, Deng made an internal statement to the 
Communist Party members: “The Hong Kong issue is now on the agenda, so we must have a clear policy 
and a clear stance. The relevant selections must come up with a policy and prepare materials for the central 
government to review.”117 In April 1981, the small group chaired by Liao Chengzhi drafted a report to the 
Central Committee of the CCP. The report suggested that according to the idea of “one country, two 
systems”, Hong Kong would became a special region under the direct leadership of Beijing, except a 
change of sovereign, most of this remained unchanged for Hong Kong.118
The concept of “one country, two systems” became part of the great strategy of China in an era of 
reforms and opening up. In July 1981, Deng Xiaoping told Louis Cha Leung-yung, chief editor of the Hong 
Kong newspaper Ming Pao that China’s three goals were to fight hegemonism, safeguard world peace, 
unify the country, and work for economic construction.119 Hong Kong was the key to two of the three major 
goals for China: as a showcase of the idea of “one country, two systems” to lure Taiwan back, and as a 
catalyst for the economic revival of China.  
The bold idea of “one country, two systems” faced great resistance from conservative members of the 
Communist Party. Li Xiannian, a senior leader who headed the party’s Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group, was the most ardent opponent. He felt that permitting a capitalist enclave to continue within the 
PRC would leave the communist revolution incomplete. He also worried that it might become the first step 
towards the restoration of capitalism in the PRC. Others suggested exploring the option of turning Hong 
Kong into a socialist society. Indeed some of the country’s leaders have expressed concern that by 1997 
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there will be “a Shenzhen which is modeled on Hong Kong, a Guangdong which is modeled on Shenzhen, 
a whole country which is modeled on Guangdong.”120
The Chinese military expressed dissatisfaction with China’s guarantee not to change Hong Kong’s 
capitalism system for 50 years after 1997. According to reports, some who attended a military seminar for 
high-ranking officials did not understand why Deng Xiaoping was willing to make such a guarantee. Other 
felt that Deng was just too soft.121  
Some of the officials from the Foreign Ministry also believed in drastic measures like cutting Hong 
Kong’s water supply to resume sovereignty over Hong Kong were the best options. A senior diplomat, 
former President of the College of Foreign Affairs, Wu Jianmin disclosed that some officials in the Foreign 
Ministry argued that the Chinese only need to cut the water supply to Hong Kong and Macao to take back 
the territories. At the time an insightful comment from Deng convinced the officials that “one country, two 
systems” was the best option for China. Deng Xiaoping argued that most important point was that China 
should recover a prosperous and stable Hong Kong. His argument convinced the officials from the Foreign 
Ministry.122
In the end Deng prevailed over his colleagues. In April and December 1981, the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee held meetings to discuss the Hong Kong issue. At the April meeting initial discussions 
were held, and final decisions were made at the December meeting. The discussions within the CCP 
meetings showed that Wong’s suggestion was right. The Chinese leaders made the final decision to resume 
sovereignty over Hong Kong mainly from a sense of obligation to redress the humiliation of the past, as no 
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Chinese leader could afford to be soft on matters of sovereignty.  
Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin said at one of the “Pow Wow” meetings in 1981 that if China 
still refused to recover Hong Kong, “we will be shamed before our ancestors, our descendants, our own 
people, and the people of the third world.”123 The pushy attitude of the British led to the Chinese decision 
to make the decision to recover Hong Kong ahead of schedule. 
In December 1981, after several more discussions, a final decision was made. A meeting was chaired 
by Party’s Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, and those in attendance included members of the Secretariat of 
the Central Committee, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and Foreign Minister Huang Hua. At the meeting, the 
guiding principles for Hong Kong issued by Deng Xiaoping were restated by Hu Yaobang, and then Liao 
Chengzhi made a report. Zhao Ziyang remarked that the culprit to blame was the British. He said that if 
China were to handle this at a later time when she was stronger, it would be so much better. Wong made an 
insightful explanation of the final decision: “So you can see that even after the final decision had been 
made, the Chinese still felt that they were being forced to take this stance.”124  
In December 1981, when the decision was made to recover Hong Kong, Deng made a statement. He 
did not attend the meeting, but in his statement he said, “Now I will give Liao Chengzhi three months to 
come up with a concrete proposal for the resumption of Hong Kong.”125 After extensive fieldwork and 
several revisions, the small group under Liao reported the “twelve points” for Hong Kong to the Central 
CCP in March 1982.126  
On 21 April 1982, the Constitutional Committee of the National People’s Congress endorsed Article 
31 of the draft constitution. Peng Zhen, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and vice 
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chairman of the National Constitution Revision Committee, explained that Article 31 provided a legal basis 
for the peaceful reunification of the country:  
 
The State may establish Special Administrative Regions where necessary. The systems to be instituted 
in Special Administrative Regions shall be prescribed by law and enacted by the National People’s 
Congress in the light of the specific conditions.”127
 
The “one country, two systems” idea was part of an exciting enterprise designed to instigate China’s 
economic takeoff. In the economic working meeting in April, an official from Guangdong province, Xi 
Zhongxun, suggested to Yang Shangkun that China should take advantage of the favorable conditions in 
Guangdong. Deng Xiaoping proposed to set up Special Economic Zones in China. In July, the No. 50 
document on the establishment of four special regions was published. The special regions were aimed at 
not only attracting foreign investments but also preparing for national reunification. Among the four special 
economic zones, Shantou was facing the center of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Shenzhen was next 
to Hong Kong, Zhuhai to Macao, and Xiamen was across the strait to Taiwan. China tries to minimize the 
economic gap between these objects of reunification and mainland China.128
After the final decision to resume sovereignty was made in December 1981, a small five-man group 
led by Liao Chengzhi, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, was 
set up in January 1982 to devise a plan to resume sovereignty and maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity and 
stability. Through research, field work and discussion, the unprecedented idea of “one country, two 
systems” gradually took shape. 
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 3. The Appointment of Xu Jiatun  
The nomination of Xu Jiatun in 1983 was a decision made by the CCP Politburo at a time when the 
Chinese government wanted to make the best of Hong Kong and to rely on a decisive and resolute 
politician to push forward the work in Hong Kong to lay the foundation for implementing “one country, 
two systems” after China’s resumption of sovereignty.   
Xu Jiatun’s predecessor Wang Kuang was a very low-profiled person. Xinhua-Hong Kong under 
Wang was a mysterious institution in the minds of the Hong Kong people, few Hong Kong people knew 
what the Xinhua-Hong Kong building was for. Allen Lee Peng-fei, a legislator in the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council from 1978-1997, recalled that Hong Kong politicians knew very little about Wang 
Kuang. Lee disclosed that at the time the deputy director of Xinhua-Hong Kong, Li Jusheng was in charge 
of communicating with the British officials in Hong Kong.129
The working style of Xinhua-Hong Kong was characterized by some leaders in Beijing as “leftist and 
narrowly focused” during Wang’s time.130 Wang had little understanding of the capitalist system in Hong 
Kong and did not make efforts to reach out to Hong Kong’s society. The Xinhua-Hong Kong was viewed as 
a secretive organization by the people of Hong Kong. After Xu’s nomination, he was surprised to hear that 
Wang Kuang was against Beijing’s policy to develop Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen. Wang did not 
appreciate or support the great strategic plans taking place in China.  
Wang Kuang was a conservative Chinese politician who did not understand the reforms and opening 
up policy of the central government. The Chief Editor of Wen Wei Po, Kam Yiu-yu told Xu two stories 
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showing Wang Kuang’s conservative stance. At the beginning of the establishment of the special economic 
zones, Wang Kuang commented, “There was no need to establish special economic zones.” On another 
occasion, some business people wanted to find a piece of land in the special economic zone to build a 
graveyard for overseas Chinese and people from Hong Kong and Macao, Wang Kuang objected 
vehemently by calling it “selling our territory under humiliating terms”.131
Xu was nominated as a reformist politician to Hong Kong at a time when China staked the success of 
its modernization drive on Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s key position in China’s modernization drive left the 
Chinese with no alternative but to make the idea of “one country, two systems” a success. During the 31 
years between 1950 and 1980, mainland China’s overall foreign trade balance was in deficit for only 12 
years. But if trade with Hong Kong is excluded from the calculation, the PRC would have recorded 
substantial deficits for 24 of the 31 years.132
Xu’s nomination to the post was related to his reports to Deng Xiaoping on the reasons for the 
economic takeoff of Jiangsu province in early 1983. At that time, Xu was the Party Secretary of the Jiangsu 
province. In early 1983, Deng Xiaoping and his family were on vacation to Suzhou city of the Jiangsu 
province. As the party secretary, Xu was accompanying Deng through his journey. During the vacation, Xu 
took the initiative to ask the Director of Deng Xiaoping’s office Wang Ruilin to arrange some time for him 
to report his work in Jiangsu to Deng. Wang Ruilin got Deng’s agreement to listen to Xu’s report for twenty 
minutes.133  
     After the Twelfth Congress, the whole nation was discussing the great economic plan of Deng 
Xiaoping. As party secretary of the Jiangsu Province, Xu Jiatun explained to Deng that Jiangsu Province 
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had found out a distinct path of economic development. In less than six years after the down of the Gang of 
Four, its economy increased twofold. Xu estimated that in less than five years the economy would have 
another twofold increase from the present level. 134
     Xu told Deng that after the toppling of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng announced that “the economy 
of the nation is on the verge of collapse”. However, a few years before Hua’s proclamation, Jiangsu 
province’s industry had been developing at a speed of two digits, its farming also increased five to six 
percent. In 1979, the total value of industrial and farming output of Jiangsu province exceeded that of 
Shanghai and Liaoning Province, and became number one in China. 135
Deng Xiaoping was very interested in Xu’s story, he asked, “Why is it possible?”136 Xu explained the 
lessons for success of Jiangsu province’s economy. He told Deng that the central government stressed that 
“the planned economy should be the main theme, while the market economy should be supplementary to 
planned economy.” Xu told Deng frankly that the ratio of planned economy and market economy in the 
whole province was fifty to fifty. In the cities and counties, the market economy covers about sixty or even 
seventy percent. In some of the counties in Sunan region, the market economy even reached eighty to 
ninety percent.” Deng Xiaoping made a comment, “It seems that market economy is very important!” 137  
Deng was impressed with Xu’s successful economic work in Jiangsu. After a month, CCP General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang asked Xu to go to Beijing and told him Deng praised Xu in the meeting of the 
Politburo and informed him that the Politburo decided to allow Xu to continue in his post regardless of his 
bypassing the retirement age.138 In April 1983, General Secretary of the CCP Hu Yaobang told Xu that the 
central government decided to send him to Hong Kong as the Party Secretary of the Hong Kong and Macao 
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Work Committee and Director of Xinhua-Hong Kong. Hu Yaobang said: “In the era of reforms and opening 
up, the central government wanted to make the best of Hong Kong and Macao, we wanted someone who is 
bold and resolute in action. You have good experience in running Jiangsu and great ingenuity, the new job 
suits you.” He also told Xu that the central government had decided to upgrade the Working Committee to 
a provincial level organ.139
Liao Chengzhi died in the summer of 1983. Before the appointment of Ji Pengfei to succeed Liao as 
director of the Hong Kong-Macao Office, Deng Xiaoping and General Secretary Hu Yaobang decided to 
send Xu Jiatun, party secretary of Jiangsu Province, to Hong Kong to be the new secretary of the work 
committee. As a high-ranking ministerial-provincial level party leading cadre, Xu was directly appointed by 
and answerable to Deng and Hu, equal to rather than subordinate to the Hong Kong-Macao Office 
director.140 This reflected high-level attention at a time when Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong 
solution were in progress and Hong Kong was on the threshold of a historic transitional period. 
 
III. Sino-British Negotiations on the Future of Hong Kong   
1. Negotiations on Sovereignty and Administration  
The Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong started with the negotiations on 
sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong. The British demand to exchange sovereignty for continued 
British administration of the territory was rejected by the Chinese. After the British realized that the 
Chinese were to make a unilateral announcement on the future of Hong Kong if the British were to insist on 
this stance, they gave up on continued administration of the territory. The British retreat made it possible 
for the British to won concession from the Chinese on the Joint Liaison Group, which denied the Chinese 
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the power to intervene in Hong Kong government’s work in the interim period of British rule from 1985 to 
1997. 
The British had unequal bargaining power with the Chinese in the negotiations. The Chinese were the 
supplier of staple food and water to the territory. In addition, the Chinese enjoyed military advantage so 
they could take back the territory by force at any time. Chief Representative of the British team from July 
to December 1983, Percy Cradock lamented that the Chinese held almost all the cards in the negotiations: 
      
They had only to wait until 1997, when, under a treaty we recognized, 92 percent of the territory 
would pass to them, the remaining 8 percent not being viable on its own. They possessed 
overwhelming military force, in addition to the capacity to cut off essential supplies.141
      
     Realizing the disadvantage of power on their side, the British objective was to exchange sovereignty 
over this tip of land for continued British rule of the territory. Thatcher explained in her memoirs: “Our 
negotiating aim was to exchange sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong in return for continued British 
administration of the entire Colony well into the future.”142
Thatcher paid her first visit as Prime Minister to China in September 1982 in the wake of her 
sweeping victory in the Falklands War. The war occupied her mind to the verge of her visit. Her victory in 
defense of another land which bore a superficial resemblance to Hong Kong made her reluctant to 
surrender the territory to China. At her meeting with Deng on 24 September 1982, Thatcher approached the 
question “in a combative and uncooperative spirit”.143 In the reminiscence of the Director of the Hong 
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Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Lu Ping, Thatcher entered the room looking “as if she 
came here to teach us a lesson”.144 As the iron lady famous for her sharpness, she began the meeting by 
trying to coerce Deng into accepting the legality of the treaties. She said: 
      
The three treaties on Hong Kong are legally binding international agreements. You should not tear 
them up. If you think these treaties are invalid, we can sign a new treaty, a new unequal treaty.145  
      
     This overbearing tone was in total disregard of Chinese aversion to the past when China succumbed 
to British gunboat diplomacy. Deng was offended by Thatcher’s remarks. He rebutted:  
 
On the question of sovereignty, China has no room for maneuver To be frank, the question is not 
open to discussion…If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when the People’s Republic will 
have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify 
themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would 
mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and 
that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang!146 If we fail to recover Hong Kong in 
15 years the people would no longer have reasons to trust us, and any Chinese government would 
have no alternative but to step down and voluntarily leave the political arena.147
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     In response, Thatcher told Deng that without the British administration, investors would lose 
confidence in Hong Kong and it would lead to disastrous consequences. Deng brushed aside her warning. 
He argued that it was an unlikely scenario. Even in that case, China would still, in spite of everything, 
move ahead with the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong.148  
The meeting was a triumph for Deng. After the meeting, in a BBC interview after her meeting with 
Deng, Thatcher could not resist the temptation to be tough. She declared:  
 
I believe the treaties are valid in international law. And if countries try to abrogate treaties like that, it 
is very serious indeed. Because if a country will not stand by one treaty, it will not stand by 
another.149  
 
This comment not only provoked Chinese resentment for past invasions, but also openly questioned 
China’s accountability, which naturally led to a campaign of attacks in the Chinese media on the Prime 
Minister. Just like Chalmers Johnston’s observation, Thatcher had “unintentionally predicated the 
negotiations about Hong Kong on the worst possible basis. She had made Hong Kong a touchstone of 
Chinese nationalism.”150 The confrontational negotiating tactics only ruined the atmosphere of the talks and 
weakened the confidence of investors in Hong Kong. By Beijing’s estimate, about $1 billion had been lost 
in 1982 because of the fall of the Hong Kong dollar.151
After Thatcher’s visit, Cradock and vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin held five rounds of secret 
talks on the agenda of the negotiations. Zhang Wenjin told British Ambassador Cradock that China would 
                                                        
r
r
148 Wong Man Fong, China’s Resumption of Sovereignty ove  Hong Kong, p. 108. 
149 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 365. 
150 Chalmers Johnson, “The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins”, Asian Survey, vol. 
24, no. 9, September 1984, p. 896. 
151 Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong: China’s T iumph and Britain’s Betrayal, p. 63. 
 79
rather “recover Hong Kong as a barren rock than allow Britain to continue administering it”.152 The five 
sessions of secret negotiations were unproductive. For six to seven months, they still could not settle the 
agenda of the negotiations.  
In March the British side was informed that China had finished a plan on Hong Kong’s future to be 
ratified at a meeting of the National People’s Congress. If no progress was made in the talks, China would 
make a unilateral announcement of their arrangements for Hong Kong. The British realized that if they 
failed to take any action, they would be kicked out of the game and lose their say on Hong Kong’s future.  
In an emergency meeting Cradock persuaded Thatcher to try the effect of a personal message. In this 
message to Premier Zhao Ziyang, Thatcher stated that Britain “would be prepared to recommend” that 
sovereignty over the whole territory should revert to China if a solution could be found to ensure Hong 
Kong’s stability and prosperity. According to Howe, this phrase went deliberately further than her original 
statement to Deng that she “would consider the question of sovereignty” and it served to reopened the 
door.153
The letter broke the deadlock of the negotiations, after which the two sides began preparations for a 
second phrase of talks. As Cradock recalled: 
 
The letter did the trick. We had given nothing substantial away. But the Chinese are good at reading 
between the lines; indeed, their most important reading has to be done in just that way. They saw in 
the change of wording, slight though it was, a sign of the British government’s readiness to move 
towards a transfer of sovereignty and thereby to make a nod in the direction of the premise, if not a 
full obeisance. Slowly we were able to move on to settling the agenda, the composition of the 
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delegations, the place and timing of the first formal meeting.154
 
Thatcher’s letter brought the British back to the game and won her some admirations from the 
Chinese. Xi Zhongxun, vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress, told a delegation from Hong 
Kong on May 19: “Mrs. Thatcher is a wise woman, and we think highly of her. To liken it to a game of 
chess, her first move was wrong. Then she changed her mind, and her second step was correct.”155   
The second phrase of 22 rounds of talks started in July 1983. The negotiators came to another 
deadlock on British insistence on continued administration. The tense situation of the negotiations, in 
addition to the strike of Typhoon Ellen in September led to a grave economic crisis which sent panic waves 
around the island. The crisis was a rehearsal of the “disastrous consequences in Hong Kong” that Thatcher 
warned Deng in their meeting. The British government did not take any measures to fix the devaluing Hong 
Kong dollar, only to find that China’s position remained unwavering. The economic crisis showed Chinese 
resolve to recover Hong Kong in spite of several hundred million dollars of losses in its foreign currency. 
Eager to break the deadlock, and with little experience of dealing with the Chinese, Thatcher was 
frustrated and sought help from the people with great understanding of the Chinese. She consulted the 
Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, who was a master on how to deal with the Chinese leadership. 
Lee’s advice pointed out a path to success for the British. Lee suggested that Britain should send a very 
senior minister or emissary to convey Britain’s proposals at the very highest level. Lee emphasized that the 
British should present themselves as “neither defiant nor submissive, but calm and friendly”. He stressed 
that Britain should clearly accept that “if China did not wish Hong Kong to survive, nothing would allow it 
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to do so”.156
With the imminent danger of the collapse of Hong Kong’s economy, Thatcher decided to send a 
message to Premier Zhao Ziyang on 14 October 1983. The note stated that the British side was prepared to 
explore Chinese proposals in order to see whether on that foundation arrangements might be made to 
ensure lasting stability and prosperity for Hong Kong. If this exploratory process was successful, the British 
government would consider recommending to Parliament a bilateral agreement enshrining such 
arrangements.157 This message ushered in a period of close cooperation between the two countries in the 
drafting of the Joint Declaration. The agreement on the transfer of both sovereignty and administration to 
China in 1997 was a result of the limited leverage of Britain on China, not an evidence of British betrayal 
of Hong Kong.     
On December 7, in the seventh round of talks, Cradock assured the Chinese that the British side did 
not insist on continued British administration of Hong Kong after 1997, or seek any form of 
joint-administration. He said: “The close relationship between China did not conflict with the premise that 
we will return both the administration and sovereignty of Hong Kong to China. Britain did not seek to 
challenge Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.”158
As the talks were secret negotiations, this crucial British concession to China were revealed only in 
April 1984, five months before the draft agreement was finished. This breaking news was announced by 
Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe in a visit to Hong Kong in April 1984. In this historic speech, Howe 
announced that “It would not be realistic to think in terms of an agreement that provides for continued 
British administration in Hong Kong after 1997.”159
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The Sino-British Joint Liaison Group was an issue of heated debate in the last rounds of the 
negotiations. The mastermind of the institution was Deng Xiaoping. The idea was to establish an organ to 
oversee Hong Kong government’s work in the transition years. The proposal of the Joint Commission was 
unveiled to the British in February 1984. British negotiators were shocked at such an idea. In the words of 
one diplomat: “Suddenly, they dumped the protocol on us.”160 The protocol proposed to establish a 
Sino-British joint commission. It would exercise, in the Chinese phrase, a “high degree of surveillance” 
over the territory, intensifying in the four years immediately before the transition.161
The British side protested that the Joint Commission would reduce the British government into a 
lame duck in the transition years. In April 1984, Foreign Secretary Howe paid a visit to Beijing. He had 
much experience in dealing with the Chinese and understood that in the negotiations “one needed to 
diminish as much as possible the atmosphere of confrontation”.162 As a result, he designed a series of 
metaphors to appeal to Chinese officials. In his meeting with Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, Howe 
remarked: “Hong Kong was like a Ming vase – an object of priceless value.” 163 He highlighted that the 
two sides were engaged in handing over the vase just like the baton in a relay race. If they were not to risk 
the disaster of dropping the vase, they simply had to get things in line with each other. 164  
Howe disclosed that his efforts to build up relations with the Chinese were very effective. His 
meeting with Wu “was the beginning of an increasingly open and friendly personal relationship.”165 After 
meeting Wu, Howe discussed the Joint Liaison Group with Deng Xiaoping. Though his meeting with Deng 
did not break the deadlock, it effectively removed some Chinese suspicions of the British. As Thatcher 
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pointed out, Howe’s meeting with Deng was “highly effective in reassuring the Chinese that we were to be 
trusted”.166 In his talks with Howe, Deng showed a little flexibility. He suggested that if the British did not 
want the Commission to be located in Hong Kong right away, they could start the meetings “in London, 
Beijing and Hong Kong alternately at the beginning”.167
The issue was deadlocked all the way to July 1984. In September 1982, Deng set a deadline in his 
meeting with Thatcher. He warned that if they failed to reach an agreement in two years, China would make 
a unilateral announcement on the future of Hong Kong.168 With only two months to go and no signs of 
progress, negotiators from the two sides were upset. To break the deadlock, Foreign Secretary Howe paid a 
visit to Beijing on 28 July 1984. A day before Howe’s arrival, Deng Xiaoping laid down the bottom line of 
the Chinese side. He told the Chinese negotiators to tell the British the following points:  
? ?  
The name of the Commission can be changed. The time for it to be situated in Hong Kong can be 
adjusted. However, this organ must be located in Hong Kong.169
      
     On the plane to Beijing, Howe and other officials drafted a text which was “something very like the 
final text of the Annex 2 of the Joint Declaration”.170 After his arrival, Howe gave Wu their draft text as 
well as a letter from Thatcher. The letter indicated some flexibility, provided that the British side secured 
essential points in the agreement itself. As he delivered the two documents to Chinese Foreign Minister Wu 
Xueqian, Howe stressed: “The differences between us now, are more on how to express ourselves than on 
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the substance.”171
     This comment highlighted the common ground of the two sides and won Wu over immediately. As 
Howe recalled in his memoirs, “Wu nodded vigorously at this, and I began to believe that we were on our 
way.” The same day Cradock had a private lunch with Chinese Chief Representative Zhou Nan. The 
Chinese agreed to accept the British draft text on the role of the JLG, to defer its location in Hong Kong for 
two years and to extend its life to the year 2000.172    
As Cradock recollected, among the turning points in the negotiations, Howe’s visit to Beijing was “in 
many ways the most dramatic”.173 After deadlock was broken on the Joint Liaison Group in Howe’s visit, 
Chinese chief negotiator Zhou Nan quoted from a Sung dynasty poem to show his appreciation for the deal: 
“Just as the weary traveler despairs of finding a road, lo, a village appears and the shade of willows and 
riotous flowers beckons.”174  
The British won the Chinese concessions on the Joint Liaison Group under a pressing deadline. 
Through their efforts to establish trust, the British diplomats successfully reduced the organ from a Chinese 
invention to supervise everything in Hong Kong into an organ of consultation with no right to interfere in 
Hong Kong government’s work. In this way, Britain maintained significant power to shape Hong Kong’s 
future from 1985 to 1997. This concession turned out to be a loss for China. Michael Yahuda pointed out 
that after the last Governor Chris Patten’s political reform proposal of 1992, Chinese specialist on their 
country’s foreign policy found out that “it had been a mistake to give up on the Joint Commission”.175 In 
the event, the Chinese’s earlier concession deprived them of the authority to intervene through the Joint 
Liaison Group.  
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2. Chinese Negotiating Strategy under Deng’s Command  
The Sino-British negotiations on the handover were under the direct leadership of Deng Xiaoping, 
the whole negotiation process was carried out according to his instructions. In a speech to the party’s 
central advisory commission he said that he only worked on two issues during the year 1984, one of them 
being to “resolve the Hong Kong question through the one-country, two-systems approach”.176  
Chief Representative of the Chinese team Zhou Nan highly praised Deng’s critical role in the 
negotiations. Zhou said: “The whole process of the negotiations on the Hong Kong issue was conducted 
under the direct leadership of Deng. Throughout the negotiations, Deng made the final decision at all the 
critical junctures on all the critical issues in the negotiations.”177
According to a senior Chinese official, Kam Yiu-yu, the policy of recovering both the sovereignty 
and administration of Hong Kong was decided by the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping himself. It was 
known that before the negotiations formally started, the British side proposed to separate Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty from its administration, in order to hand over the former to China in principle while retaining 
the latter for Britain in reality. The question was referred to Deng, who was said to have replied:  
 
Nonsense! Sovereignty and the power of administration are inseparable. What is sovereignty without 
the power of administration? Both have to be taken back. If they don’t want to give them, we will 
take them back ourselves.178
  
With the decision to take back both sovereignty and administration of Hong Kong, the Chinese 
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government drafted their designs for Hong Kong with twelve principles on Hong Kong’s future. By August 
1982, a month before Thatcher’s planned visit, the small group under the leadership of the Directors of the 
Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Liao Chengzhi produced a draft paper and submitted it to the 
Politburo. The paper contained 12 points, mostly on arrangements to maintain Hong Kong’s confidence. It 
formed the basis for discussions among the top leaders. The paper’s final draft after Thatcher’s visit 
underlined the importance of protecting Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. It also became the Chinese 
team’s basic brief for formal negotiations with Britain.179
Memoirs of senior Chinese officials shed light on the Chinese negotiation strategy and its blueprints 
for the Hong Kong issue. It is evident that Chinese leaders were willing to incur economic losses and were 
prepared to settle the issue unilaterally as a counter-measure to the confrontational approach of Britain.  
On the one hand, China was prepared to suffer heavy economic losses during the negotiations. As a 
member of the five-man group led by Liao Chengzhi, Wong Man-fong recalled that in a report to Deng to 
describe the worst scenario, they predicted that first, if Hong Kong’s economy became chaotic, Chinese 
earnings could be reduced by two-thirds to one-half. Second, the whole of Hong Kong would be in a state 
of confusion – the people of Hong Kong might object to China’s resumption of sovereignty, and foreign 
forces might make use of the opportunity to make the situation worse. After receiving the report, Deng said, 
“A small confusion is unavoidable, medium-scale confusion is possible, but you must try your best to avoid 
a major confusion in Hong Kong.”180 By Beijing’s estimate, about $1 billion had been lost in 1982 because 
of the fall of the Hong Kong dollar.181 China’s position was unyielding even in the September Storm of 
1983, an economic crisis in which the value of the Hong Kong dollar plunged to the lowest level. 
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On the other hand, China was prepared to go it alone and announce its plans for Hong Kong 
unilaterally, and in the worst case take back Hong Kong by force. In his talks with Thatcher in September 
1984, Deng Xiaoping warned her that the Chinese could walk in and take Hong Kong later that day if they 
wanted to.182 After Thatcher’s rebuttal that it would be the end of Hong Kong, Deng said: “If China bet its 
four modernizations on the prosperity of Hong Kong, then our decision of four modernizations is not a 
sound policy. If it may lead to ‘catastrophic consequences’, then we will face the catastrophe courageously 
and make our decisions.”183 On another occasion, Deng said:  
 
Should the British government refuse to cooperate, then only one solution exists – China will send 
troops to Hong Kong before 1997. After sending troops and recovering Hong Kong, China will go 
back to her original plan of implementing the special policies for Hong Kong.184
 
Hong Kong’s great importance to the Chinese government made the Chinese willing to accept a 
pro-British Hong Kong leader as the future Chief Executive of Hong Kong. The Chinese officials had been 
considering how to select the top leaders of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Wong 
Man-fong recalled that in a meeting in 1982, Liao Chengzhi said: “I am afraid that the first Chief Executive 
of Hong Kong should be pro-British so as to stabilize Hong Kong.” The officials at the meeting agree to his 
idea.185
In a meeting with the President of the Hong Kong University Rayson Huang and President of Hong 
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Kong Chinese University Ma Lin, Deng Xiaoping and Liao Chengzhi asked for their advice on how to find 
a political leader in Hong Kong. At that time, what Deng and Liao had in mind was a capable political 
leader like Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. After the meeting, Deng instructed that development of different 
political groups in Hong Kong should be encouraged. Deng believed that only in political struggles could 
talented political leaders be found.186
On 4 April 1983, Deng Xiaoping was checking the Report by the Hong Kong and Macao Office of 
the State Council entitled “Report on the Revised Plan on the Resolution of the Hong Kong Issue for 
Instructions”.187 This is a revised version of the twelve points on the solution of the Hong Kong issue. On 
11 April 1983, a local academic group return from Beijing bringing a message from Liao Chengzhi that 
Hong Kong would have its own mini-constitution after 1997 according to which the local people would 
enjoy self-administration as a Special Administrative Region.188  
The “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” model allowed more autonomy than the system under 
British reign, with a concentration of power in the Governor. The British were shocked at the idea of “Hong 
Kong people ruling Hong Kong” offered by the Chinese, which returned much more power to the hands of 
the Hong Kong people than their model of concentration of power under the governor.   
 
3. Xu’s Initiatives during the Negotiations 
During the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong’s future, Xu Jiatun made important suggestions 
to the Chinese government from his vantage point in Hong Kong. He took the initiative in the negotiations 
                                                        
f
186 Wong Man Fong, “Shui Shi Xingzheng Zhangguan Zhenming Tianzi?” (Who Is the Future Chief 
Executive?), Huang Wen ang Lun Tequ Shouzhang (Wong Man Fong on the Chief Executive of the Special 
Administrative Region), Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishing Limited, 2006, pp. 6-7. 
187 Zong Daoyi et al, eds., Zhou Nan Koushu, p. 258.  
188 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Chronology”, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng ed., Hong Kong: In Search of a Future, pp. 
251-252.  
 89
by explaining to Beijing the positions from Hong Kong and London. His reports to the top leaders led to 
the first public announcement of Deng Xiaoping on the garrison issue and helped breaking the deadlock on 
the Joint Liaison Group. At a time when the negotiation process was completely directed by Deng Xiaoping 
himself, other CCP members did not interfere in the negotiations process. During the negotiations, Xu 
Jiatun was the only one to display initiatives in the negotiations on Hong Kong’s future.  
Xu was eager to participate in the policy-making process. Deng’s first public announcement on the 
garrison issue was directly related to Xu’s report. According to a Chinese policy adviser, Wong Man-fong, 
originally Deng Xiaoping was more inclined to garrison the PLA only in Shenzhen.189 This official position 
was confirmed by the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Office, Liao Chengzhi in November 1982, 
when he told an entrepreneur delegation from Hong Kong that Beijing would not send any troops to Hong 
Kong.190 Later, Chinese official position shifted to insistence on garrison in Hong Kong.  
Deng’s change of mind occurred around April 1984 in Deng’s meeting with Foreign Secretary Howe. 
Howe recalled in his memoirs that at the end of the meeting, Deng said that he had forgotten to mention 
one final point: after 1997 China would station in Hong Kong a small garrison, similar to the present 
British garrison. Howe wrote:  
? ?  
Deng’s “forgetfulness” struck me as an attempt to slip in a really fast ball at the very end of our talk. 
I responded vigorously, “We do not dispute your right to do that,” I said, “but it would help 
confidence greatly if you were to refrain from doing so.”191
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Deng Xiaoping did not shrink from his original position. In April, Deng Xiaoping wrote an 
instruction on the report by the Foreign Ministry on sending troops to Hong Kong, “No concessions should 
be made on sending troops to Hong Kong.”192 Deng’s instruction marked a change in the Chinese policy on 
the garrison issue.  
In May 1984, Xu Jiatun had a chance to report directly to Deng Xiaoping on the situation in Hong 
Kong. Xu told Deng Xiaoping that some of the leaders said something about Hong Kong that diverted from 
the position of the central government which led to uneasiness and suspicions in Hong Kong. Seizing 
Deng’s attention with such serious mistakes by Chinese top officials, Xu stressed the issue that violated the 
Chinese stance on stationing troops to Hong Kong. He said, that the former Defence Minister, 
vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress said in the Hunan subgroup of the NPC that the Chinese 
troops would not be stationed in Hong Kong, this was different from the position of the central government. 
Xu reported that Geng Biao said “China would not station troops in Hong Kong” while Huang Hua said 
that “Hong Kong representatives could join the Chinese delegation in the United Nations”. Deng was 
angered by Xu’s report and as he walked out of the room, he made an angry outburst on the issue.193
As the journalists were to leave the scene, Deng Xiaoping called them back and had an angry 
outburst on the garrison issue. “I want to squelch a rumor,” he said, his face flushed with anger. “Huang 
Hua and Geng Biao have been talking bullshit. What has been said about the question of stationing troops 
in Hong Kong is not the view of the [party’s] Central Committee. You go and publish this bit of news: 
Troops will be stationed in Hong Kong. It is part of Chinese territory – why shouldn’t we station troops 
there?” 194  
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 Xu was to blame for provoking Deng’s anger on this issue which he took very seriously. Through 
Xu claimed in the report to Deng that Geng Biao’s comments lead to serious consequences in Hong Kong, 
the effects of the report led to counterproductive effects in Hong Kong. The Hang Seng Index, which was 
up in early morning trading, shed thirty points by the mid-day recess.195  
It would be difficult to understand why Deng would lose his temper and created such a shocking 
scenario without taking into consideration of the content of the report by Xu Jiatun. According to a 
journalist, Geng Biao’s comments became headlines on all the major Hong Kong newspapers and led to all 
sorts of speculation on Chinese politics. The prevailing judgment in Hong Kong was that Deng Xiaoping 
had lost his grips on Chinese politics.196 Xu’s report provoked the paramount leader to call names of two 
vice-chairmen of the CCP, Huang Hua and Geng Biao in public, which was a shock to the people of Hong 
Kong. Later Deng made an apology to Huang Hua as Huang never made comments on the garrison issue.197
Years later, Deng’s remarks after his outburst were revealed. After the journalist left the scene, Deng 
pointed out that garrison was a symbol of Chinese sovereignty and was crucial to prevent the city from 
falling into chaos. Deng Xiaoping said:   
 
Why do we have to garrison in Hong Kong? The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will 
enjoy high autonomy. The Chinese garrison was a symbol of Chinese territory and our sovereignty. 
What else can symbolize Chinese sovereignty? Above all, we have to realize that after 1997 there 
will still be people who want to make a mess of Hong Kong. This will not be changed by our will. 
The destructive forces will always be present, not only on public order, but also in other areas. With 
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the Chinese garrison and the stabilizing force, they will be cautious, and they cannot just mess up 
everything at will. However, if we have no troops in Hong Kong, and we only send troops after 
turbulence erupted, the situation will be completely different. So we must insist on this issue.198
 
Xu also contributed to Chinese decisions on the Joint Liaison Group. The Chinese insisted on 
building up such an organ to prevent the British from creating troubles for the Chinese government in Hong 
Kong in the final years of British rule. Such a concern was clear in the speech by head of the Foreign 
Affairs Leading Small Group Li Xiannian at the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Meeting in March 1984. 
Li’s remarks highlighted the deep suspicions of the Chinese government on the Hong Kong issue. He even 
pointed out that to prevent the British from creating troubles in Hong Kong, an early takeover of the 
territory was necessary. Li instructed:  
 
We must have the insight to understand that Britain, as an old imperialist country, is trying to 
preserve its rights in Hong Kong and will not make compromises easily with us. It is likely that an 
agreement will not be reached. Even worse, Britain may cause chaos in Hong Kong through its 
maneuvers. We should have sufficient appraisal of the crafty nature of Britain, and think twice on its 
every move. Some time earlier, Britain played the “confidence card” and “economic card” causing 
dramatic devaluation of the value of Hong Kong dollar and messing up the economy of Hong Kong, 
attempting to internationalize the Hong Kong issue. These are all evidence showing that we should 
have sufficient preparation. If chaos is to occur in Hong Kong, we should be prepared to take back 
Hong Kong in advance and consider the method to do it. Even if it harms the stability and prosperity 
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of Hong Kong, that is no big deal. We believe that with a correct policy, Hong Kong will be 
prosperous.199
 
     With the approaching of the deadline set by Deng, the negotiators from the two countries were all 
very upset. At that time, Xu made a trip to the famous summer resort of Beidaihe. Through offering his 
ideas to the top Chinese leaders, Xu found a way for the two countries to break the deadlock. His 
suggestions on the Joint Liaison Group helped to solve this thorniest issue in the last stage of the 
negotiations.   
     Xu Jiatun first had a meeting with Party Secretary Hu Yaobang. Hu said: 
 
The British had a poor record of retreating from colonies. There are more than ten years of transition 
period before our resumption of sovereignty. Will the British be irresponsible and “mess up” Hong 
Kong like comrade Deng Xiaoping said? We should be on guard. This is our major consideration for 
setting up the Joint Liaison Group. Surely, it will be beneficial for both countries, as other things may 
need to be settled by the two sides.200
 
     Xu Jiatun reported to Hu the situation in Hong Kong. He said some people in Hong Kong were 
concerned that China would use the group to interfere in the governance of Hong Kong. He revealed that 
the major obstacle was that the British did not want to be the lame duck. He offered an ingenious idea to 
solve the problem. He said, “To remove some of the concerns of the British and the Hong Kong people, I 
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have a suggestion. We can extend the time of the meeting of the Joint Liaison Group after 1997.” 201  
Xu argued that mirror-imaging the Joint Liaison Group could convince these people that the 
interference was a two-way affair. If the Joint Liaison Group could interfere in the running of Hong Kong 
and become another center of power, then it would also become another center for the British to interfere in 
the running of Hong Kong after 1997. Xu suggested that the Chinese government should let the British 
know they had no intention to interfere in the running of Hong Kong. He also said this would save face for 
the British. He said such an arrangement was also beneficial for China as after the resumption of 
sovereignty there would be issues that would need to be settled with cooperation from Britain. 202
     Hu Yaobang was very pleased with the idea; he decided to discuss it with Primer Zhao. The other day 
Xu reported his suggestion to his superior Ji Pengfei. Ji did not say anything. During the report the 
secretary of Zhao Ziyang asked Xu to meet Zhao immediately. Ji told Xu that Deng Xiaoping wanted to 
find a solution to this problem for the next few days. 203  
     Deng Xiaoping had arranged a meeting of the Politburo on 5 pm. Zhao Ziyang had been waiting 
urgently for Xu. Hu told Zhao that Xu had a suggestion to break the deadlock of the negotiations. Zhao was 
in a hurry, after he heard the brief report of Xu, he asked Xu’s opinion for the time of the Joint Liaison 
group to be extended after 1997. Xu suggested, “It should not be too long, two or three years is OK. It 
should not exceed five or six years.” 204 After this brief discussion, Zhao Ziyang rushed off for the meeting. 
The day after the meeting Ji Pengfei told Xu, that Zhao Ziyang raised his idea at the meeting and Deng 
Xiaoping endorsed it. Li Hou was in the same room, after hearing Ji’s words he expressed his pity that the 
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same suggestion by them was not endorsed by the top leaders.205  
     Xu’s interesting story showed a basic pattern of Chinese decision-making. It followed the rule 
explained by Kam Yu-yiu that the major decisions in China were made when heads and heads met together. 
From the story it seems that the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council also had such an 
idea, but back then it was not accepted by the top leaders.   
     Xu’s idea was accepted because he was really informed of the situation in Hong Kong and the 
concerns for the British government. He was able to persuade the top leaders because he explained to them 
the reasons of the deadlock, especially the perspective from Britain and Hong Kong. When the Chinese 
officials in Beijing considered the situation, they were mainly concerned about possible British tricks in 
Hong Kong. They wanted to set up an organ to prevent the British from hurting the interest of Hong Kong 
while such a demand sounded too much like an act of interference to the British. But they failed to consider 
the deepest worry of the British that they were afraid to be the lame duck.  
Xu’s argument was that while China had no intention of using the JLG as a second power center, 
Britain’s suspicions could be allayed by the willingness to allow the JLG to function after sovereignty had 
been returned to China. If China created difficulties in the JLG before 1997, Britain could do the same 
subsequently.  
Xu offered his advice in a way that appealed to the way of thinking for Chinese leaders. Face is an 
important matter for the Chinese. When Xu Jiatun linked such an offer with the face of the British, it 
aroused Deng’s sense of mercy and led to his generous offer to help the British save face. In explaining 
China’s policy to the British, Deng Xiaoping had for many times showed his considerations on finding a 
satisfactory solution for both countries. In June 1983 in a meeting with delegations from Hong Kong and 
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Macao to the National People’s Congress and the Consultative Conference, Deng explained that they have 
considered that if they asked the British to negotiate under the precondition of recognition of China’s 
sovereignty to Hong Kong, the British would feel that they would “lose face”. So we would “give them a 
way out”. We should first discuss what to do after 1997. After this issue was settled, nothing needs to be 
discussed on resumption of sovereignty.206   
 
IV. Insertion of the Clause on Elections 
1. Negotiations on Hong Kong’s Political System 
The clause on elections got into the Joint Declaration only in September 1984, in the last few days of 
the negotiations. It did not spell out specifically the form of the elections. However, the key was that the 
clause got into the Joint Declaration. It laid the foundation for the British to further democratic reforms in 
Hong Kong. The clause that the future legislative of the Hong Kong SAR be constituted by elections was a 
step forward from Chinese original stance that members of the Legislative Council should be appointed or 
elected.  
China’s first elaboration on the future political system of Hong Kong was expressed in an attractive 
slogan called “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.” On 20 October 1982, Director of the Hong Kong 
and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Liao Chengzhi, explained to a visiting delegation of the 
Hong Kong Factory Owners that Hong Kong’s administration after 1997 would adhere to the principle of 
Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong. He said, “China will resume sovereignty over Hong Kong. After 
China’s resumption of sovereignty, Hong Kong will become a special administration of China and 
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implement “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”.207 The Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong model 
was a countermeasure by the Chinese side to reject the British demand of continued administration in Hong 
Kong and to win over the hearts of Hong Kong people.  
As can be inferred from the public statements and memoirs of Chinese officials, China’s original 
blueprint for the political system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after 1997 was to keep 
most of the elements of Hong Kong’s current political system intact except a British governor. Such an idea 
was best characterized by a vivid explanation by Liao Chengzhi, who said after 1997, everything would 
remain the same. “except changing the Union Jack to the Chinese National Flag, and changing the 
Governor to an Chief Executive appointed by Beijing”.208
Though Thatcher was attracted to the idea of radical democratization of Hong Kong, such an idea 
was dropped as an impractical option for the British during the negotiations. During the deadlock in 
Sino-British negotiations in January 1983, Thatcher advocated that the British should implement radical 
democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Governor Edward Youde and British ministers and 
officials in charge of Hong Kong affairs objected to her ideas.209  
Thatcher explained that her original plan was to realize independence of Hong Kong through radical 
democratic reforms: 
 
I proposed that in the absence of progress in the talks we should now develop the democratic 
structure in Hong Kong as though it were our aim to achieve the independence or self-government 
within a short period, as we had done in Singapore. This would involve building up a more Chinese 
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government and administration in Hong Kong, with the Chinese members increasingly taking their 
own decisions and with Britain in increasingly subordinate position. We might also consider using 
referenda as an accepted institution there. Since then legislative elections have demonstrated a strong 
appetite for democracy among the Hong Kong Chinese, to which the Government has had to respond. 
At that time, however, nobody else seemed much attracted by my ideas.210
 
Democracy was not a major contention point in the negotiations. As of 1984, there were no elected 
members in the legislative or executive council, the two key policy-making organs in Hong Kong. At the 
time all appointees to these councils have been directly nominated by the governor. As Howe explained to 
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, “Democracy was not canvassed, as far as I know, with any 
seriousness at all during the course of the negotiations on the Joint Declaration”.211  
In October 1983, exactly at the time of Thatcher’s message to Zhao, Chief Secretary Haddon-Cave 
got Governor Youde’s permission to explore ways of making the Hong Kong government more 
representative. The goal was to create a self-perpetuating system of selecting Legislative and Executive 
Councilors. There was also talk of erecting “roadblocks,” which could keep Beijing from interfering too 
often and too directly in Hong Kong’s internal affairs.212
As the Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe explained 20 years later, the British only took symbolic 
steps in introducing reforms to the Legislative Council. He pointed out the overwhelming Chinese military 
force was the British primary concern:  
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If we suddenly announced a Westminster style parliament in Hong Kong, the Chinese might well 
have taken that as a cause for simply marching in. I don’t think they would necessarily contemplate it, 
but who was to know.213
 
As the British could not implement democratic reforms in Hong Kong facing Chinese pressure, they 
decided to win concessions from the Chinese on this issue at the negotiating table. When the two sides 
discussed about the future political system of Hong Kong, their starting points on the issue were very 
different. According to the chief Legislator of the Executive Council, Sze-yuen Chung, the British side 
suggested that members of the Legislative Council should all be directly elected. The Chinese side severely 
objected to the idea. They insisted that the members of Legislative Council should be “elected or 
appointed”.214 As neither side could convince the other to accept their points, they were also preoccupied 
over the grave matters of sovereignty and administration at the time; they decided to shelve the discussion 
on the future legislature.  
On the selection of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, the initial positions of China and Britain were 
not that different. Originally China suggested that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong “should be nominated 
by the Central People’s Government based on consultations”.215 The British side argued that the Chief 
Executive should be nominated through “elections or consultations” 216, which was not very far from the 
Chinese stance. The Chinese did not voice objections to the British idea. 
The Chinese team had proposed during the early rounds that the future legislature would be 
“constituted by elections or consultations to be held locally”, that the governor would be appointed by 
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Beijing “on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally”, and that the governor 
would then nominate principal officials, who would also be appointed by Beijing. The British team wanted 
to include provisions for a Western-style democratic government, with an elected governor and legislature. 
The talks could founder on this one issue alone. Wilson pushed hard but got nowhere. The issue was put 
aside “for further consideration”.217 
The two sides did not go deep into the issue on Hong Kong’s political system from the beginning, 
and shelved it as it was not that important. The British side ingeniously picked it up again in the last few 
days of the negotiations, at the time of a pressing deadline within a period of great working relationship 
between the two delegations.   
When Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe announced in Hong Kong that China would recover the 
territory in April 1984, people were shocked at the news but few noticed an important message at the end of 
his speech. After informing the public about the agreements between the two countries, Howe disclosed 
that the British were committed to develop a representative government in Hong Kong. He said:  
 
This would follow a process of development which is already under way and which I expect to 
evolve further. During the years immediately ahead the government of Hong Kong will be developed 
on increasingly representative lines.218   
 
British diplomats are always believed to the most effective bargainers. The chief British 
representative at the negotiating table David Wilson was a China hand who spoke fluent Chinese and had 
deep understanding of the best way to communicate with the Chinese. At the last stage of the negotiations 
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the British successfully included many details into the final agreement and transformed the “twelve points” 
proposals of the Chinese into a comprehensive and convincing international agreement almost 8,000 words 
long.219
Wilson revealed that the secret of their success was to understand the line of thinking of the Chinese. 
He revealed that when the Chinese negotiators looked at a piece of the British drafting, “they would think 
the British are indefinitely clear, very subtle, desperately devious and we don’t trust them an inch.”220 
Wilson stressed that finding out the concerns of the Chinese government was the key to persuade the 
Chinese in accepting their proposals. He highlighted that “90 percent of the time the problems were solved 
once we found out what was at the root of their concerns”.221
In July 1984, the Hong Kong government issued a green paper, which aimed to “develop 
progressively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able 
to represent authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable 
to the people of Hong Kong”.222 The expression in the Green Papers was similar to the 1981 White Paper 
on district administration in Hong Kong which stated that Hong Kong would develop “a system of 
government which is firmly rooted in our community; on which the views of the community are fully 
represented; and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong”.223  
The Green Paper proposed to add an initial twelve elected Legislative Council members in 1985 to 
be increased to 24 in 1988. These new members would be drawn from the functional constituencies and an 
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electoral college composed of all members of the Urban Council, the new Regional Council and the District 
Boards. The establishment of functional constituencies was an important reform to change the political 
system of Hong Kong. David Aker-Jones, Secretary for District administration, described the functional 
constituency’s role as being necessary for the smooth transition of Hong Kong; allowing for “direct input 
by key people”.224
The Green Paper of July 1984 was a consultative paper. It was published only two months ahead of 
the completion of the draft Sino-British Joint Declaration. Especially at a time with few calls for democracy 
in Hong Kong, it was difficult for the Chinese government to foresee the ripple effects of the documents on 
the territory. Though the Chinese felt a little uneasy about what the British were trying to do in Hong Kong, 
they were not over suspicious of this issue. For further steps of the British government on development of 
the representative government, the Chinese took a wait and see approach and did not voice objections to 
those signs of change. The following day, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry made an 
unemotional comment on the Green Paper: “The plan was drafted by the British side. The Chinese side 
undertakes no obligation to it.”225
Near the end of the negotiations the Chinese agreed that the Hong Kong Legislature would be 
“constituted by elections” and the chief executive of Hong Kong would be chosen by “elections or 
consultations”. In the eight-thousand-word Joint Declaration, which spelled out in details Hong Kong’s 
autonomy and international status, only twenty-four words were devoted to democratization. But the 
important thing is that they made it into the document.226  
Through their great negotiating skills, the British added the clause that the future executive be 
                                                        
t
r
s
224 “‘Major Role’ of Constituencies”, in Hong Kong S andard, 6 December 1984, in Nicholas Thomas, 
Democracy Denied: Identity, Civil Society and Illiberal Democracy in Hong Kong, (Ashgate 1999), p. 162. 
225 Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong: China’s T iumph and Britain’s Betrayal, p. 103. 
226 Bob Beatty, Democracy, A ian Values, and Hong Kong: Evaluating Political Elite Beliefs, Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2003, p. 16. 
 103
“accountable” to the legislature in the Joint Declaration. The British team knew all too well that the 
Chinese government would never agree to a Western-style democratic government in Hong Kong. 
Historian Mark Roberti revealed in his investigation that the British apparently decided to slip the term 
accountability into the agreement by telling the Chinese side that Hong Kong’s civil service was already 
accountable to the Legislative Council. It had to seek approval for all public expenditure and proposed laws, 
and it had to answer questions about policy in the council. The Chinese team was instructed to maintain 
existing systems, so it agreed to insert the term, though the definition was not spelled out. 227
Through extensive interviews with those people who participated in final rounds of the negotiations, 
Roberti still could not solve the mystery about how the word “accountability” got into the Joint Declaration. 
He revealed that rumors in pro-China circles pointed it out that the British negotiators told their Chinese 
counterparts that “accountability” meant to make an account to. A Hong Kong academic with a good 
relationship with the Chinese leadership said that after the negotiations, he was asked by a Chinese official 
to provide definitions of “accountability,” which were brought back to Beijing. The editor of one of the 
pro-Beijing newspapers in Hong Kong said he asked Lu Ping, one of the Chinese negotiators, if the 
Chinese had accepted this definition from Britain. Lu denied that they had, but as the journalist pointed out, 
he could have been covering up for a mistake. The most common story, and most plausible, is that the 
British negotiators told their Chinese counterparts that under the current system, the governor is 
accountable to the Legislative Council. The timing of when the Chinese agreed to put the term into the 
accord was also unclear.228
Following Howe’s visit in July 1984, the two negotiating and special drafting teams continued to 
work over the Declaration until the final version was ready by the third week of September. During the 
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negotiations, the Chinese team insisted that when Beijing agreed to maintain “existing systems” in Hong 
Kong that meant existing in 1984. The British team insisted that Hong Kong was a dynamic place, and 
there would have to evolution during the transition period.229  
Taking into account of China’s position on the issue, the British were very careful about how they 
framed their demand. The agreement with China on elections was reached in an ingenious way, through the 
use of the most effective informal channel. The last minute deal was reached not through exchanges at the 
negotiating table, but in an unconventional way through a correspondence from Foreign Secretary Howe to 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wu.  
One of the last ministerial exchanges occurred on 15 and 16 September, when Howe sent a note to 
his Chinese counterpart insisting that the governor and the legislature should be democratically elected. The 
Chinese agreed to the inclusion of a statement that the legislature “shall be constituted by elections” and 
that the executive would be accountable to the legislature. However, they refused to define the term 
“elections” in any way – a point which was to lead to a lot of controversy later – and insisted that the 
procedure for the appointment of the future Governor, or Chief Executive, would be “by election or through 
consultations held locally”.230  
It seems odd that such a fundamental issue that how the government would be chosen in the future 
SAR should have been left until such a very late stage in the negotiations. John Flowerdew disclosed that 
British thinking, presumably, was that raising this issue earlier in the negotiations would have been likely to 
antagonize the Chinese and result in a possible breakdown in the talks. 231    
The 1984 Joint Declaration left many points to be resolved between the two sides – including the 
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actual political system. It specifically states that the Hong Kong SAR legislature “shall be constituted by 
elections”. What the British government considered “elections” likely differed from the Chinese 
interpretation. Nevertheless, given the contrasting views, the Joint Declaration also spelled out an 
agreement that both sides would work together to resolve their differences, particularly in the second half 
of the transition period. The purpose was to ensure a smooth transition – laying the groundwork for a 
“through train.”232
The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 was a great diplomatic success for the British. In October 
1984, the draft agreement was hailed as “the most outstanding achievement of British diplomacy since 
Lord Carrington concluded the Rhodesian negotiations” by Denis Healey in the British Parliament.233 One 
of the reasons for such a high praise of the deal was the unexpected success for Britain in reaching an 
agreement with China on the political system of the future Hong Kong SAR.234  
2. Chinese Visions for Hong Kong’s Future Political System  
After China’s resumption of sovereignty, the colonial system of Hong Kong with a concentration of 
power in the governor would not persist in Hong Kong. The following question was how to realize the 
Chinese concept of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”. The Chinese government wanted the political 
systems of Hong Kong to be more democratic than the system under British rule but they also had 
reservations that changes in the political system would have negative repercussions on Hong Kong’s 
prosperity. The outcome of this debate was to keep the present system of Hong Kong basically intact.   
In an interview with Wide Angle in 1982, a Chinese official revealed Chinese visions for the future 
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political system of Hong Kong. He pointed out that the Governor had to leave Hong Kong and the future 
Governor of Hong Kong would be chosen by the Hong Kong people. He argued:  
 
Except with regard to defence and diplomacy, Hong Kong will be its own master. We won’t send 
officials there. However, the present Hong Kong Governor must go. It is a shame to have a British 
person as the Governor of a Chinese city. The future Governor can be chosen by election and then 
endorsed by China. He need not be an advocate of socialism. We distinguish between two kinds of 
patriots at the moment: those who support Chinese socialism and those who support the unification 
of China. Anyone who agrees that China should take back Hong Kong, and who has high 
qualifications and capabilities, is eligible for that post. As for the rest of the governing machinery, 
basically there will be no reshuffle.235
 
The Hong Kong issue was under the direct leadership of the top leaders. Liao Chengzhi passed away 
on 10 June 1983. The next day after Liao’s death a meeting of the CCP Politburo decided to put the Hong 
Kong issue under the direct command of Li Xiannian and Zhao Ziyang. On 25 June 1983, when Deng 
Xiaoping was greeting representatives of the CCP and the Political Consultative Conference, he made the 
formal announcement that the Hong Kong issue was under the direct command of Li Xiannian and Zhao 
Ziyang.236   
Xu Jiatun was appointed as the secretary of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee, while Ji 
Pengfei became the director of the Hong Kong and Macao Office. The formal line of command requires the 
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secretary of the Work Committee to answer to the director of the HKMAO. However, sometimes Xu Jiatun 
bypassed the HKMAO and reported directly to the Politburo, with the latter’s encouragement. Xu was a 
special case because of his seniority in the party, but, more importantly, because he had access to Premier 
Zhao and Deng Xiaoping. In the latter case, this was due to his close personal connections with Deng’s 
eldest son, Deng Pufang. Making use of his special access to the top and to Beijing’s fluid power relations, 
Xu at times outmaneuvered the others.237 (See Chart 3.1)   
Chart 3.1 The Structure of Hong Kong Policy-making in Xu Jiatun’s Time238
 
 
       Conservatives  (leftist)                               Reformist  (leftist) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Deng Xiaoping
Foreign Affairs 
Leading Small Group 
Head: Li Xiannian 
Taiwan Affairs 
Leading Small Group 
Head: Yang Shangkun 
State Council Foreign 
Affairs Office 
CCP CC Taiwan 
Affairs Office 
Hong Kong and 
Macao Affairs Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The phrase in the Joint Declaration
shall be constituted by elections”, was 
required a special message from the F
Chinese were very unwilling; their resista
way. Even so, there was no reference to 
                                                        
237 Steve Tsang, Hong Kong: An Appointm
238 ??????????????????
 Hong Kong & Macao 
Work Committee , “the legislature of th
one of the last conc
oreign Secretary to 
nce to democracy wa
direct elections; nor 
ent with China, I.B. T
??1997??73??
108Secretary:  Xu Jiatun Xinhua News Agency 
Hong Kong Branch 
Director:   Xu Jiatun  Administrative Region e Hong Kong Specialessions wrung out of the Chinese and had 
art, Wu Xueqian. The his Chinese counterps at least consistent; but in the end they gave 
was there any chance at the time of securing 
auris & Co. Ltd, 1997, p. 140. 
 
agreement to such a phrase.239  
The Joint Declaration had fudged the issue, hiding the gulf between the two sides. But it was clear it 
did not mean elections in the Western sense. As Patten revealed that when he consulted his reform proposal 
in 1992 which include changes to the political structure of Hong Kong with Prime Minister Thatcher, 
Thatcher pointed out that Patten’s reforms were a far cry from the Sino-British agreement of 1984. She 
stalwartly and vigorously insisting that the Joint Declaration signed in her name should mean what it 
said.240  
In 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe, who successfully inserted the clause on elections into the Joint 
Declaration, disclosed that the Chinese government wanted to preserve the current political system of Hong 
Kong:   
 
My discussions with the Chinese leaders have convinced me that they want the Hong Kong systems 
to remain fundamentally as they are. We have stressed all along the need for firm assurance that 
arrangements for…effective autonomy will continue.241
 
During the negotiations, the Chinese government also accepted advice from Hong Kong politicians 
when drafting the Joint Declaration. At that time, several Hong Kong people were also working within the 
Chinese government to promote for the course of democracy in Hong Kong, Democrat Martin Lee 
Chu-ming recalled that the Chinese government was very open to his advice during the negotiations: 
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I had also been working hard behind the scenes to persuade Chinese officials that Hong Kong should 
maintain its common law system, and that was promised in the Joint Declaration as well. My success 
in quiet negotiations then led me to believe the best way to deal with the Chinese government was 
behind closed doors. Only if there was a major disagreement should the matter be aired in public. At 
that time, I achieved a lot behind closed doors.242
 
In 1984, the Green Paper was received coolly by the Communist spokesmen. The Chinese 
government made no objections to the Green Paper, a spokesman stated that China was under no obligation 
to honor the proposed political reforms.243 Dennis Duncanson interpreted that the Chinese cool response 
was because they believed that the future political system of Hong Kong was under the full control of the 
Chinese government. He pointed out that “there is reason to believe that they had envisaged the 
introduction of representative government only after 1997, under their own auspices”.244  
Though they did not express grave concerns on the new development, the Chinese government made 
it clear that they were not so enthusiastic about democratic reforms in Hong Kong. Ji Pengfei, director of 
China’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, expressed that the PRC government was in favor of 
“stability and prosperity,” not “prosperity plus reform.”245 Ji openly expressed the view that the proposition 
of “prosperity plus reform” in unacceptable and that “only those elements that run counter to the transfer of 
sovereignty, that exhibit colonial characteristics and that damage the honor of the Chinese people need to 
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be changed while all others should remain unchanged.246    
In spite of the Chinese reservations on democratic reforms in Hong Kong, the Chinese officials made 
clear in their public statements that they wanted to give full democracy to the Hong Kong people. Li 
Chuwen, deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency expressed in public that the 
Chinese government fully support the democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong people. On 23 January 
1984, He stated:  
 
The demand for democracy on the part of Hong Kong’s people is fully justified and should win the 
sympathy of all those with democratic aspirations-including the Chinese. If Hong Kong prefers direct 
elections to determine its officials, then it should strive for that, and it will have the support of the 
Chinese people.247
 
The Chinese government’s willingness to give democracy to Hong Kong was expressed by Primer 
Zhao Ziyang. In a much quoted letter dated 22 May 1984, by Premier Zhao explained to the students of the 
University of Hong Kong that the future political system of Hong Kong would be democratic: “It is 
self-evident that the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will practice a democratized political 
system that is what you call Hong Kong ruled democratically.”248 The letter was a sign that the Chinese 
government was contemplating a political system for Hong Kong with more democratic elements than 
under British rule to fully represent the views of the Hong Kong people.  
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In the interview in 2007, Xu Jiatun revealed that there were difference of opinions within the CCP on 
how to put the idea of “one country, two systems” into practice. He said after his nomination, top leaders in 
the CCP, including Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Xi Zhongxun (standing secretary of the Central Secretariat) 
and President Li Xiannian all had discussions with him on the Hong Kong issue. Xu Jiatun had the feeling 
that though the top leaders shared the same principle of implementing one country, two systems, they had 
different opinions on practical issues.249
Some of the Chinese leaders had a positive attitude on introducing democracy in Hong Kong, but no 
consensus was reached on the issue. In an interview in 2007, Xu revealed that both the Party Secretary Hu 
Yaobang and the Secretary of the Central Secretariat Xi Zhongxun expressed positive opinions on the 
concept of democracy in 1983. He disclosed that before he came to Hong Kong, he heard Hu Qili 
advocating democracy at the dinner table. Hu Qili said, “Democracy and Freedom are the common wealth 
of mankind, we should not exclude them because they were Western stuff.”250
The Chinese government’s design for the future political system of Hong Kong was to split the Hong 
Kong politicians into three parts, one third of them were pro-Beijing, one third  were pro-London and the 
last one third were neutral members. According to a report by a Hong Kong scholar, Director of the Hong 
Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Ji Pengfei once stated that the future legislators in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be constituted according to the following ratio: one third 
of pro-Beijing members, one third of pro-London members and one-third members with a neutral stance on 
the issue.251
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It was clear that though there were people sympathetic to the development of democracy in Hong 
Kong, the Chinese leaders had not reached a consensus on the issue. In October 1984, when Deng Xiaoping 
said in a meeting with a large group of Hong Kong people that the future leaders of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) must mainly be patriotic persons who loved the country. Deng said:  
 
We should of course have people from the leftist camp, but they should be kept to a minimum. There 
should be people from the rightist camp as well. More people should be neutral. In this way, people 
from all circles would feel much better.252  
 
In an interview with a renowned Chinese scholar in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Huan 
Xiang, a French journalist asked whether it was fit for Hong Kong to form a Legislative Council through 
general elections. Huan replied that the Chinese government had not reached a final decision on direct 
elections in Hong Kong. He pointed out:  
 
Hong Kong people had not enjoyed democratic rights under British rule. We believe that Hong Kong 
people should enjoy democratic rights, a form of which was general elections. At present, we are 
studying these issues but have not reached a conclusion on the issue.253
 
The “three-three ratio” was a past method of the Communist Party to unite people under its flags 
when the party was still based in Yanan before the founding of the PRC. According to the method, in any 
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parliaments or organizations, the communist members only took up one third of the organization, the 
activists and the progressive people constituted the other two thirds. The constitution of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee was constituted according to the same principle.254   
In a visit to China to sign the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Prime Minister Thatcher tried to push 
forward democratization in Hong Kong in the atmosphere of close cooperation between the two countries. 
On 19 December 1984, Thatcher had a meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyang. At the end of the meeting, 
Thatcher tried to persuade Zhao to accept British democratic reforms in Hong Kong. She recollected that 
Zhao refused to discuss it with his British counterpart. Thatcher revealed:   
 
I then broached what I knew would be an even more sensitive topic. I said that the Chinese would be 
aware of our proposals for the constitutional development of Hong Kong - essentially strengthening 
in a modest way democracy and autonomy, though I was careful not to use these words. Mr Zhao 
answered that the Chinese Government was not prepared to make any comment on constitutional 
development in the transitional period. In principle, the Chinese too wanted more Hong Kong people 
involved in the administration. But that process must not adversely affect stability and prosperity or 
the smooth transfer of government in 1997. I left it at that; it was as far as I felt it was prudent to go 
at this meeting.255
 
It was obvious that Zhao would not make any promise to Thatcher when the top leaders had not 
reached a consensus on the issue. Just as Geoffrey Howe remarked inserting the term “elections” into the 
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Joint Declaration had been “a struggle of wills and aspirations from the outset”.256 It was really the best the 
British could achieve in the situation at the time.  
 
3. Xu’s Adaptation to the Situation in Hong Kong  
As a former Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province, Xu Jiatun arrived in Hong Kong with limited 
knowledge on Western customs, but he quickly adjusted to the new job in Hong Kong. As the top CCP 
official in Hong Kong, the nomination of the new director of Xinhua-Hong Kong raised the curiosities of 
the journalists in Hong Kong. As Xu Jiatun emerged from the train, he was surrounded by cameras. The 
journalist mocked the messy hair of Xu, T-shirt and dark sunglasses in their articles as the image of a head 
of a sinister gang. Xu solemnly responded to the questions of the journalists of why he came to Hong Kong 
as “to contribute to the reunification of the motherland”.257 Xu’s image showed his ignorance of the 
Chinese officials to Western customs at the beginning of the opening up of China. At that time, many 
Chinese top leaders had never set foot on Hong Kong. 
After his arrival in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun made extensive fieldwork and conducted research of the 
situation in Hong Kong. After three months of hard work, he came out with a detailed report on the 
situation in Hong Kong. In mid-September, he came to Beijing with the summary of his report on the 
situation in Hong Kong. Xu asked the Secretary of the Central Secretariat Hu Qili to ask him to arrange a 
report to the top. Hu Qili reported to General Secretary Hu Yaobang, and made the arrangements for Xu 
Jiatun to report to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the Central Committee.  
The people listening to the report were the head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, Li 
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Xiannian, deputy head of the group Zhao Ziyang, Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Ji 
Pengfei, Finance Secretary Wang Bingqian and another minister of the Central Organization department.258  
The meeting was hosted by Premier and vice-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
Zhao Ziyang. In this report, Xu revealed that most people in Hong Kong did not know China’s decision to 
resume sovereignty and practice one country two systems in Hong Kong. Those that knew were concerned 
about the prospects. There were capital flee and emigration in Hong Kong. Many people Xu met including 
the upper class in Hong Kong hoped the British rule would continue. The most urgent need was to gain the 
trust of the Hong Kong people. Li Xiannian commented, “Winning their hearts is our most important task.” 
259  
The meeting agreed to add 400 personnel to Xinhua-Hong Kong and the money allocated to Hong 
Kong skyrocketed from over 30 million Hong Kong dollars to over 300 million Hong Kong dollars.260 The 
decision to upgrade Xinhua-Hong Kong showed the Chinese government’s great emphasis on the Hong 
Kong issue at a time of reform and opening up. The Chinese wanted to listen to British advice and they 
were also welcoming suggestions from Hong Kong.   
Xu explained Premier Zhao Ziyang’s letter to students of Hong Kong University in a press 
conference. His speech sketched out the Chinese visions for the future political system of Hong Kong. He 
said:  
 
How to achieve democracy in Hong Kong? We should do it according to the practical situation. 
Our policy is that we should consider the history and the practical situation in Hong Kong. The 
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interests from all circles from Hong Kong will be taken care of; including the interests of the 
capitalists…We should keep the status quo and gradually solve the external and internal conflicts 
under the current situation. It should be solved gradually instead of radically. We are trying to find 
out a special model that suits Hong Kong to realize democracy, by keeping the status quo yet 
implementing some reforms.261
 
Though the Chinese side rejected British demands to include Hong Kong representatives in the 
British team, they wanted to reach a deal satisfactory to the Hong Kong people. Deng was quite ready to 
speak of three interested parties. He did so in a speech to the central advisory commission in October 1984, 
and again in speaking to Mrs Thatcher in December. On the latter occasion he said:  
 
To settle the Hong Kong question peacefully, we had to take into consideration the actual conditions 
in Hong Kong, China and Great Britain. In other words, the way in which we settled the question had 
to be acceptable to all three parties – to the people of China, of Britain and of Hong Kong. If we had 
wanted to achieve reunification by imposing socialism on Hong Kong, the Hong Kong people would 
have rejected it and so would the British people. Reluctant acquiescence on their part would only 
have led to turmoil. Even if there had been no armed conflict, Hong Kong would have become a 
bleak city with a host of problems, and that is not something we would have wanted. So the only 
solution to the Hong Kong question that would be acceptable to all three parties was the “one-county, 
two-systems” arrangement, under which Hong Kong would be allowed to retain its capitalist system 
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and to maintain its status as a free port and a financial center,. There was no other alternative.262  
  
The reference to elections in the Joint Declaration had only been introduced at the last minute. The 
term “elections” was not defined. China had just as much right, it could be argued, as Britain to interpret 
the word “elections” in the way this was meant in China, as a process of consultation, rather than universal 
suffrage, as elections were understood in the West.263
Xu changed the working style of the Xinhua-News Agency in Hong Kong by starting to make friends 
with renowned Hong Kong people. During the negotiations, officials of the local Xinhua News Agency had 
been very active in trying to win over the hearts and confidence of Hong Kong people. The important 
targets initially were businessmen, opinion leaders, academics and state union activists.264
As the negotiations leading to the Sino-British Joint Declaration was coming to an end, Xu Jiatun 
loyally implemented his mission of defending Chinese interest in Hong Kong by arguing that Hong Kong 
should enjoy too much autonomy after China’s resumption of sovereignty. On 9 September 1984 Xu Jiatun 
addressed the University Graduates’ Association. He stated: 
 
Hong Kong after 1997 will not be a dependent territory of Britain, and will not be any “independent 
political entity”. Instead it will become a highly autonomous SAR under the Chinese Government, 
while an “independent entity” is independent of China. On this question, there is a view and a 
tendency that is worthy of your attention.265
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 The Joint Declaration was received warmly by the Hong Kong people. The people from Hong Kong 
were encouraged by the generous offer by the Chinese government on Hong Kong people ruling Hong 
Kong and especially for the clause on elections. According to David Wilson, “When the Joint Declaration 
came out, most people in Hong Kong were astounded by how much detail it had in it and how ‘good’ it was 
from the Hong Kong point of view. To such an extent that, I think it is fair to say, most people disbelieved it 
and said it would never happen like that.”266   
 
V. Conclusion  
In this case, the innovative concept of “one country, two systems” gradually took shape in China and 
was written into the bilateral agreement. The Chinese made concessions to the British in conferring to the 
other side the full power to administer Hong Kong before 1997. The British skillfully inserted the clause 
that the legislature of Hong Kong be constituted by elections to the final agreement, paving the way for 
their reforms in Hong Kong afterwards.  
The Sino-British negotiations on the handover of Hong Kong started at a time of great 
transformation of China when the country was recovering from the Cultural Revolution and embarking on a 
course of reforms and opening up. At that time, most of the Chinese foreign currency came from Hong 
Kong. The Communist Party was facing a great challenge as the transfer of Hong Kong from Britain to a 
socialist country had the risk of killing the goose that laid golden eggs. At that time, neither the Hong Kong 
people nor the international community had confidence that Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability would be 
maintained after China’s resumption of sovereignty. 
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After years of negotiations, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 spelled out the visions of the 
Chinese government on the future of Hong Kong. The Chinese government decided to recover Hong Kong 
in 1997 and worked out the innovative idea of “one country, two systems” to maintain the prosperity and 
stability of Hong Kong. In the final days of the negotiations, the Chinese made a concession to the British 
by accepting the clause that the future legislature of Hong Kong be constituted by elections in the final 
agreement. The clause on elections did not spell out specifically the form of the elections but laid the 
foundation for the British to further democratic reforms in Hong Kong. 
All these prescriptions for Hong Kong’s future led to debates within the Communist Party, especially 
about whether the unprecedented “one country, two systems” formula would work in Hong Kong. The 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping took a keen interest in the Hong Kong issue. He triumphed over other 
Chinese leaders and endorsed the innovative idea of “one country, two systems”.   
The bold decisions by the Chinese government led to adjustment in the Hong Kong policy-making 
apparatus, which led to the upgrading and expansion of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency 
and the nomination of an outstanding politician, Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province, Xu Jiatun to replace 
his predecessor Wang Kuang in 1983. As a veteran CCP member, Xu quickly adapted to the new 
environment in Hong Kong, made suggestions to the top leaders in the negotiations, and started his united 
front work in Hong Kong.  
Hong Kong’s political system was a marginal issue in the negotiations as there were very limited 
demands for democracy in Hong Kong at the time and the British had taken only hardly noticeable steps on 
Hong Kong’s reforms. Xu was nominated at a time when the Chinese government had made the decision 
on “one country, two systems” and wanted a politician with resolve to be stationed in Hong Kong.   
The clause on elections in the Joint Declaration gave rise to continuous disputes between the two 
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countries on what the terms meant. The quarrels focused on the interpretation of a clause in the agreement: 
“The Legislature shall be constituted by elections. And the executive should be accountable to the 
legislature.”267 Later the two sides came into fierce debates over what the term “elections” meant. As 
political scientist James Tang argues: “The Joint Declaration did not settle the Sino-British differences; 
rather, it became the source of these differences.”268 The dispute on this issue continued in the years that 
followed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: British Democratic Reforms and 
Agreement on Convergence 
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I. Background  
After the British inserted the clause on elections into the Joint Declaration, they started their initial 
democratic reforms in Hong Kong. At the same time the Chinese government started to draft the Basic Law 
for Hong Kong, the establishment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative 
Committee mobilized many renowned Hong Kong people to participate in this unprecedented law making 
process of China. As a result, the political scene in Hong Kong was beginning to change.  
The enshrinement of the clause that the future legislature of the Hong Kong SAR be constituted by 
elections was a boost to the demands for democracy in Hong Kong. Democrat Martin Lee Chu-ming 
recalled his great pleasure after seeing the Joint Declaration:  
 
When I read it, I was thrilled, because it promised that the people of Hong Kong could elect their 
Chief Executive and legislature and through them, hold the government accountable to the people. 
To me that meant democracy.269
 
As a follow up to the Green Paper on representative government in July 1984, the Hong Kong 
government assessed in the White Paper of November that “there was strong public support for the idea of 
direct elections but little support for such elections in the immediate future.”270 In November 1984, the 
British government took a step further by publishing a White Paper on the Further Development of 
Representative Government in Hong Kong. The White Paper was drafted by Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary 
Haddon-Cave. Although he had gotten the Executive Council’s approval to introduce democratic elections 
                                                        
t
269 Martin Lee, “The Fight for Democracy”, in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon eds., Hong Kong Remembers, 
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 236. 
270 Emily Lau, “When All’s Said and Done, Wider Interests Prevail”, Far Eas ern Economic Review, 29 May 
1986, p. 69. 
 122
to the Legislative Council in 1988, he did not state this explicitly in the White Paper. He feared that the 
Foreign Office would object on the grounds that it might cause a confrontation with China. Instead, he only 
hinted at the government’s intention.271  
The White Paper suggested a cautious approach “with a gradual start by introducing a very small 
number of directly elected members by 1997.”272 The publication of the White Paper provided for enlarging 
the Legislative Council, introducing directly elected members to the council in 1985. It foresees a 
progressive increase in the number of indirectly elected members of the legislative council, with a review to 
assess progress in 1987, and made positive suggestions about direct elections for a number of Legislative 
Council seats in 1988. 
The White Paper made some concrete prescriptions for reforms in Hong Kong’s political structure in 
the years ahead. It announced that the first step toward representative government would be taken in 1985, 
with the setting up of functional constituencies and electoral colleges. The next step was to be direct 
elections for the Legislative Council. It added 24 “elected” seats to the 1985 Legislative Council. Among 
them 12 were elected by electoral colleges made up of DB and UC/RC members. 12 were elected by 
functional constituencies made up of business and industrial groups and professional bodies.273
The enshrinement of “elections” into the Joint Declaration, and the promise from the British 
government to develop a representative government in Hong Kong unleashed a growing desire for 
democracy in Hong Kong’s political arena. The clause was a stimulus to the development of democracy in 
Hong Kong and also led to calls in the British Parliament for democratic reforms. Soon after the signature 
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, internal political groups multiplied. In the District Board elections in 
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March 1985, many types of intra-district and inter-district coalitions appeared. Some of the political figures 
in Hong Kong started to organize political parties.  
With these encouraging signs, some of the political figures in Hong Kong started to organize political 
parties. In 1984 and 1985, two members of both the Legislative and Executive Councils, Maria Tam 
Wai-chu and Allen Lee Peng-fei, were making preparations to form political groups that would develop into 
political parties. Such political groups would include the central figures in the establishment as well as 
representatives from the established rich families and major business conglomerates. Maria Tam Wai-chu 
even formally launched the Hong Kong Progressive Society. 274
In 1985 elections at various levels were held. On 7 March, territory-wide elections to the district 
boards were held. 137 people were elected to the 19 district boards in the first territory-wide election.275 
Among the winners, 30% are businessmen and industrialists, 17% are educationalists, 8% are social 
workers, and 12% are other professionals.276 In the District Board elections in March 1985, many types of 
intra-district and inter-district coalitions appeared. The District Boards elections opened up the possibility 
of the candidate being further elected to the Legislative Council. In September, the district boards together 
are to elect 10 members to Legislative Council. Nine “functional groups”, including those representing the 
commercial, industrial, legal and medical sectors of the community, are to elect another 12 representatives 
to the reconstituted Legislative Council.277
Despite some success in increasing electoral participation, the British policy makers failed to raise 
the political awareness of most Hong Kong people. In 1985 a survey showed that 70.9% of the respondents 
did not know that the Executive Council is the top policy-making body, 60.3% had no knowledge of the 
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Legco elections, and 53.3% could not identify the District Board members in their residential areas.278
The British reforms were limited in scale but at that time the calls for democracy in the society was 
very limited. Facing criticisms against governor Youde for not taking bigger steps in introducing the 
reforms, political Adviser for Hong Kong in 1985, John Boyd argued that it would be unhistorical to 
criticize the Hong Kong government for not doing enough for democracy in Hong Kong: 
 
You could probably say that particularly Labour governments way back should have moved faster on 
broadening the franchise in Hong Kong. I think it is a reasonable proposition to debate. However, 
advice from Hong Kong, at that period, was consistently against it. I think that there was genuinely 
little grass roots pressure for change back then. It would, at any period, have been regarded as poison 
by the Mainland and would have prejudiced longer term chances of stability and bringing off a 
settlement; and it would have been imprudent at a time when we had not thoroughly tested the water 
with the Mainland about the chances of our staying on.279  
      
     As the British made their tentative steps in democratic reforms, the Chinese started to draft the Basic 
Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. The two countries’ different visions for 
the future political system in Hong Kong led to rising tension between the two countries. After October 
1985, the Chinese side started to demand convergence of the British reforms with the Basic Law, the 
British made a public announcement on their agreement to the Chinese principle in January 1986.  
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II. Initiation of Basic Law Drafting 
1. British Participation in the Drafting of the Basic Law  
The fact that the British were able to influence the drafting of the Basic Law was not revealed until 
years later. The British consulted with the Chinese mainly through private channels. The Chinese were 
willing to take into account the views of the British side as the Basic Law was to put down the Sino-British 
agreement in more details to draft a mini-constitution for Hong Kong. The drafting of the Basic Law was 
an unprecedented law-making process of China which ensured the participation of people from different 
circles in Hong Kong, representatives from the mainland and was open to British input.  
The Annex I of the Sino-British Joint Declaration clarified that the Chinese government should be in 
charge of drafting the Basic Law to put down the idea of “one country, two systems”. It stipulates that the 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region “the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practiced in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong Kong’s Previous capitalist system and life-style shall 
remain unchanged for 50 years”.280  
The Joint Declaration entered into force on 27 May 1985 and was registered by the PRC and UK 
governments at the United Nations on 12 June 1985. The signature of the Joint Declaration marked the 
beginning of the thirteen years of transition period of Hong Kong. The drafting of the Basic Law led to 
close consultations between the Chinese and the British governments.  
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Even before the signature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the two countries started discussions 
on the Hong Kong Basic Law. The first issue under discussion was about when to draft the Basic Law. 
Martin Lee Chu-ming revealed that Chinese officials told him that the British side suggested that the 
Chinese should wait until the very end of the transition period before drafting the Basic Law.281  
During the Sino-British negotiations, Deng Xiaoping discussed about the Basic Law with Wu 
Xueqian and Zhou Nan. He wanted the Chinese side to draft the Basic Law earlier to stabilize Hong Kong 
and to have closer cooperation with the British on the Basic Law. He instructed:  
 
The Basic Law should be drafted ahead of schedule, no later than 1990, drafting it earlier would be a 
better option. Don’t promulgate it as late as 1993. The early publication of the Basic Law would be 
great for stabilizing Hong Kong and for Chinese participation, as the British said that China and 
Britain would have very close cooperation after the publication of the Basic Law.282
 
Chinese decision to draft the Basic Law before 1990 was announced before the signature of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration. On 19 December 1984, before the signature of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration on the Hong Kong issue, Premier Zhao Ziyang announced: “China will promulgate the Hong 
Kong Basic Law no later than 1990.”283  
In 1985, China established a Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) with fifty-nine appointed 
members, 23 were prominent Hong Kong residents. The 23 delegates were selected to represent all major 
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sectors from Hong Kong, including leaders of religion, education, labor, the legal profession and business. 
The BLDC held its first meeting in June 1985. In December 1985, the PRC set up the Basic Law 
Consultative Committee (BLCC) whose members were prominent figures in Hong Kong to be in charge of 
collecting and consulting public opinion in Hong Kong.  
Director of the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch, the top CCP official in Hong Kong, Xu 
Jiatun explained in his memoirs that the Chinese government adopted an open attitude toward British 
participation in the drafting of the Basic Law. He revealed: 
 
The Chinese government welcomed British participation in the drafting of the Basic Law and respected 
British opinions. We knew that the British Foreign Office had established a special organ studying the 
Basic Law in the Hong Kong government.284
 
The most important discussions between the two countries were about the future political system of 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong Governor David Wilson revealed:  
 
Part of all these discussions was precisely about the structure of the legislature and how quickly you 
should move on this upward slope towards a fully geographically elected Legislative Council. That 
went on for a long period of time.285
  
The British consulted with the Chinese on the Hong Kong Basic Law only through private channels. 
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They kept a low profile in consultations on the Basic Law. They were “very careful that they should not be 
public because that would have embarrassed China very much and would have made it harder to achieve 
what we wanted”.286 Wilson argued that the British presented their ideas as suggestions without taking a 
pushy attitude: “So we said: it’s your affair to get on with. But you might find these ideas helpful.”287 
By making these consultations secretive, the British were able to influence this important law-making 
process of China. British participation in the indisputably “internal affair” of China was amazing. Xu Jiatun 
disclosed: “The British side made suggestions to each chapter, paragraph, section and even choice of words 
in the Basic Law. Such a deep involvement [of a foreign country in Chinese law-making process] was 
unprecedented.”288
David Wilson argued that the key for British participation in the drafting process was to keep it secret. 
The British influenced the drafting of the Basic Law through the pro-British members in the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee and through British officials’ private communications with the Chinese. He disclosed:  
 
We had no direct locus in that. The Chinese made it absolutely clear that we had no direct locus. We 
had though on their discussion panels a lot of people from Hong Kong, some of whom were friendly 
towards the Hong Kong Government, some who were not, so we had lines into that. But we also – 
more importantly really – made sure that we had lines directly into the Chinese Government, using 
the rubric that these were suggestions we were making informally which might be helpful to them.289
 
2. Initiation of Basic Law Drafting     
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The drafting of the Basic Law was an unprecedented law-making process of China which guaranteed 
the participation of the different political groups in Hong Kong and respected the views of the British 
government. The central government had some broad principles in place to ensure the law would become 
the cornerstone of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. Though the top leaders offered some general 
guidelines on the future political structures of the Basic Law, they wanted the drafting Basic Law to be the 
result of a democratic process.  
The drafting of the Basic Law was no easy task. According to the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law 
needed to put down in more details the contents of the Joint Declaration, which was to be the 
mini-constitution for Hong Kong. Both the mainland and Hong Kong must strictly obey the articles in the 
Basic Law once the legal document was finished. A legal expert from the mainland, drafter of the Basic 
Law Duanmu Zheng explained that the Basic Law Drafting Committee had the historical mission “to 
translate the policy language of ‘one country, two systems’ and the diplomatic language of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration into the legal language of the Basic Law.”290  
     The Chinese government wanted the Basic Law to reflect the opinions of the Hong Kong people and 
to make it the cornerstone of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. To make the Basic Law 
accountable to the people of Hong Kong, the Chinese officials believed that Hong Kong people had to 
become members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, all the best scholars in China, including Hu Sheng, 
director of the Party History Research Centre of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the famous anthropologist Fei Xiaotong, and the famous legal experts like Zhang Youyu, Xiao Weiyun 
and Xu Chongde were all appointed to the Basic Law Drafting Committee.  
The Hong Kong people were excluded in the negotiations on the Sino-British Joint Declaration from 
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1982 to 1984, as the Chinese government insisted that they could not negotiate with their own people. 
According to Xu Jiatun, Beijing had two views concerning whether Hong Kong people should participate 
in the drafting of the Basic Law. One group held that Hong Kong people did not need to be included in the 
drafting committee. Another group argued that Hong Kong people should be included in the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee. The prevailing idea was to include Hong Kong people. Xu Jiatun once discussed the 
issue with Ji Pengfei in Beijing. Both of them agreed that Hong Kong people should participate in the 
drafting of their future constitution.291  
The drafting of the Basic Law brought together both mainlanders and Hong Kong residents. In late 
1984, it was even difficult for the architect of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher to imagine Hong Kong people being included in the Basic Law Drafting Committee. In her trip to 
Beijing and Hong Kong to sign the Joint Declaration in December 1984, Prime Minister Thatcher made a 
remark on the drafting of the Basic Law in a press conference. She said she was satisfied with China’s 
promise to solicit a wide range of views from Hong Kong, adding: “You wouldn’t expect representatives of 
Hong Kong to sit in the drafting committee.” She insisted, “The Basic Law is the law of China. You would 
expect China to draft the Basic Law.”292 This piece of news published in Far Eastern Economic Review 
showed that the Western politicians under-estimated the communist party’s willingness to give Hong Kong 
people the right of participation in the drafting of the Basic Law.   
The central government handed over some of the power to the Basic Law Drafting Committee. As 
long as the outcome did not violate the general guidelines from Beijing, the result should be decided by 
votes in the Drafting Committee. On specific issues, the drafting of the Basic Law became a mission for the 
mainland drafters and Hong Kong drafters within the Basic Law Drafting Committee. The Chinese officials 
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started to initiate the drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law in 1985. The chairman of the BLDC was Ji 
Pengfei, the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. Ji was a Long March 
veteran and a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Central Advisory Commission. There were 
eight deputy directors of the BLDC, four from the mainland and the rest from Hong Kong.  
The mainland vice-chairmen were Xu Jiatun and Wang Han Bin, secretary-general of the Chinese 
National People’s Congress.293 The secretary-general of the BLDC was Li Hou, a member of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the vice-director of China’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. The two deputy 
secretary-generals were Lu Ping, the vice-director of China’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, and 
Mo Kwan-nin, the vice-director of the Xinhua-Hong Kong.294 (See Chart 4.1)  
Chart 4.1 The Leaders in the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
Hong Kong Special administrative Region Basic Law Drafting Committee 
Director Ji Pengfei  
Deputy 
Director 
Ann Tse-kai, Pao Yue-Kong, Xu Jiatun, Fei Yi-ming, Hu Sheng, Fei Xiaotong, 
Wang Hanbin, David Li Kowk-po 
Secretariat Li Hou 
 
The initiation of the drafting of the Basic Law showed the Chinese government’s genuine wish to let 
Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong. After the signature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration Chinese 
leaders worked very hard to win over the faith of the Hong Kong people. As he greeted journalist from 
Hong Kong, Chairman Peng Zhen of the National People’s Congress told Hong Kong reporters that he 
treated them as “members of the family” rather than as reporters.295 The journalists did not expect such a 
warm reception from a Chinese leader.  
The drafting of the Basic Law was designed to be a very democratic process. The drafts of the Basic 
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Law would twice be handed by the BLDC for consultation, and then it would go up to the standing 
committee of the National People’s Congress for discussion and decision. Xu Jiatun disclosed that himself 
and the director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Ji Pengfei shared the 
same idea that only when representatives from Hong Kong participated in the drafting process, could the 
Basic Law be accepted by most people in Hong Kong. In addition, with the presence of the Hong Kong 
members in the committee, it would be convenient for Beijing to understand the views from Hong Kong, so 
it helps the central government in winning the hearts and minds of the people of Hong Kong.296   
Ji repeatedly said Hong Kong should not look to the Chinese mainland or abroad for a political 
model, but must develop its own system. He said China did not have any concrete design, blueprint or 
preconception on the SAR political system and was willing to listen to Hong Kong people’s views.297  
The Drafting of the Basic Law for Hong Kong started as a great enterprise to really allow Hong 
Kong people to rule Hong Kong. It was designed to have the widest representation, and the Chinese 
government was willing to listen to British suggestions on the running of Hong Kong. It was a 
breakthrough in the history of Chinese law-making. In recalling his experience in the drafting of the Basic 
Law, democrat Martin Lee Chu-ming wrote: 
 
When I started off, I was extremely enthusiastic and the mainland Chinese delegates were also very 
confident. Two of them separately told me that since the Joint Declaration had been warmly 
welcomed in Hong Kong, the Basic Law would find even greater support; if it didn’t, then they 
would consider that the committee had failed in its duties.298
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 After the initiation of the drafting of the Basic Law, the Chinese officials had been clarifying that the 
Chinese side believed that the “elections” in the Joint Declaration did not mean direct elections. Vice 
Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, the chief representative of the Chinese negotiating team in the negotiations 
over the Joint Declaration stated before the first Basic Law Drafting Committee in July 1985 that “the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration had only stated that there would be elections to the [Legislative] council, 
without pinpointing whether they would be direct or indirect”299. 
Cha Chi-ming, a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, presented a proposal entitled “Basic 
Policies and Constitution for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” to the Chinese leaders during 
the first meeting of the Basic Law Drafting Committee held in Beijing in mid-1985. Cha’s proposal 
suggested that “one-third (of the legislature) will be elected initially by District Board members and 
eventually directly by the electorate in geographical constituencies”.300 It was said that Cha’s proposal 
attracted much attention from the Chinese authorities and the Hong Kong government. 
On 10 December 1985, a signed article under the pseudonym Gu Xinghui appeared in the newly 
published The Mirror (a pro-China monthly) under the title “Preliminary Discussions on the Future Basic 
Law Blueprint”. The Mirror’s proposals also indicated that 40 percent of the members of the legislature 
should be directly elected.301 According to Joseph Cheng Yu-shek, although the Chinese authorities still 
claims that they have no preconceptions about the political system of the Hong Kong SAR, it is obvious 
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that they and the local communities approve of the proposals of Cha Chi-ming and The Mirror.302 Both 
proposals did not rule out direct elections to the legislature. The legislature of the Hong Kong SAR should 
ideally have 60 to 80 members, half of them returned by functional constituencies and half directly elected 
by geographical constituencies. As half of the members would be returned by functional constituencies, it 
would be easier to meet the demands of the business community and satisfy the condition that one-third of 
the seats go to the business community, the professional bodies, and the pro-China organizations. 303  
The Basic Law Drafting Committee worked very hard to collect opinions from Hong Kong so that 
the views of the Hong Kong people would be fully represented in the mini-constitution for Hong Kong. 
According to the head of the political small group of the Basic Law drafting committee, Professor Xiao 
Weiyun, after the establishment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, he joined the 12 member 
investigation team led by Lu Ping to solicit opinion from Hong Kong on the structure of the Basic Law, 
they consulted over 1,000 people from business, education, cultural, financial, labor, media, civil servants, 
courts, etc.304
 
3. Xu Jiatun’s Efforts to Ensure Wide Representation 
As the top CCP leader in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun played a crucial role in the drafting of the Basic 
Law. He was in charge of providing the name list of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law 
Consultative Committees to Beijing. As deputy director of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, he was also 
one of the senior Chinese officials in charge of the drafting of the Basic Law.  
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Xu Jiatun was one of the first Chinese officials in Hong Kong to make negative statements on 
British democratic reforms. After the release of the 1984 White Paper, Xu Jiatun made a public statement 
stressing the importance of the Basic Law over British reforms. He said: “The political structure of the 
future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is to be defined by the Basic Law drafted under the 
Chinese National People’s Congress.”305
Xu had a mixed record in the drafting of the Basic Law, which to a large extent was due to his 
ignorance on democratic procedures and to his conservative political ideas. As the vice-chairman of the 
Basic Law Drafting Committee and the top CCP cadre in Hong Kong, Xu was in charge of providing the 
name lists of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee. As Xu could 
decide who were to sit in the drafting committee, he could use this chance to promote united front work in 
Hong Kong and influence the important law-making process.  
After it was decided that Hong Kong representatives should participate in the drafting of the Basic 
Law, the next step was to select who should sit in the drafting committee. This task naturally fell into the 
hands of Xu Jiatun. The instruction from Beijing was to have the widest representation in Hong Kong so 
that the Basic Law would reflect the need of the Hong Kong people.  
Xu made great efforts to reach out to different people in Hong Kong. His selection of members 
showed his resolve to play the united front strategy of China to the utmost. It also showed his conservative 
political ideas as most of the people were from the upper class of society with very conservative ideas on 
Hong Kong’s democratization. Xu made three major contributions in the formation of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, the increase of Hong Kong members in the Basic Law Drafting Committee, his efforts 
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to include membership of different circles in the Hong Kong society and his pressing for the establishment 
of the Basic Law Consultative Committee.   
First of all, Xu expanded the numbers of the Hong Kong members in the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee from 18 to 23. In a visit to Beijing, Xu’s superior Ji Pengfei asked Xu to prepare the lists for the 
Hong Kong members in the Basic Law Drafting Committee. After Xu returned to Hong Kong, he was 
informed by the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council that the central government 
decided that 18 people could participate in the Basic Law Drafting Committee. Xu asked for an increase in 
the numbers to have wider representation of the Hong Kong people in the Drafting Committee. Ji Pengfei 
agreed to increase two to twenty members to the list. Xu fight for a further expansion of the Hong Kong 
members. In the end he provided a 23 member list which exceeded three members than the original limits, 
such a list was accepted by Beijing.306  
Secondly, Xu worked hard to achieve a balanced representation in the number of his list. He took the 
initiative to invite pro-British Hong Kong politicians and members of Kuomintang into the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee. The appointments of two appeals court judges –Simon Li Fook-sean to the BLDC and 
Yang Ti-liang to the BLCC, showed that the CCP wanted to draft a professional and authoritative law. He 
revealed that some of his colleagues objected to the inclusion of democrat Martin Lee Chu-ming in the list 
as he advocated radical democratization in Hong Kong, Xu argued that they should be tolerant to Lee’s 
ideas and included him in the list.307  
Thirdly, Xu pushed hard for the establishment of a Basic Law Consultative Committee to copy the 
“elite democracy” model of the British in running Hong Kong. Xu told Ji Pengfei that the Hong Kong 
government had more than three hundred consultative organizations to implement “elite democracy”. This 
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organ will be a civil organization to offer the Hong Kong people more chances to participate in the drafting 
of the Basic Law. He speculated that his suggestion was reported by Ji Pengfei to the top and accepted by 
the central government.308 As a result, a Basic Law Consultative Committee was established to solicit 
opinion from Hong Kong, as a further sign of the ideal of democracy enshrined in the drafting of the Basic 
Law.  
Though Xu tried to expand the united front work of the Chinese government to the utmost in his 
selection of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, his selections of members also caused criticisms in Hong 
Kong. The criticisms were for the most parts from the democrats in Hong Kong, for they protested that the 
members he selected held conservative political views. Xu tried to select representatives from different 
circles in Hong Kong, the people he selected were all well-renowned people in Hong Kong. The emphasis 
on the upper class of society showed the stress of the Chinese government on the capitalists of Hong Kong 
to keep the prosperity of the territory.  
Another problem in his selection was the exclusion of representatives of labour organizations in 
Hong Kong. Xu claimed that the Communist members from the mainland could represent the labour 
organization in Hong Kong. It had been a tradition of the Communist Party to claim that it was the sole 
representative of the working class. Xu wrote in his memoirs that he believed that the majority of the 
mainland members would be Communist Party members, so these groups did not have their representatives 
in the drafting committee.309  
In the interviews with Duowei Monthly in 2008, Xu Jiatun stressed that he had a firm belief in the 
ideals of democracy. He said he had a very open attitude toward letting the Hong Kong people express their 
wills freely in the drafting committee. He claimed that he argued then whatever views expressed by the 
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Hong Kong people should be recorded loyally in the records of meetings. The Hong Kong members were 
able to write freely on their understanding of the word “freedom”, they were allowed to write many 
suggestions on what the government “should not” do freely.310  
Despite the fact that Xu worked very hard to reflect the views of the Hong Kong people in the Basic 
Law, his ignorance of the concept of democracy made him violated democratic procedures in the drafting 
of the Basic Law. His words and actions were reported by the media. The future political structure of the 
Hong Kong SAR was first to be discussed in the political subgroup of the Basic Law Drafting Committee. 
The political subgroup of the BLDC would draft their proposals on the political models to be passed on the 
plenary meetings. It was the Chinese tradition that the head of an organization would have a bigger say in 
the decision-making of the group. A good friend of Xu, publisher of Ming Pao, Louis Cha Leung-yung 
became the head of the political subgroup in the Basic Law Drafting Committee. Cha had been arguing 
forcefully in support of Xu’s conservative ideas in Hong Kong. Shortly before the BLDC meeting, Cha 
urged the Hong Kong government to postpone any decision on direct elections to Legco until the Basic 
Law was drafted, in order to avoid conflict in Peking. The appointment of Cha was perceived in Hong 
Kong as Peking’s endorsement of Cha’s views.311  
After the establishment of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, six members produced a Basic 
Law Consultative Committee draft constitution. When the draft constitution was discussed in the drafting 
committee, the use of the phrase “democratic consultation” attracted widespread criticisms. On 20 August 
1985, lawyer Liu Yiu-chu spoke about her objection to the phrase as a Chinese Communist “code word”. 
Hearing the word, Xu Jiatun lost his composure and told the meeting there was nothing wrong with 
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“democratic consultation”, a phrase which he said was coined by the Kuomintang and was not a communist 
invention. He went on to say that the Hong Kong people probably did not understand that Britain would be 
transferring sovereignty to China, and not to the Hong Kong people. 312 Xu’s outburst shocked the meeting. 
The names of the 180 BLCC members were announced on 25 November and included seven BLDC 
members. This was seen as an attempt by the BLDC to lead the BLCC. Xinhua officials quietly circulated a 
list of acceptable candidates among sympathetic members. One official told a BLCC member that since 
most members hardly knew each other, Xinhua was there to give them a helping hand. To assure balanced 
representation among the seven standing-committee office bearers, the BLDC vice-chairmen responsible 
for setting up the BLCC, including Xu, shipping magnate Sir Pao Yue-Kong and Bank of East Asia’s David 
Li Kowk-po, moved to conduct the “election” for office bearers, though the BLCC constitution laid down 
that the standing-committee meetings must be held with seven days’ notice. After several minutes of 
consultation among the BLDC vice-chairmen, Pao pulled out a slip of paper and read out seven names.313 A 
member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Raymond Wu Wai-yongrevealed that Xu Jiatun announced 
that “consultation” was a form of election.314
Xu’s ignorance of democratic procedures created very bad impressions among the Hong Kong 
members in the drafting of the Basic Law. In Xu’s memoirs he revealed that Liao told him, Beijing’s idea 
was the “political regime of the future Special Administrative Region should be composed chiefly of the 
bourgeois class, but with the participation of the proletariat. While it should be a regime reflecting the unity 
of different social classes, it however is basically bourgeois in nature.”315  
Xu’s selection of the Hong Kong members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee reflected the top 
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leaders’ idea to preserve the current system of “elite democracy’ in Hong Kong. Xu’s interference in the 
drafting of the Basic Law and his emphasized on the bourgeois in his selections of the Hong Kong 
members of the Basic Law drafting committee showed his understandings of the political situation in Hong 
Kong, which still retained at a time before the death of Liao Chengzhi in 1983. The following deviation 
crisis further revealed his tough stance on Hong Kong’s democratization.   
 
III. The Deviation Crisis 
1. Democratic Reforms as Fait Accompli 
In November 1984 the British published a White Paper on political reforms in Hong Kong. A series 
of democratic reforms followed in 1985. The British did not ask for Chinese permission of the reforms but 
presented the reforms as fait accompli to the Chinese government. The White Paper made some concrete 
prescriptions for reforms in Hong Kong’s political structure in the years ahead. It announced that the first 
step toward representative government would be taken in 1985, with the setting up of functional 
constituencies and electoral colleges. The next step was to be direct elections for the Legislative Council. It 
added 24 elected seats to the 1985 Legislative Council. Among them 12 were elected by electoral colleges 
made up of District Boards and Urban Council/Regional Council members. 12 were elected by functional 
constituencies made up of business and industrial groups and professional bodies.316
In the House of Commons debates, then minister of state responsible for Hong Kong Richard Luce 
pointed out that the constitutional development of Hong Kong had caused great interest. In a famous line 
that was always quoted as a landmark statement on Hong Kong’s democratization, he proclaimed, “We all 
fully accept that we should build up a firmly based democratic administration in the years between now and 
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1997.”317  
The White Paper was presented to the Chinese government as a fait accompli. In mid-November 
1984, a few days before the White Paper was published in Hong Kong, Ambassador Evans called on the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry to give Zhou Nan a copy of the Paper. Zhou saw it as a sign of Britain’s 
insincerity. Zhou told Evans that the White Paper preempted the Basic Law, which would spell out the 
future political system of Hong Kong.318
The Chinese government originally refrained from interfering in the reform proposals of Britain. 
According to the Joint Declaration, Britain still had the power to administer Hong Kong in the thirteen 
years of transition. The Chinese side did not wanted to voice much objections to the everyday affairs of 
Hong Kong, as it might lead to the impression that the Hong Kong government was a lame duck. In April 
1985, Ji Pengfei clarified the Chinese stance on the issue by stating “that officials would be selected by 
either consultation or election immediately after 1997, and only by election thereafter.”319  
Despite the calm situation of bilateral relations on the surface, the rifts between the two countries on 
their interpretation of the term elections in the Joint Declaration created tension between the two countries. 
Around October 1985, a shift in Chinese stance on the issue can be identified through the different 
expressions by the Chinese official statements on the democratic reforms in Hong Kong. A subtle change of 
Chinese policy on the Hong Kong issue took place around October 1985, when the Chinese officials 
declared that the reforms in Hong Kong should converge with the Basic Law.  
In October, the Chinese officials dropped their original ambiguous stance on the Hong Kong issue. 
Receiving a delegation of Hong Kong architects in Beijing, chairman of the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
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Ji unveiled China’s plans for the transitional period. The political system prevailing in Hong Kong after 
1997 would be fixed in the forthcoming Basic Law. Therefore, he said, to ensure a smooth transition, the 
British Hong Kong government should only alter the Hong Kong political system prior to 1997 in ways 
which brought it more closely into conformity with the prescriptions of the Basic Law. Ji gave the name of 
“convergence”.320
From mid-October onwards, Ji Pengfei, director of the Chinese State Council’s Hong Kong and 
Macao Affairs Office, frequently received visitors from Hong Kong, and a main theme of the conversations 
was on the future political system of Hong Kong. He argued that “if changes could be avoided, then they 
should not be initiated.”321 On 19 October 1985, in his meeting with a delegation of Hong Kong architects, 
headed by Donald Liao, Ji expressed his hope that there would be no rapid or major changes in the territory 
in the transitional period, and his belief that the most important thing was to guarantee the smooth recovery 
of Hong Kong’s sovereignty.322 Ji disclosed that Chinese government would prefer to wait until 1997 to 
resolutions of specific issues.323 He stated: 
 
Hong Kong has entered an important transformation era. In this period we must avoid the emergence 
of unnecessary chaos which may affect a smooth transfer of sovereignty…We have a common aim: 
maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.324
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The change in Chinese official statements seemed to be directed toward a series of public statements 
by the British officials claiming that China should not interfere in the reforms, which added to the tensions 
between the two countries. Hong Kong’s Secretary for General Duties, Peter Williams, stated in London on 
30 September 1985 that plans for the development of representative government in Hong Kong had been in 
existence at the time of the Sino-British negotiations. He also predicted an almost inevitable period of 
unrest in the early 1990s that would call for appropriate preparations. He subsequently told reporters that 
Beijing would not need to be consulted on the issue of political reforms.325 On 31 October 1985, Timothy 
Renton, British Foreign Office minister responsible for Hong Kong, emphasized that Hong Kong should 
devise its own political reform with advice but not interference from the UK.326
The first open conflict between the two countries occurred in November 1985, which was often 
called “deviation crisis” (benzi fengbo). In his first press conference in Hong Kong, Xu vehemently 
accused the British of violating the Joint Declaration. Xu Jiatun accused the British of violating the Joint 
Declaration: “If you act against the regulations of the Joint Declaration, it risks destroying the Joint 
Declaration…Now we can see some people showed the tendency to act in disregard of the paper. We 
cannot just ignore the problem.”327  
Xu argued that British attempts to develop representative government in the colony showed “current 
tendencies to deviate” from the Joint Declaration and warned that “unfortunate consequences” would 
result.328 Xu’s remarks came five days before the second meeting of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. It 
was clear that his remark was not a response to the British reforms but directed at progress in the Basic 
Law Drafting Committee and the meeting of the Joint Liaison Group. The strong statement reflected no 
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small degree of seriousness of lack of consensus between the two governments. The next day the Hang 
Seng index of stock prices dropped nearly fifty points. This is the first sign of a Sino-British rift since the 
agreement. The rift is clearly caused by their different perceptions and attitude toward political reform 
introduced by the Hong Kong government.329  
     Xu’s blunt remarks came as “a bombshell” to the people of Hong Kong. Many in Hong Kong felt that 
rather than the British deviating from the agreement, Xu’s own remarks constituted a breach of the accord, 
which says the British government will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object 
of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability” and China will give its 
cooperation. Xu was also accused of attempting to rewrite the Joint Declaration. Xu said it was premature 
to decide what kind of political system the SAR should have and whether it should include direct or 
indirect elections, or “consultation”.330
The press conference of Xu Jiatun sent ripple effects across the world. The chain reactions from 
Britain were overwhelming. The Hong Kong government and the Foreign Ministry in London quickly 
responded, even the British press started to criticize Xu Jiatun’s comments. The Foreign Ministry of British 
made a public statement that “they have the responsibility to rule Hong Kong until the year 1997. The 
Chinese government will be in charge of drafting the Basic Law. The two governments are both working in 
accordance to the Sino-British Joint Declaration.” When asked if political reforms were a breach of the 
agreement, a Foreign Office spokesperson said: “We have no idea what is in Mr. Xu’s mind. Both 
governments are fully committed to the Joint Declaration.”331   
While the British government denied that they are against the Basic Law, some media said, “The 
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current Beijing government is taking a high pressure approach, it is doubtful whether China would allow 
high autonomy in Hong Kong.” Some groups even protested to the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong 
that the comments of Xu Jiatun are irresponsible.332 Some of Xu’s friend in Hong Kong told him in private 
that he was overreacting.  
On 30 November 1985, Ji Pengfei’s visit to Hong Kong was disclosed by the Chinese government. On 
the same day Ji’s most recent statements on Hong Kong were also released by Liaowang, a Beijing weekly. 
Ji was quoted as follows: “In the transition period, the British will be responsible. Both sides having a hand 
at it will easily cause chaos. But the British administration in Hong Kong has to assume responsibility 
genuinely. Of course, when it comes to issues of the transfer, issues which need to be clarified in the 
transfer, we are going to have a say.” On the development of representative government in Hong Kong, Ji 
said: “The question of Hong Kong’s political system after 1997 will be decided by the Basic Law. Reforms 
of Hong Kong’s political system in the transitional period have to take into consideration convergence with 
the Basic Law.” 333
 
2. Deviation Crisis and Debates in Beijing  
    Initially the Chinese government refrained from making any comments on democratic reforms in 
Hong Kong. After the publication of the 1984 Green Paper, the Chinese government released a statement 
that the Paper “was Britain’s business and it was not obliged by the reforms proposed”.334 Xu Jiatun made a 
stronger statement after the release of the 1984 White Paper: “The political structure of the future Hong 
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Kong Special Administrative Region is to be defined by the Basic Law drafted under the Chinese National 
People’s Congress.”335
The four years after the signature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration from 1984 to 1988 were the 
best period of Sino-British relations in the transition years of Hong Kong. It was always called the 
honeymoon period of Sino-British relations. At the end of the drafting of the Joint Declaration of 1984, 
Deng Xiaoping extended a warm welcome to the British by inviting the queen to come to China. Such an 
offer was a confirmation of the sound bilateral relations between the two countries.  
In 1985 Britain initiated a series of reforms in Hong Kong. The Chinese government’s response to 
the reforms had been restrained. When he was asked about election to the Hong Kong legislative council in 
September 1985, Xu Jiatun stuck to the line set by Beijing by responding tersely: “No comment. We do not 
support it. We do not oppose it.”336
Contrary to the usual pattern in which changes in Chinese policy followed the top-down model, in 
which a change was achieved through a change of instructions from the top leaders. The decision to change 
China’s stance on democratic reforms in Hong Kong was made at the ministerial level in the Hong Kong 
and Macao Affairs Meeting in Beijing around October. Xu made this trip to change the party line by asking 
for a meeting on Hong Kong and Macao Affairs with a systematic analysis of British conspiracy in Hong 
Kong. The heads of other CCP organs in Hong Kong were impressed by Xu’s reports and the meeting 
reached a conclusion that China should not stand by but had to insist on convergence. 
In his memoirs Xu claimed that he was the first one to be alert of the British conspiracy. His 
sensitivity to the situation in Hong Kong saved the CCP from a disaster. According to Xu Jiatun, none of 
the other Chinese officials saw through the tricks of the British government in Hong Kong. At first the 
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official Chinese response to changes in Hong Kong was “no comments”, which was repeated by officials in 
Hong Kong. According to Xu Jiatun, when he was asked about this problem, he added a point that “this is 
the British government’s business”. Later on the officials in Beijing were also making the argument that 
they were not responsible for what the British government were doing. 337  
     Xu’s suspicions on the democratic reforms of the British were not shared by some officials in Beijing. 
Emily Lau Wai-hing, a senior journalist from the Far Eastern Economic Review revealed that reservations 
over Xu’s remarks were also conveyed to Ji by at least one BLDC vice-chairman, who warned that millions 
of dollars could be shipped out of Hong Kong via a simple telex by anyone worried about Hong Kong’s 
political stability at any given time.338
 
3. Xu’s Maneuver in Hong Kong  
Xu Jiatun worked very hard in Hong Kong to put a stop to the British reforms in Hong Kong. Before 
the deviation crisis, Xinhua officials have been privately telling student groups that Peking is opposed to 
the Hong Kong Government’s concept of “returning the government to the people” since Britain is going to 
return Hong Kong to China, it is not up to the British to hand over anything to Hong Kong. The Chinese are 
reportedly upset with the expression in the Hong Kong Government’s White Paper on representative 
government, which says it aims to develop a system of government “the authority of which is firmly rooted 
in Hong Kong.”339
After his public accusations of the British on deviating from the Joint Declaration, Xu started 
interacting with Hong Kong and British politicians in Hong Kong to prevent the British from advancing 
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their reforms in Hong Kong. His efforts were directed at preventing the British from introducing direct 
elections to the Hong Kong legislature in 1988.  
Judge from the situation at the time, it was true that from his vantage point in Hong Kong, Xu was 
one of the first Chinese officials to be suspicious of British democratic reforms in Hong Kong. However, to 
claim that all others were ignorant of the consequences of British reforms and he was the only one that was 
alert on the British conspiracies in Hong Kong was an exaggeration. The Chinese government believed as 
the future sovereign power, they should have a say on Hong Kong’s political system. Wilson explained that 
the Chinese believed British democratic reforms was “pre-empting this in a way that make it difficult for us 
in drafting the Basic Law”.340
To put ourselves in the shoes of the Chinese leaders, we can easily imagine how the Chinese leaders 
viewed the democratic reforms introduced at the eleventh hour of British rule. Seen from the perspectives 
of the Chinese officials, the Green and White Papers of 1984 and the reforms in 1985 happened exactly 
after the British decided to give up continued administration of Hong Kong. For over a century, the 
centralized, executive-led political system had guaranteed the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. 
Tolerating capitalism in a socialist country was thorny enough, the risks in turning it into a democracy was 
too much for the Chinese government to accept. As the future sovereign, China would be the biggest 
sufferer from inheriting an unstable and independent Hong Kong.  
Xu Jiatun always viewed the British reforms with suspicion. Though he had never been a diplomat 
in his whole life, Xu was good at dealing with the media. He liked to explain some of the policies of the 
Chinese government to the media, and sometimes had his own comments published in the media 
anonymously. In March 1985, officials from Xinhua-Hong Kong had expressed concerns over the reforms 
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in the elections in district boards. Emily Lau Wai-hing reported that the ambiguous attitude of the Chinese 
government on this issue was best expressed by senior Chinese official based in Hong Kong. He said he 
was uncertain what the Hong Kong government hoped to achieve through the political reforms; nor was it 
apparent to him what kind of political change it would like to see in the territory. Nevertheless, he indicated 
that the bottom line was: “No matter what happens, the changes must not affect Hong Kong’s prosperity 
and stability.”341 This official was probably Xu Jiatun himself.   
Around October, a subtle change emerged in the Chinese government’s official statement on Hong 
Kong’s democratic reforms. This change of policy on Hong Kong’s democratic reforms came at a time 
when the Chinese government had started to draft the Hong Kong Basic Law. The change of policy showed 
an adjustment in Chinese positions on the future political system in the Basic Law.   
After the deviation crisis, Xu’s public statement was reported by the Foreign Ministry and the Hong 
Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council to the Central Committee as a grave incident that 
undermined the bilateral relations between the two countries. The two organs in Beijing took the crisis as 
such a serious error by Xu that the issue became in item for discussion in the central secretariat meeting. 
Xu’s press conference was given a few days before the meeting Sino-British Joint Liaison Group between 
the two countries. Through creating a crisis in Hong Kong, Xu successfully pushed the issue of democratic 
reforms on the agenda of the Joint Liaison Group.  
 Many officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State 
Council believed that Xu was overreacting to British reforms. The deviation crisis was the nastiest scenario 
between China and Britain in 1985, which was the only unpleasant event in the harmonious bilateral 
relations. Both the Foreign Ministry and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council had 
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a negative evaluation of Xu’s public accusations of the British. The Foreign Ministry did not make any 
comment on Xu’s speech.  
In his memoirs Xu recalled that he sensed that the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office Ji Pengfei disagreed with his outburst very much. Xu said Ji Pengfei refused to make any comments 
about the deviation crisis in public. He recalled at one of the parties a businessman criticized Xu’s 
statement to Ji, while Xu was standing nearby, Ji did not say anything in Defence of Xu’s press conference. 
Xu wrote that he was angry to find that Ji did not say anything in support of his speech.342  
Xu’s press conference were very controversial in Beijing as none of the other officials in charge of 
the Hong Kong issue argued so forcefully for a demand to the British to freeze the democratic reforms in 
Hong Kong. Xu’s comments ran contradictory to the comment by Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. It was 
only on 27 May 1985 that the two countries officially ratified the agreement, after all, at a ceremony in 
Beijing. In June 1985, on a visit to Britain to discuss trade, Zhao Ziyang was still able to say, in a reference 
to the implementation of Joint Declaration, that Britain and China “share[d] identical views on this 
question”. 343
After the crisis, the Foreign Ministry and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office sent a report to 
the Central Committee and the State Council which criticized Xu for overreacting to the British reforms. 
The issue was discussed in the Central Secretariat Meeting. Xu revealed that on the Central Secretariat 
meeting, Wan Li stood out to speak for him. Wan said, “I’ve read the whole speech of Xu Jiatun, I don’t 
think there are any problems.” Xu argued that thanks to the support of Wan Li, he was not involved in 
bigger troubles.344   
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Tracing the changing Chinese official statement on this issue, Chinese positions gradually evolved 
from making positive declarations on Hong Kong’s democracy, to making ambiguous statement and later 
objecting to the British unilateral reforms. Lee Yee, editor-in-chief of The Nineties, asked Lu Ping during 
his visit, “Will Hong Kong after 1997 retain only its capitalist economic system, and not the capitalist 
political system?” Lu Ping’s answer was very reassuring: “Certainly not. The Sino-British Joint Declaration 
stipulates the maintenance of the capitalist social system, this includes the economic system as well as the 
political system. The economy is the base, politics is the superstructure.” 345  
On frequent occasions, the Chinese officials responsible for Hong Kong have indicated that the 
Chinese government itself does not object to democracy and is not opposed to political reforms and direct 
elections; rather, it is the business leaders in Hong Kong who are against them.346 Li Hou, an official of 
China’s Hong Kong and Macao Office, also told a group of Hong Kong lawyers: “We are not afraid of slow 
political reform. We are afraid of rapid political reform.”347 After October 1985, these positive statements 
disappeared from the official line of the Chinese government.  
With his acute sense of the political situation, an unofficial member of the Executive and Legislative 
councils, Allen Lee Peng-fei pointed out sharply the bottom lines for China and Britain on Hong Kong’s 
democratic reforms. Lee said Britain does not care what happened to Hong Kong over the next 12 years so 
long as political and economic stability is maintained and developments in the territory did not adversely 
affect Sino-British relations. Lee said China’s biggest concern over political reforms in Hong Kong was 
that members of the Legislative Council, the territory’s law-making advisory body, be elected directly. 
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“That is Peking’s bottom line,” he said, “and I myself don’t support a wholly elected Legco”.348  
At the end of December 1985, Allen Lee Peng-fei, a member of both Councils, indicated that his plan 
to organize a political party was to be shelved for the time being. In an interview with the Hong Kong 
Standard, published on 29 December 1985, Lee stated that he did not believe China would allow genuine 
self-administration in Hong Kong. He said that the chief executive of the future SAR government would be 
appointed by the central government in Beijing. While a political party, had been intended to fill the 
vacuum, there was no longer a vacuum to fill, and hence forming a political party was meaningless.349
The deviation crisis led to a redefinition of the term of the “present systems” of Hong Kong in the 
Joint Declaration by the Chinese government. The Chinese official stance began to clarify that by “present 
systems” they meant the time of the signature of the Joint Declaration, meaning the year 1984. Although 
the British had insisted that the Joint Declaration should specify that Hong Kong’s legislature would be 
“constituted by elections”, the Chinese later claimed that they were unaware of the ramifications of the 
British definition of the term “election”. However, the British had proposed modest reforms in 1984, even 
before the end of the Sino-British negotiations, including indirect elections to the Legislative Council in 
1985.350
 
IV. Agreement on Convergence 
1. British Consultations with China   
In the wake of the deviation crisis, the British diplomats discussed electoral reform in Hong Kong 
with the Chinese officials in the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group-a body that supervises the 
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implementation of the Sino-British agreement. Since November 1985, the Sino-British alliance has 
precluded the possibility of implementing drastic and rapid electoral reform in Hong Kong during the 
transition period. Similar to Scott who once revealed that universal suffrage was unsuitable for Hong Kong, 
Timothy Renton, the British foreign office minister responsible for Hong Kong affairs, implied that the 
majority of the Legislators would not be directly elected. Renton said, “We all know the…Legco…is a 
mixture of official, appointed members, appointed unofficials and elected unofficials. This is a very unique 
composition…[I]t has evolved as appropriate to the unique system of Hong Kong and I am sure that further 
developments will be equally, must be equally appropriate to the system of Hong Kong because you are in 
a unique situation.”351
Xu’s statements came as a shock to Hong Kong. The British government protested vehemently to the 
Chinese government. Since Xu’s news conference, the British have been forced into discussing political 
reforms with China in the JLG, a diplomatic body set up to implement the joint declaration. 352 The British 
can ill-afford to see the Sino-British rift unhealed. In fact, before Ji Pengfei’s goodwill visit to Hong Kong 
in December 1985, it was believed that Britain had yielded to Chinese pressure, agreeing to discuss Hong 
Kong’s political reforms and its linkage problem with the Basic Law at the forthcoming meeting in March 
1986 by the Joint Liaison Group.353
When the Joint Liaison Group met at Villa Two of the Diaoyutai State Guest House on November 26, 
the Chinese side, as expected, insisted that all reforms be delayed until after the publication of the Basic 
Law in 1990. After much acrimonious discussion, David Wilson said that the British government would put 
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off “all major constitutional changes”. In exchange for the Chinese consent to the review, the British 
government suggested that that the political review go ahead, but agree to put off all major constitutional 
changes. It was the easiest, but worst possible solution. The agreement was kept a closely guarded secret. 
The British government did not want to admit to Parliament or the people of Hong Kong that it was no 
longer responsible for determining political reforms in the approach to 1997. 354
Joint Liaison Group meetings thereafter provided the PRC with advance briefings on Hong Kong 
reform proposals. Akers-Jones claimed that the two sides had “exchange of views” which not amount to 
consultation, but he would not rule out the possibility that Beijing would change the content of the 1987 
green paper.355
After routine meeting in the Joint Liaison Group and British minister of State Renton’s formal 
meeting with Chinese director of the Hong Kong and Macao Office, Ji Pengfei, the two sides reached an 
agreement in January 1986 on convergence of the democratic reforms in Hong Kong with the Basic Law. 
This agreement froze British efforts to implement reforms in Hong Kong till the year 1990.   
Initial agreement in the Joint Liaison Group was reflected in a change of the public statements by the 
British officials. On 30 December 1985, Akers-Jones held a long briefing with the press, the entire thrust of 
which was that the “systems must converge”. Earlier Renton, in a press statement from Peking, had used 
the word “convergence” some eight times. There was an implicit admission that Hong Kong and China had 
been in danger of divergence, but this situation was being corrected to bring about steady convergence. 
China is hardly going to change direction and converge with Hong Kong. Clearly, Hong Kong must do all 
the converging, so that, as Akers-Jones and Renton stress, the transition will be smooth.356
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In addition to the discussions in the Joint Liaison Group, the negotiations were conducted at the 
ministerial level. In an obvious attempt to avoid further controversy, Ji said the implementation of the joint 
declaration is “generally good”.357 When Renton visited Peking in January, Ji told him not to pay attention 
to irresponsible statements by individuals, a reference to Xu’s bombshell. 358 The British representative in 
the talks was the British minister of state in charge of Hong Kong Renton while the Chinese representative 
is the Chinese director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Ji Pengfei. The result of the 
negotiations was a triumph for the Chinese. In December, the British changed their original stance by 
claiming that they had to take into consideration the Chinese positions for convergence of the reforms.   
The agreement of the convergence of the reforms with the Hong Kong basic Law was made public in a 
crucial meeting of Renton with Ji Pengfei in January 1986. After the meeting, Renton made a public 
statement to announce this Sino-British agreement. Statement of Timothy Renton, the minister of state at 
the Foreign Office in charge of Hong Kong affairs, in his conversations with Ji Pengfei, “We agreed above 
all on the need for convergence between the system that is evolving in Hong Kong…and the system to be 
laid down in the Basic Law.”359 This statement marked that the efforts for a unilateral settlement of the 
issue ended in failure. Renton argued that convergence was necessary to achieve a “smooth transition” in 
1997.360 If not, “there obviously could be a very unpleasant jolt some time after ’97,” Renton said. He used 
a railway-track analogy to explain the term convergence:  
 
We are creating a set of railway lines that lead up to 1997. The Chinese will be creating a set of 
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railway lines that lead on from 1997. The need is to see that those two railway lines meet together at 
a crossing point.” Renton did not explain how convergence could be achieved.361  
 
2. Designing the Future Political System of Hong Kong  
From 1985 to 1989, through rounds and rounds of discussions, the Chinese government dedicated 
much time and energy to the drafting of the Basic Law. The law was passed through very strict procedures. 
Lu Ping revealed that the 160 articles in the Basic Law were not passed all together, but one by one. Each 
clause needed a two thirds majority to be passed in the drafting committee. The procedure was designed to 
ensure that views of the Hong Kong people were fully represented in the legal document. He disclosed:  
 
Every clause needs a two thirds majority to be passed. Why two thirds? As Hong Kong members 
were the minorities. There were 36 mainland members and 23 Hong Kong members. We decided that 
a two thirds majority was mandatory, so that it was impossible for the law to be passed replying on 
the votes from the mainland. So that Hong Kong people would put their hearts at ease. Each version 
of the draft was passed in this way.  
 
     Director of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Ji Pengfei explained that the Basic Law was drafted 
with the guideline of “democracy and openness”. He said:  
 
By Democracy, we mean that everyone expressed their opinions freely in the meeting of the drafting 
committee and all small groups. The Drafting Committee also drafted the drafts for soliciting 
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opinions in Hong Kong, held seminars and collected opinions through all channels. So we can say 
each article was written with serious investigation and full discussions. They reflected the majority’s 
opinion and respected the views of the minority. By openness, we mean that all the big and small 
meetings were reported to the Consultative Committee and informed the journalists, the media 
covered each step of the drafting of the Basic Law.362  
 
Ji Pengfei proudly announced: “Some legal experts believed that in the past and future, no 
constitutional documents of any country in the word had attracted so much attention and such wide 
participation.” 363  The drafting of the Basic Law was the best the Chinese could achieve in the 
circumstances.  
3. Triumph of Xu’s Hardline Approach 
Xu’s accusations of the British came at a time when the Chinese government was demanding British 
reforms to converge with the Hong Kong Basic Law. Though his accusation of the British were not in tune 
with the sound Sino-British relations at the time, the prospects of future British reforms convinced the top 
leaders in Beijing that Xu’s judgment was right and measures should be taken to prevent the British from 
going too fast in the reforms.  
Based in Hong Kong, Xu knew perfectly well that his accusations of the British were not the truth. 
His visit to Beijing and his press conference in Hong Kong aimed at changing Chinese policy on two major 
forums, the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. By his active works, 
he achieved his objective. Xu’s accusations of the British was the result of his conservative political ideas 
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and his will to influence the drafting of the Basic Law, which had been going on for several months during 
the deviation crisis.  
Xu believed that past stability had been achieved because the executive authority had been 
centralized in the office of the governor, because the civil service system had been efficient and effective, 
and because a network of consultative committees had been established to advise the government.364 The 
first two features were incorporated into the Basic Law when it was promulgated in 1990, while the third 
remained an important element in decision-making practices. Thus, an executive-led system, which had its 
origins in British colonial rule, came to represent the Chinese government’s preferred, formal model for 
future governance.365
The PRC government was more and more convinced that the Hong Kong government and its alleged 
“Chinese agents” have engaged in a conspiracy by developing Hong Kong into a British model of “Hong 
Kong people rule Hong Kong” as a fait accompli, leaving China no choice in 1997. According to the 
sources close to China, the PRC government was indeed of the belief that the development of 
representative government was a conspiracy of using democracy to resist communism; it was not intended 
to preserve the characteristics of capitalism, instead, it was to transform Hong Kong into a “separate 
political entity,” a city-state of its own, subject to no constraints from the Central People’s Government. 366
The conspiracy theories developed by Xu Jiatun contained three crucial logics that directly 
addressed the worst fears of the Chinese government on the situation in Hong Kong. The first charge was 
that Britain was determined to effect a fundamental change in Hong Kong’s political system. According to 
Xu Jiatun, the Chinese side believed that the British had formulated a well-planned strategy before they 
                                                        
364 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu, p. 183.  
365 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu, p. 179.  
366 Henry N. Geraedts, “Hong Kong: The Economics of Political Dictates”, in Jürgen Domes and Yu-ming 
Shaw eds., Hong Kong: A Chinese and International Concern, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 51.  
 159
started the political reforms in Hong Kong.  
Though the effects of these evil schemes were hardly noticeable for the time being, in the end it 
would lead to disastrous consequences for the CCP. By increasing elements of elections in Hong Kong, it 
could keep its “links” with Hong Kong, and play the public opinion card with China, and gradually change 
the public opinion card to the democracy card. Following Xu’s report on the reforms in the 1984 Green and 
White Papers, which he characterized as amounting to “13 years of great change and 50 years of no 
change” the Centre subsequently shifted its policy from not interfering in the reforms to insisting on 
gradualism and the principle of convergence. Xu claimed he was instrumental in convening meetings of the 
departments concerned and in convincing them of what he perceived to be long-term implications of the 
program for developing representative government.367
Xu began with vague warnings about the tendency to create an “independent political entity”. Local 
democrats initially disregarded such insinuations, saying Xu could not have meant them since he knew they 
were not agitating for independence. Yet questions among local leftists persisted, fed by Beijing’s 
suspicions. Perhaps the green paper was actually a clever Trojan-horse ploy designed to leave behind the 
very same residual British presence, via the system of representative government that Beijing had been 
rejecting in one form after another for the past five years. Having conceded sovereignty on its own behalf, 
London was now evidently trying to transfer power directly to the people through the Western system of 
elected representatives.368
The second charge is cashing China’s promise in advance. One country, two systems was the Chinese 
government’s generous offer to the Hong Kong people, which allowed Hong Kong people to rule Hong 
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Kong. However, Britain wanted to implement China’s offer in advance to steal the allegiance of the Hong 
Kong people. According to the Joint Declaration, the British government was to hand over the 
administration of Hong Kong to the Chinese government, while by promising “Hong Kong people ruling 
Hong Kong”, the Chinese government was to return the administration of Hong Kong to the Hong Kong 
people. Xu argued that it showed that Britain did not want to return the power of ruling Hong Kong to the 
Chinese government, but wanted to return them to the Hong Kong people. By cashing this Chinese promise 
in advance, it would win the hearts and minds of the people of Hong Kong and have an honorable retreat. 
Such a plan ran counter to the Chinese plan. A Senior Chinese official in private conversation stated that 
China wanted to hatch its own chicken and did not want to receive a half-boiled egg in 1997.369  
As Xu Jiatun pointed out, the British government was trying to implement Chinese plans to reform of 
the political systems of Hong Kong in advance to win the support and affections from the Hong Kong 
people, by accelerating reforms, they can create different groups in Hong Kong’s society and to develop 
pro-British forces in the last years of the colonial rule. 370 According to Xu’s memoir, he also referred to the 
comments in some of the newspapers in Hong Kong which argued that what the British wanted were “big 
changes in thirteen years and no changes for fifty years”.371 It was clear such a line of argument would be 
reported to the meeting in Beijing as a further source of British conspiracy. And from the opinion of the 
newspaper it can be inferred it was the line of argument from a communist newspaper under Xu’s control.  
The third charge, is the most sensational, that Britain would turn Hong Kong into a base to topple the 
Communist regime. Xu’s report took advantage of the comment by Williams. Some people in Hong Kong 
were concerned over a speech in London on 30 September by Peter Williams, Hong Kong’s secretary for 
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general duties. Addressing the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Williams said: “The early 1990s will 
almost certainly see a new period of uncertain [in Hong Kong], and we shall have to have well thought out 
and firm plans for the changes which will then need to be introduced.”372 Xu argued that the CCP did not 
anticipate fundamental structural change in the transition period. Their understanding was no change in the 
status quo. A radical change of political system would lead to instability in Hong Kong. Such a change was 
part of British plan to use democracy to fight communism.  
The second is the scale of the reforms. The election held on 26 September 1985, was a low-key affair. 
Only 70,000 of the colony’s six million people were eligible to vote. Only 25,000 people, or less than one 
percent of the population, actually cast their ballots. 373 In the first indirect elections to the Legislative 
Council, less than 0.5% of the territory’s 5.5 million people elected 42% of the new-look Legco.374 By most 
standards, the 1985 political reforms represented democratization of a most limited kind. The Executive 
Council remained the same. Legco was expanded by twenty-six elected members, however all these new 
members were only indirectly elected under a Byzantine voting system. Save for Lee and a few others, 
Peter Harris of the University of Hong Kong described most of the newcomers to Legco as “middle class 
and middle minded,” indicating that this is exactly what the government wanted, not people who “might 
rock the boat.”375
These reforms were not only very small, but they obey strictly to the White Paper. These papers were 
given to the Chinese government before their publication, and the Chinese government did not make any 
objections on these papers. The idea of a referendum on Hong Kong’s future was ruled out by the British 
government on the grounds that consultative processes were adequate. (Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign 
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Secretary, said in the House of Commons that Britain attached great importance to the views of Hong Kong 
people. Hansard, vol. 64, no. 195, col.201 [1984].) Sir Geoffrey argued that there was no tradition of 
universal suffrage in Hong Kong and that presumably any form of referendum could be misunderstood and 
misapplied.376  
Xu Jiatun had been advocating convergence before his visit to Beijing, before that the Chinese 
official line was none-interference in the reforms of the British government. However, raising his points 
after the September Legislative Council elections gave Xu much stuff to sensationalize about. They were 
the biggest steps ever taken by the British government. Before these crucial papers, the changes to the 
political system of Hong Kong were hardly visible. The introduction of functional constituencies and 
electoral colleges became the bedrocks of Hong Kong’s political structure. It was also the political system 
enshrined in the Hong Kong Basic Law in 1990. Such reforms were the best source for sensationalizing in 
Hong Kong. 
Xu’s report provoked the deepest concerns of the Chinese government in Hong Kong. Such a 
concern was ever present in Chinese thinking. When Deng Xiaoping met Howe in April 1984, he expressed 
his worries for the transitional period. An article published in one of China’s leading newspapers in 1985 
argued: “Hong Kong’s economy is rather fragile and cannot stand much turbulence. If there is a sudden 
change in the political system in Hong Kong, accomplished by a violent upheaval in its social structure, the 
international society will lose faith in Hong Kong and refrain from making investment and engaging in 
commerce and finance in Hong Kong, and the city will soon suffer from an economic depression. Therefore, 
the maintenance of Hong Kong’s stability is of special significance in promoting the economic prosperity 
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of Hong Kong.”377
After they realized through Xu’s inspiration how evil the British were, the officials at the Hong Kong 
and Macao Affairs meeting agreed to change China’s original policy of not interfering in the running of 
Hong Kong. The changes were immediately reflected in demands on convergence in the official statements 
of the Chinese government.  
At the end of December 1985, Allen Lee Peng-fei, a member of both Councils, indicated that his plan 
to organize a political party was to be shelved for the time being. In an interview with the Hong Kong 
Standard, published on 29 December 1985, Lee stated that he did not believe China would allow genuine 
self-administration in Hong Kong. He said that the chief executive of the future SAR government would be 
appointed by the central government in Beijing. While a political party, had been intended to fill the 
vacuum, there was no longer a vacuum to fill, and hence forming a political party was meaningless. 378
In February 1986, Sir David Akers-Jones, chief secretary, who had before his assumption of duty 
spoken of the need of compatibility between the Chinese system and the evolving one of Hong Kong, had 
expressed that in the 1987 review exercise on the representative system, the PRC government will be 
consulted before the publication of the Green Paper.379
In the latter half of 1986, Xu’s British conspiracies theories had triumphed within the Chinese 
government and convinced the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. When Xu Jiatun met Deng Xiaoping, 
Deng asked him, “Didn’t one of your comments lead to great controversy?” He replied, “Yes, causing many 
troubles.” Deng said, “Your are right, if you didn’t say anything, and the British get their way, Hong Kong 
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will fall into chaos.” 380
 
V. Conclusion  
The second case was the Sino-British negotiations from the publication of the White Paper of 
November 1984 that sketched out British plans for electoral reforms to January 1986 when the British 
declared their concessions to the Chinese that British reforms should converge with the Hong Kong Basic 
Law still being drafted. In this case, the Chinese were concerned that the British had a secret agenda in their 
initial democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The Chinese toughened their stance and demanded that reforms 
in Hong Kong should converge with the Basic Law. After months of discussions, the British pronounced in 
January 1986 that they agreed to the Chinese principle that reforms would converge with the Basic Law.  
British initiatives to introduce democratic reforms in Hong Kong unleashed a growing desire for 
democracy in Hong Kong’s political scene. In June 1985, the Chinese government established a Basic Law 
Drafting Committee to draft the mini-constitution for the special administrative region. The Chinese argued 
that the British reforms were pre-empting the Basic Law. The timing of the reforms at the eleventh hour of 
the British rule made the Chinese ever more concerned about the hidden agenda of the British. The reforms 
were interpreted as British efforts to unilaterally change the current political system of Hong Kong to create 
troubles for the Chinese government after 1997. The Chinese were alarmed that democratization would risk 
Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability and make the territory more independent toward the central 
government.  
As the tension build up, in October 1985, the Chinese officials demanded in their public statements 
that British reforms should converge with the Basic Law. In his first press conference in November, Xu 
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Jiatun accused the British for “deviating” from the Joint Declaration. Xu’s statements led to great 
controversies. After Xu’s press conference, the two sides began to consult with each other on Hong Kong’s 
political system. The agreement between the two sides on convergence of democratic reforms with the 
Basic Law was announced by the British in early 1986.  
Xu Jiatun was in charge of preparing the lists of the Hong Kong drafters in the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee, though Xu’s selection of the lists covered most of 
the professions in Hong Kong, most of people he chose were from the upper level of society with a very 
conservative idea of Hong Kong’s democratization.  
During the drafting of the Basic Law, Xu made a special trip to Beijing to change the central 
government’s original policy of non-interference in Hong Kong government’s democratic reforms. He 
stressed that the British government were planning a radical change in the Hong Kong political system. 
They wanted to return the power to the Hong Kong people and cash the promise of democracy of Beijing to 
Hong Kong in advance. He also judged that Britain wanted to turn Hong Kong into a base to topple the 
Communist regimes in the mainland. Xu’s analysis of the British conspiracies and his fresh evidence from 
Hong Kong convinced his colleagues in Beijing. Xu’s report led to a redefinition of the Chinese 
government on the agreement with Britain in the Joint Declaration. The Chinese government started to 
emphasized that by maintaining the “present” system unchanged for 50 years, they meant the system of 
1984.  
After his report in Beijing, Xu accused the British for violating the Joint Declaration in his first press 
conference in Hong Kong. Afterwards he contacted the senior legislators in Hong Kong and the British 
officials to force them to freeze the democratic reforms in Hong Kong. Under Chinese pressure, the two 
sides reached an agreement that the reforms in Hong Kong should mirror-image the Hong Kong Basic Law, 
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the agreement on convergence was formally announced by British official Renton in January 1986.  
In this case, Xu Jiatun played an important role in the Chinese Hong Kong policy-making process as 
the Chinese government started to draft the Basic Law for Hong Kong. As a vice director of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, he followed the instructions from the top to ensure the widest participation possible 
from Hong Kong in the drafting committee. From his vantage point in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun was one of 
the strongest advocates of taking a tough stance towards the British. His trip to Beijing added to the 
Chinese government’s suspicions of the British reforms, his liaison in Hong Kong also facilitated British 
agreement to the principle of convergence. After hard negotiations, the British side decided to put off the 
direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988. Through his trip to Beijing and his press conference in 
Hong Kong, Xu successfully changed the Chinese government’s original stance on the issue.  
 
Chapter Five: Hong Kong Basic Law and the 
Through Train Agreement 
 
I. Background  
The political system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was the most controversial 
issue in the draft Basic Law. The small group on political structure took a very long time to reach a 
consensus. A concrete plan for the future political system of Hong Kong was forged in the second draft of 
the Basic Law in February 1989. The drafting of the Basic Law was soon interrupted by the Tiananmen 
incident. After serious discussions, the Chinese and the British governments reached an understanding on 
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an increase in directly elected seats in the legislature, which was a response to an upsurge of demands for 
democracy in Hong Kong.  
After the deviation crisis, the British took a more cautious attitude in introducing reforms in Hong 
Kong. On 27 May 1987 the Hong Kong government published the Green Paper of the 1987 Review of 
Developments in Representative Government for public consultation. The key question in the Green Paper 
was whether to introduce direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988, or to wait until 1991. Direct 
election of some members to the Legco in 1988 was listed as an option. The Hong Kong government 
downplayed the election question in its Green Paper.  
The 1987 review suggested putting off elections until 1991. To register the views of the Hong Kong 
people on these and other questions, the government set up a Survey Office and hired a polling firm to 
sample public opinion. In October 1987, the Survey Office published its findings which showed that a 
majority of Hong Kong people opposed holding direct legislative elections in 1988. However, the results 
had been obtained by using highly questionable polling and tallying methods.381  
Based on the result of the survey that most people in Hong Kong prefer not to introduce elections in 
1988, the Hong Kong government issued a White Paper entitled The Development of Representative 
Government: The Way Forward in February 1988, which stressed “prudent and gradual change”. The White 
Paper acknowledged the need for a “convergence” between Hong Kong’s internal developments and the 
future Basic Law. It included a decision to delay introducing direct elections to the territory’s Legislative 
Council in 1991.382     
On 28 April 1988, the first draft of the Basic Law was released for a public consultation. On 28 
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January 1989, the Basic Law Drafting Committee issued a “mainstream” proposal for political reform, 
initialed by Louis Cha Leung-yung, chairman of its sub-group on the political system, and further modified 
by Chi Ming Cha, a member of the BLDC. The “proposal of the two Chas” elicited strong criticism for 
being too conservative. The mainstream model laid the foundation for the second draft of the Basic Law 
published on 22 February 1989. 
The drafting of the Basic Law was soon interrupted by the Tiananmen incident. The next day after 
the issuance of the Martial Law, on 31 May 1989, a million Hong Kong people (one fifth of the population) 
participated in the protesting demonstrations. On May 18, 1.5 million people participated in the 
“Democratic Demonstration of Chinese around the World”, on June 4, 1 million people participated in the 
mourning assemblies. On May 21, the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China 
led by democrats supplied money and stuff to the students on Tiananmen Square.383 Slogans like “Today 
Beijing, Tomorrow Hong Kong” were a vivid expression of the anxiety of Hong Kong people.384   
After the Tiananmen incident, a general consensus emerged in Hong Kong that there should be a 
faster pace for democratic reforms in Hong Kong. Even the conservatives voiced the same opinion in Hong 
Kong. The architect of the conservative group, Lo Hong-sui, revealed in an interview on 21 June 1989 that 
he would try to persuade the more conservative wing of his group to accept for a faster pace of democratic 
transition. He said: 
 
We still do not believe democracy in Hong Kong can be a bulwark against Beijing; but the response 
of the people of Hong Kong, their sincerity and commitment made us believe democratization can be 
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accelerated.385
 
Alvin So argued that the Tiananmen incident had profound implications for Hong Kong’s 
democratization. First, it greatly empowered the service professionals, their democracy project was given a 
chance of rebirth after its near-fatal defeat in the Basic Law struggles. Second, anti-democracy forces 
decomposed during and in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. Third, at the height of the Tiananmen 
affair, Beijing lost its credibility with the Hong Kong public. Fourth, the protest marches during the 
Tiananmen incident expanded the support of the service professionals among the grassroots population.386
In May 1989 the unofficial members of the Legislative Council unanimously agreed that one third of 
the Council should be directly elected in 1991 and half in 1995. The Basic Law Consultative Committee in 
June 1989 terminated its work with an announcement: “We are temporarily unable to carry out our work as 
planned.”387 In July 1989 the unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) 
recommended that one third of the Legislative Council should be directly-elected in 1991 and not less than 
50 percent in 1993. This became known as the OMELCO consensus model.  
 
II. The Draft Basic Law 
1. Sino-British Discussions on British Reforms 
The agreement that British reforms should converge with the Basic Law laid the foundation for 
further consultations between the two countries on the Hong Kong Basic Law. According to the White 
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Paper, the British government was about to publish a review on whether to introduce direct elections to the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council in 1988. The Chinese government was against such an idea. The British 
side decided to put off the introduction of directly elected seats to the Legislative Council. At the same time, 
the two countries continued their discussions on the future political system of Hong Kong.   
The two countries reached an understanding that democratic reforms should not be introduced too 
quickly in Hong Kong. Some people believed that some secret understandings were reached between the 
two countries on the future political system of Hong Kong. John Walden, the former director of home 
affairs in the Hong Kong Government, wrote an article in The Times which revealed: “within a year of 
Parliament’s endorsement of agreement” - of the joint declaration with China in December 1984 - “Foreign 
Office Officials had secretly agreed to China’s demand that Britain slow down its plans for democratic 
reform.”388
On 23 September 1987, Hong Kong Governor Wilson paid his first visit to Beijing as the newly 
appointed governor. The Chinese argued that they were against introducing direct elections to the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council in 1988. Wilson argued that the British had to consider whether to introduce the 
reforms by looking at the result in the review of 1987.389 The two sides failed to reach an understanding on 
the issue.  
It was speculated that Peking and London reached an understanding on political changes when the 
Hong Kong Governor, Sir David Wilson, held talks with Chinese officials in Peking on 3 to 5 December 
1987. The two governments were believed to have agreed that direct elections would not be introduced in 
1988 but in the early 1990s, after the promulgation of the Basic Law.390 The last Governor Patten also 
                                                        
388 House of Common Hansard Debates for 4 April 1990, Column 1574.  
389 Li Hou, Bainian Quru Shi de Zhongjie, p. 226.  
390 Emily Lau, “A Limited Franchise”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 December 1987, p. 36.  
 171
believed that some form of “understanding” was reached between China and Britain. He believed that it 
had been agreed that if direct elections were not held in Hong Kong in 1988 by Britain, then China would 
include some sort of commitment to direct elections in their own Basic Law.391  
The British diplomats in charge of the negotiations were against the criticisms that they were 
engaged in dirty deals with the Chinese. According to Governor David Wilson, the Chinese were against a 
review because to them it preempted the Basic Law, the future constitution for Hong Kong. The results 
showed Hong Kong opinion was divided over how quickly Britain should move towards a more 
representative government.392  
Wilson admitted that democratic reforms in Hong Kong were thorny issues to handle: “Those who 
wanted us to go faster, criticized it; those who would have liked it to go more slowly, were also critical, but 
much more quietly because they were those sort of people.” Wilson explained that what was achieved was 
“something which met the growing aspirations in Hong Kong, but managed to fit them in with what was 
tolerable to China.”393
Foreign Secretary Howe also argued that the report was based on the political opinions of the Hong 
Kong people. He pointed out in an article on Wall Street Journal, “The fact is that the process of developing 
representative government in Hong Kong is being conducted in accordance with the wishes of the people of 
Hong Kong. Whatever the critics may say, it was clear from a 1987 review that the majority support a 
gradual evolution of more representative government.”394  
The British kept discussing with the Chinese on the Basic Law through private channels. The 
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British government was working hard to make their political reforms converge with the Basic Law to 
ensure that their democratic reforms could pass the threshold of 1997. As Governor Wilson explained to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, his main objective of consulting the Chinese was to ensure continuity of the 
political system of Hong Kong before and after the handover, “If we mirror-image before 1997 what is in 
the Basic Law with the objective of continuity of the legislature, which to us is something which is of great 
importance, that there should be continuity while making due allowances for the change of sovereignty.” 
395
In February of 1988, the British postponed direct elections in Hong Kong until 1991. According to 
the testimony of Lydia Dunn at the Foreign Affairs Select Committee even before the Tiananmen incident, 
the public opinion in Hong Kong on the issue was still divided. In January 1989 the British officials 
expressed satisfaction on British input in the Basic Law. Kuai Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper reported, 
“After initial research on the articles in the Basic Law, the British government was satisfied and believed 
that many British suggestions were accepted by the Chinese.”396
In November 1988, Governor Wilson held talks in Beijing with Chinese officials. It is understood the 
two governments agreed on a method of forming the first SAR legislature that would help ensure a smooth 
transition from British to Chinese rule in 1997. During the November meeting, a source told the Far 
Eastern Economic Review the British Government accepted the Chinese position that the first SAR chief 
executive should not be elected by universal suffrage.397  
The British did not achieve their initial objective to introduce reforms to the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council in 1988, but they were still working to persuade the Chinese to accept a faster pace of democratic 
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reforms in Hong Kong. They tried to achieve this objective through discussions with the Chinese on the 
Hong Kong Basic Law.  
The British were skillfully trying to give the Chinese the wrong impression that they wanted to push 
the reforms on the Chinese. Wilson argued that the British presented their ideas as suggestions without 
taking a pushy attitude: “So we said: it’s your affair to get on with. But you might find these ideas 
helpful.”398  
By making these consultations secretive, the British were able to influence this important law-making 
process of China. British participation in the indisputably “internal affair” of China was amazing. Xu Jiatun 
disclosed: “The British side made suggestions to each chapter, paragraph, section and even choice of words 
in the Basic Law. Such a deep involvement [of a foreign country in Chinese law-making process] was 
unprecedented.”399
In a visit to Beijing, head of the British delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee Mr Jopling 
revealed that before the Tiananmen incident the Chinese government had a positive attitude toward a faster 
pace of democratization in Hong Kong. He disclosed:  
 
The report that this Committee wrote after our previous visit: “our discussions in Beijing, which 
were held in April 1989, before the events of Tiananmen Square, let us to believe that the Chinese 
government had no objection to fast process” (that is with the move towards democracy). “The 
Chinese officials to whom we spoke emphasize that the timetable for the introduction of 
representative government was a matter of Hong Kong.” Now, that is my clear reflection, and it is 
the clear reflection of all of us who went to Beijing and discussed these matters. We put it in our 
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report, it has never been challenged by anybody from China.400
 
2. Shaping Hong Kong’s Political System 
The political system of the Basic Law was the most controversial part of the mini-constitution of 
Hong Kong when it was drafted. Since the establishment of the political subgroup of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee in April 1986, members of the small group were at pains to forge a consensus on Hong 
Kong’s political system. Head of the small group, a legal expert from Peking University Xiao Weiyun 
disclosed that among the five small groups in the Basic Law Drafting Committee, the political sub-group 
held the most frequent meetings, had the longest discussions and took much more time to talk things over 
than other sub-groups.401
The Chinese government’s decisions on the future political system of Hong Kong were gradually 
taking shape as the Basic Law was being drafted. The general principles on drafting of the Basic Law were 
explained by Deng Xiaoping to the Basic Law Drafting Committee. However, on specific issues on which 
the central government did not have a clear idea, Chinese officials in charge of the Hong Kong issue, Ji 
Pengfei, Xu Jiatun, Li Hou and Lu Ping seemed to disagree on the political system in Hong Kong.  
On 18 June 1987, Xinhua-Hong Kong distributed an advanced summary of an interview with Li Hou, 
deputy director of the PRC State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and secretary general of 
the Basic Law Drafting Committee. Li declared that direct elections in 1988 would fail to “converge” with 
the Basic Law being drafted by China, was contrary to the spirit of the Joint Declaration, and would 
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sharpen class contradictions, leading to instability harmful to a smooth transfer of sovereignty in 1997.402
The considerations of the Chinese government on the drafting of the Basic Law had been explained 
to the drafters of the Basic Law by Deng Xiaoping in a meeting with members of the drafting committee in 
1987. It was decided that Hong Kong’s political system should not copy the West, and changes should take 
place gradually. The Chinese government wanted to preserve the current system of Hong Kong. The 
overwhelming consideration for the decision was concerns that a change in the political system of Hong 
Kong would undermine the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.    
Deng’s speech was published in full in September of the same year contained some of the best clues 
to the final decisions by the Chinese government. Deng Xiaoping revealed his vision for the political 
system of the future Hong Kong SAR. The central government’s three concerns in drafting the Basic Law 
were clearly explained in Deng’s speeches. 
First of all, the Chinese government did not want much change in the present political system. Deng 
appreciates Governor Wilson’s idea of “gradual and incremental” change to the Hong Kong’s present 
political system. Deng argued:   
 
As I said before, the Hong Kong Basic Law should not be too specific, nor should the political 
system of Hong Kong be westernized and completely copy the West. Hong Kong did not practice the 
systems of Britain or the United States and had been like this for one and a half century. If we copy 
the West now, for example, to establish the separation of powers and the parliamentary systems of 
Britain and the United States and judge whether it was democracy through this criteria is 
inappropriate. Recently, Governor Wilson said that the changes should be gradual and incremental. I 
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think this is a practical idea. Even if we want universal suffrage, we need a gradual transition and 
take one step at a time.403
 
Secondly, Deng was concerned about the negative implications of democratization to Hong Kong. He 
pointed out that the people elected by general elections may not fit the criteria of loving China and loving 
Hong Kong. Deng said:  
 
So far as democracy is concerned, on the mainland we have socialist democracy, which is different in 
concept from bourgeois democracy. Western democracy includes, among other features, the 
separation of the three powers and multi-party elections. We have no objections to Western countries 
doing it that way, but we on the Chinese mainland do not have such elections… would it be good for 
Hong Kong to hold general elections? I don’t think so. For example, as I have said before, Hong 
Kong’s affairs will naturally be administered by Hong Kong people, but will it do for the 
administrators to be elected by a general ballot? We say that Hong Kong’s administrators should be 
people of Hong Kong who love the motherland and Hong Kong, but will a general election 
necessarily bring out people like that?”404  
 
     Thirdly, Deng argued that despite the high autonomy enjoyed by the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China, he was concerned that some interference from the central government was 
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necessary. The biggest concern of the central government was the occurrence of disturbance in the 
transition period. He stated that in the case of disturbance in Hong Kong, the central government would 
interfere:  
 
Do not think that since Hong Kong affairs will be managed by Hong Kong people and be entirely 
free from interference from the central government, everything is therefore all right. This is not 
permissible, and this idea is unrealistic. The central government will not interfere in the Special 
Administrative Region’s routine affairs, nor does it feel a need to. But what if something happens in 
the SAR that threatens to jeopardize the country’s fundamental interest? Will this not happen? Will 
Peking have to step in then? Will things that jeopardize Hong Kong’s fundamental interest not 
happen in Hong Kong? Can one imagine that Hong Kong would ever be entirely free from 
disturbance and destructive forces? I think that such self-assurance is unfounded. If the central 
government gives up all its rights and powers, there would be chaos and Hong Kong’s interests 
would be adversely affected. Thus the central government’s reservation of certain powers could not 
be beneficial to Hong Kong. We should soberly consider this: will Hong Kong encounter problems 
that cannot be solved without Peking acting on its behalf? In the past, whenever Hong Kong has 
encountered such problems it has always had Britain to count on. There will be problems that you 
cannot solve without the central government acting on your behalf…405
 
Deng’s speech set the line for the Chinese officials. On 3 June 1988 Deng Xiaoping made another 
important instruction, he said:  
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 Hong Kong’s transition period should be stable. After China’s resumption of sovereignty, when Hong 
Kong people are ruling Hong Kong, Hong Kong should also be stable. This is a key. To maintain the 
stability of Hong Kong, we should not only keep Hong Kong’s economic development, but also 
maintain a stable political system. I said that the political system of Hong Kong was not practicing 
the political system of Britain or the United States, afterward it should not copy the West. If we copy 
the West and it lead to unrest, that will be very disadvantageous for us. This is a practical and very 
serious issue.406
 
The broad principles for drafting the Basic Law were set in stone with the speech of the paramount 
leader. From Deng’s comments it was obvious that the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong were the 
central government’s biggest concern. A stable political system was the surest guarantee for Hong Kong’s 
continued economic success. Deng only gave a broad description of the outlook in the drafting of the Basic 
Law. He laid out that as long as there was not a radical change in the present political system and as long as 
the change did not disrupt the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, it would be acceptable to the central 
government. This handed over great power to the Basic Law Drafting Committee, in which the decisions 
were determined by votes.  
Drafting the Basic Law was a historical enterprise to enshrine the unprecedented idea of “one country, 
two systems” in the mini-constitution of Hong Kong. To make the law reflect the opinions of the Hong 
Kong people, the central government left the issue to be settled by votes in the Basic Law Drafting 
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Committee. The central government only laid out some broad principles, but did not exert much control on 
the issue.  
The senior Chinese officials in charge of drafting the Basic Law on a daily basis were Ji Pengfei, Li 
Hou and Lu Ping from the State Council, Zhou Nan from the Foreign Ministry and Xu Jiatun from 
Xinhua-Hong Kong. The biggest challenge in drafting the legal document was how to design the future 
political system of Hong Kong, among which the most important issues include how to elect the future 
chief executive of Hong Kong, the constitution of the Hong Kong legislature and the relations between the 
legislature and executive of the Hong Kong government.  
The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law were both unprecedented documents which tried to lay out 
Hong Kong’s future systems in advance. Such a process was challenging for drafter from both the mainland 
and Hong Kong. It was bound to be a process of trials and errors. Xu Jiatun revealed in one of the meetings 
of the subgroup on political structure presided by Li Hou, Li advocated that there would be separation of 
the three powers in future political system of the Hong Kong SAR. There should be checks and balances 
among the three powers. Such a formula was not acceptable to Deng Xiaoping, later on Deng raised his 
objections to such a formula.407
In this unprecedented law making process in China, the Hong Kong and mainland members with 
different perspective on the pace of democratization in Hong Kong all tried to influence the final result, to 
get what they preferred into the final constitution of Hong Kong. The result was an intriguing process that 
involved people advocating rapid democratization, people with very conservative ideas. The work of the 
drafting committee was also instantly publicized by the media. As a result, the outcome of the politics of 
Basic Law Drafting became a process the outcome of which was surprising even for the Chinese officials 
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who were heads of the meetings. In this process, Xu Jiatun seemed to outmaneuver his colleagues in the 
mainland and succeeded in passing the more conservative version he preferred in the draft Basic Law.         
     All the top positions of the BLDC and BLCC were political appointees. As they were by no means 
politically neutral, the credibility and impartiality of the two bodies were undermined. The chairman of the 
BLDC was Ji Pengfei, the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. There were 
eight deputy directors of the BLDC, four from the mainland and the rest from Hong Kong. The mainland 
vice-chairman were Xu Jiatun, Wang Hanbin, secretary-general of the Chinese National People’s Congress; 
Hu Sheng, director of the Party History Research Centre of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party; and Fei Xiaotong, an anthropologist.408
Members of the sub-group of political structure included the Chief Editor of Ming Pao, Louis Cha 
Leung-yung and a legal expert from Peking University, Xiao Weiyun were in charge of the group. The 
members in the group were Mo Kwan-nin, Szeto Wah, Xu Chongde, Li Hou, Martin Lee Chu-ming, Li 
Fook-sean Simon, Zhang Youyu, Zheng Weirong, Xiang Chunyi, Cha Chi-ming, Huang Baoshin, Lu Ping, 
Lei Jieqiong, Liu Yiu-chu, Duanmu Zheng and Maria Tam.409  
 
Chart 5.1 Sub-group on Political Structure in the Drafting Committee 
Head Xiao Weiyun, Louis Cha Leung-yung 
Member Mo Kwan-nin, Szeto Wah, Xu Chongde, Li Hou, Martin Lee Chu-ming, Li 
Fook-sean Simon, Zhang Youyu, Zheng Weirong, Xiang Chunyi, Cha Chi-ming, 
Huang Baoshin, Lu Ping, Lei Jieqiong, Liu Yiu-chu, Duanmu Zheng and Maria Tam 
 
Xiao Weiyun revealed in his report to the Small Group on Political Structure in August 1986, he 
included 26 proposals. In the reports on the “Selection of the Chief Executive” and “The Summary on 
Proposals on Selection of the Chief Executive” the Basic Law Consultative Committee listed over thirty 
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proposals. These proposals included the different opinions from all groups in Hong Kong. As a result, 
Annex I of the Draft Basic Law Eliciting Opinions included five proposals.410  
During a BLDC political sub-group meeting in June 1987, the mainland head of the sub-group Xiao 
Weiyun proposed the formation of an “executive meeting,” modeled on Hong Kong’s present Executive 
Council. Members of the executive meeting would be nominated by the chief executive and appointed by 
Peking. To further strengthen the chief executive’s position and to whittle down the powers of the 
legislature, the majority of the political subgroup members agreed to BLDC deputy secretary-general Mo 
Kwan-nin’s proposal that a motion to impeach the chief executive could only be passed if approved by 75% 
of the legislature, thus making impeachment almost impossible. All of these proposals were supported by 
Hong Kong political subgroup members Maria Tam, Simon Li Fook-sean, Louis Cha Leung-yung, Cha 
Chi-ming and Liu Yiu-chu. The only dissenters were Szeto Wah and Martin Lee Chu-ming.411
The political structure of Hong Kong was the most important and most controversial issue in the 
drafting of the Basic Law. With the presence of two democrats, Martin Lee Chu-ming and Szeto Wah in the 
political small group of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, the small group had long discussions but 
always presented several models in their reports to the Drafting Committee. As the first draft of the Basic 
Law was to be finished in 1989, the heads of the small group, Xiao Weiyun and Louis Cha Leung-yung 
were working hard to forge a model on the future legislature of Hong Kong.  
At the 16th meeting of the Subgroup held in Guangzhou from 19 to 22 November, Mr Louis Cha 
Leung-yung submitted the working paper to the Subgroup. The Subgroup amended the provisions on the 
political structures according to the opinions collected in the five-month consultation period. The Subgroup 
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spent three days discussing and amending Annexes I, II and III, and another day and evening discussing 
and amending other articles. The Subgroup adopted the “show of hands” voting method to decide on the 
amendments to the Annexes and articles. Eighteen out of the 19 members were present at that meeting. One 
of the mainland members was absent with apology. The amendments to the articles were all adopted with 
the consent of more than half of the members present at that meeting, i.e. by at least 10 members.412  
The meeting in which Louis Cha Leung-yung tried to pass his model on the future political system 
of Hong Kong was criticized by many people as a violation of democratic rights of the Hong Kong people. 
The details on the meeting are disclosed at the present time. Xiao Weiyun disclosed that he received the 
telegram from Louis Cha Leung-yung in early November 1988. Xiao arrived in Guangzhou on 18 
November 1988 to attend the meeting to be held that day. Xiao claimed that he suggested that Louis Cha 
Leung-yung should go a little faster in his political model.413
The meeting started with the procedures on discussions of the political structure of Hong Kong. Xiao 
argued that the discussions within the small group was not based on the mainstream model, but was passed 
with discussions of all proposals on the political structure. It was decided that discussions centered on the 
different issues to be passed one by one. The issue was divided into three issues: how to select the Chief 
Executive, the pace for development and the final goal. The big issues were also broken down to specific 
issues like the formation of the Election Committee, how to divide functional group, the number and ratios 
of the functional constituencies, and the nominations, etc.414
Some of the Hong Kong members in the Basic Law Drafting Committee were against the 
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introduction of direct elections in the Basic Law. It was reported that Lawyer Dorothy Liu Yiu-chu, a 
member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee had admitted she was the source of reports which appeared 
in the mass-circulation Hong Kong newspaper Oriental Daily News and the influential Hong Kong 
Economic Journal. These reports, quoting “a source close to China,” said that Peking might rule out direct 
elections in the first special administrative region legislature, thereby stopping Britain from introducing 
direct elections in the transition period. The reports were denied by the BLDC deputy secretary-general Lu 
Ping and by Xu Jiatun. Xu accused “someone” of using China’s name to float trial balloons.415
The deputy secretary-general of the Basic Law Drafting Committee Leung Chunying was a political 
activist with distaste for the middle-class liberals. In an interview with Lo Shiu Hing, Leung revealed that 
the Hong Kong people sometimes could not persuade the Chinese government to accept their proposals on 
Hong Kong’s political system because they did not know how to communicate with the Chinese 
government:  
The approach of some Hong Kong people is counterproductive because they did not understand that 
communication with China requires a special finesse. These people have no experience in 
communicating with China. For instance, when they discuss the feasibility of adapting a particular 
political model for Hong Kong with the Chinese side, they often use threats and cite the public 
opinion card, saying that if China does not accede to their demands, the Hong Kong people will 
emigrate. This is not the correct approach to communicate with China…416
 
The democrats criticized the composition of the Basic Law Drafting Committee by claiming that the 
                                                        
415 Emily Lau, “The Leaking Lawyer”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 March 1987, p. 12.  
416 Lo Shiu Hing, “The Politics of Cooptation in Hong Kong: A Study of the Basic Law Drafting Process”, pp. 
8-9.  
 184
Hong Kong people’s views could not be represented by the Basic Law Drafting Committee. They criticized 
that the composition of the Basic Law Drafting Committee meant that the Hong Kong members were 
always the minority and could not pass the proposals their favoured the most in the drafting committee. In a 
testimony before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, democrat Szeto Wah revealed that among the 59 
drafters of the Basic Law, there were only 23 Hong Kong people, but 36 mainland drafters. He mentioned 
that when Martin and him tried to find five people to join them in proposing a bill, “could not find even 
five to support us”.417  
     Xiao revealed that the mainland drafters were not the majority in the small group. In the meeting that 
passed the mainstream model of Louis Cha Leung-yung. 18 members of the 19 member small group 
participated in the discussions, including 10 from Hong Kong and 8 from the mainland. Two mainland 
members seldom raised their hands in the voting process. As a result, the mainland members had only 6 
votes in the voting process.418 The report on the political model reads: “The present political model has the 
support of the majority of the Subgroup members and is a compromise model built on the basis of the 
opinions collected in the five-month consultation period.”419
The BLDC passed a controversial, conservative political model at the eighth BLDC plenary session, 
held in Canton from 9-15 January. The plenary session’s proposed draft will be submitted to the NPC 
standing committee for approval in February. A second draft Basic Law will then be published. The 
approved political model was proposed by Louis Cha Leung-yung. It stipulates that the territory’s people 
will not be allowed to elect their own chief executive until at least 2012. It also suggests that 27% of the 
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SAR’s first legislature be directly elected, with the rest to be chosen by functional constituencies. Under the 
Cha model, the proportion of directly elected legislators would increase to 38% in the legislature’s second 
term, beginning in 1999, and to 50% in its third and fourth terms, starting in 2003 and 2007 respectively. A 
referendum might be conducted in 2011 to decide whether the chief executive and the entire legislature 
should be elected by universal suffrage. The first chief executive, would be selected by a 400-member 
committee consisting of businessmen, professionals, works and local and mainland politicians. The 
committee would be expanded to 800 to select the chief executive for the second and third terms. The 
plenary session also approved an amendment proposed by Hong Kong businessman Cha Chi-ming that 
would make it virtually impossible to hold a referendum on universal suffrage. Cha’s amendment states that 
the decision to hold a referendum in 2011 must be approved by the chief executive, two-thirds of the 
legislature and the NPC standing committee and it must be supported by 30% of qualified voters.420
     Since the seventh plenary session of the Drafting Committee ended in April 1988, some members of 
the Subgroup on Political Structure have conducted two consultation exercises in Hong Kong, in June and 
in September of respectively. During July and August, some of the mainland drafters held discussion 
sessions in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Fuzhou to listen to people’s views – on the Draft Basic Law 
for Solicitation of Opinions. 
In mid-November, the majority of the Basic Law Drafting Committee political subgroup members 
approved a proposal that a referendum should be held in 2011 to decide if the chief executive should be 
elected by universal suffrage. Until then, he would be chosen by a 400-member election committee. The 
subgroup also recommended that 27% of the first SAR legislature be elected by universal suffrage and the 
rest by functional or professional constituencies. Chinese officials eventually promised that the proposal 
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could be changed at the BLDC plenary session in January, and conceded the referendum could be held after 
the second, instead of the third, five-year term of the chief executive.421
In January 1989, Louis Cha Leung-yung and Cha Chi-ming of the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
proposed a “mainstream” proposal. The model had 27% of the Legco members elected in 1997, and 50% 
elected by 2007. The proposal was considered conservative and was passed by the Constitutional Panel of 
the BLDC. The proposal has to be approved later by the plenary meeting of BLDC. The Cha-Cha model 
was enshrined in the draft Basic law. Some middle-class liberals publicly burnt the political section of the 
Basic Law in early 1989.422
The second draft of the Basic Law issued in February 1989 provided for 27 percent of the seats to be 
directly elected, that is 15 out of 55.423 In March 1989, the voter turnout at municipal elections in the 
territory fell to a record low of 17.6%, compared to 26.6% in those held three years ago. The elections for 
the Urban Council and Regional Council on 9 March were the highest level of direct franchise permitted in 
Hong Kong. Half of the 30 members of Urban Council are elected by one person, one vote and the other 
half are appointed by the government. Of the 36 Regional Council members, only one-third are directly 
elected.424  
 
3. Xu Jiatun’s Role in the Drafting Committee 
After the deviation crisis, pro-Peking elements in Hong Kong have begun a propaganda campaign, 
including leaks to the press in early February 1986 stating China’s strong objection to direct elections to the 
Legislative Council in 1988. It is understood the Hong Kong government views the leaks as “private 
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initiatives” by members of the official Xinhua news agency. It is felt a good deal of confusion has arisen 
within Xinhua about the party line in Hong Kong since the movement against “bourgeois liberalization” 
began in China in January. Some Xinhua officials are apparently equating direct elections with bourgeois 
liberalism. The reports were seen by some Hong Kong officials and politicians as “trial balloons” to put 
pressure on the British and Hong Kong governments and to intimidate and silence the Hong Kong public 
on direct elections.425
In 1987, Xinhua-Hong Kong officials exhorted the liberals not to promote democratization too 
vigorously, because China would strengthen her position against the idea of “using democracy to resist 
communism.”426 Xu’s successful united front work increased his leverage in Hong Kong’s politics through 
his connections with key Hong Kong politicians. Ever since his nomination in Hong Kong, Xu had 
established good relations and met regularly with the senior executive members of the Legislative Council 
Chung Sze-yuen. Some politicians in Hong Kong criticized that Xu almost brainwashed Chung with his 
political doctrines.  
On 23 April 1987, Hong Kong Government’s most senior appointed political adviser Chung 
Sze-yuen said Britain would be turning over Hong Kong’s administration to China in 1997 – not to the 
Hong Kong people. Though the Joint Declaration stipulates that the SAR legislature is to be constituted by 
elections, it does not say whether elections are to be direct or indirect. He said China would not tailor its 
Basic Law to accommodate Hong Kong and so Hong Kong would simply have to follow the Basic Law. 427 
Chung’s statement led to many criticisms in Hong Kong. His remark was made a week after Deng’s 
comments that universal suffrage and direct elections to a representative assembly would not be beneficial 
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to Hong Kong. Legco member Conrad Lam said Chung sounded more like a Chinese official than an Exco 
member. Chung’s argument was a copy of the line of Xu Jiatun. 
It was widely believed that the Hong Kong governor took up the matter in his private meeting on 20 
June 1987 with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, who happened to be passing through Hong Kong on 
his return to China from a trip abroad. Almost simultaneous with Wu’s “courtesy call” on Governor Wilson 
in Hong Kong was an even stronger criticism of the Hong Kong government’s electoral reform by an 
“anonymous” senior Chinese official in an “off-the-record talk” with Hong Kong journalists in Shenzhen. 
This senior Chinese official was widely identified in the Hong Kong press and media as none other than Xu 
Jiatun. Xu’s “off-the-record” remark was that the promise of an elected legislature in the Joint Declaration 
was Beijing’s concession for the sake of maintaining good relations with London. This implied that either 
the provisions for elections were a promise not to be taken literally or that Britain had tacitly indicated it 
would be satisfied with indirect elections. However, when TVB, Hong Kong’s leading television station, 
referred to this remark in its evening news on June 21, the local Xinhua-Hong Kong spokesman issued an 
immediate rebuttal labeling the TVB news report as “inaccurate.”428
Through his provision of the lists of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Xu outmaneuvered his 
colleagues at the beginning of the Drafting Committee, due to his opportunities to dine with the famous 
business leaders and other renowned people in Hong Kong. The large proportion of the Hong Kong 
business people in the Basic Law Drafting Committee were perceived negatively by the liberals in Hong 
Kong.  The conservative business people always held a negative attitude on Hong Kong’s 
democratization.  
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Through building wide connections in Hong Kong, Xu also established good relations with some of 
the key figures in the drafting committee, as the establishment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and 
the Basic Law Consultative Committee was an important part of the united front policy of the Chinese 
government, to win over the hearts of the richest and the most powerful people in Hong Kong. Xu’s united 
front work in Hong Kong made it possible for him to take control of the confusing and disorderly situation 
in the drafting of the Basic Law. Through his preaching to important figures in Hong Kong about his 
political ideas and through spreading his political beliefs publicly and anonymously, Xu was trying to 
manipulate the political seen in Hong Kong.  
Deng’s prescriptions were vague expressions on Hong Kong’s political system. On how to spell out 
Deng’s prescriptions in the Basic Law, the top Chinese officials in the drafting committee still held 
different views on specific issues. It seemed that Xu held the most conservative idea on Hong Kong’s 
democratization among the top Chinese officials. As could be seen in Xu’s memoirs, Ji Pengfei respected 
the democratic procedures much better than Xu Jiatun. He ignored Xu’s suggestion that Ji should call a 
meeting to force a consensus on Communist members of the Drafting Committee before the meeting in 
1989. Lu Ping and Li Hou seemed also to be sympathetic to the democratization in Hong Kong. British 
ambassador Richard Evans said he was impressed by the understanding of Hong Kong displayed by the 
senior officials of the Hong Kong and Macao Office of the States Council. He said “people like Li Hou, 
whom you met, and Lu Ping, strike me as people who are extremely knowledgeable and who had antennae 
which vibrated when a signal came to them.429  
The British ambassador from 1984 to 1988, Richard Evans expressed a positive attitude toward Hong 
Kong’s democratic reforms by expressing his impression that the Chinese officials in charge of the Hong 
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Kong issue were well-informed of the Hong Kong issue. He assessed that “I am sure every individual 
Chinese minister and official who has responsibility for Hong Kong is traveling up a learning curve. 
However great his degree of knowledge and sensitivity, sensibility beforehand, as time goes on they all 
know more.”  
Xu made several blatant public statements about his negative attitude towards democracy in Hong 
Kong and even relating the demands for democracy of the liberals with patriotism. Xu Jiatun once 
criticized some liberals as “divisive elements” who created confrontation and whose behavior could be 
regarded as “unpatriotic”. Xu said:  
 
Patriotism is a sacred conviction and an admirable sentiment…We should not allow any turbulent, 
divisions and confrontation, but should strive for a healthy way to move forward. Hong Kong 
compatriots and people should comprehend this feeling…It is unfortunate that there are [people] 
building [their] political influence; appearance of conflicting camps; odds between one individual 
and another as a result of the debate [on political reform].430  
 
     At the 16th meeting of the Subgroup held in Guangzhou from 19 to 22 November, Mr Louis Cha 
Leung-yung submitted the working paper to the Subgroup. The Subgroup amended the provisions on the 
political structures according to the opinions collected in the five-month consultation period. The Subgroup 
spent three days discussing and amending Annexes I, II and III, and another day and evening discussing 
and amending other articles. The Subgroup adopted the “show of hands” voting method to decide on the 
amendments to the Annexes and articles. Eighteen out of the 19 members were present at that meeting. One 
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of the mainland members was absent with apology. The amendments to the articles were all adopted with 
the consent of more than half of the members present at that meeting, i.e. by at least 10 members.431  
The most controversial recommendation was the requirement of a referendum to be held between 
2003 and 2007 to decide whether the chief executive and the members of the Legislative Council should be 
directly elected. In case of a negative result, further referendums may be held only every 10 years.432 The 
present political model has the support of the majority of the Subgroup members and is a compromise 
model built on the basis of the opinions collected in the five-month consultation period.433
The movement’s weakness were fully exposed in November 1988 when the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee’s sub-group on the political structure of the Hong Kong SAR adopted a proposal by the chief 
editor of Ming Pao, Louis Cha Leung-yung, at a meeting in Guangzhou. Louis Cha Leung-yung was 
supposed to present a compromise formula, but his proposals were more conservative than expected and 
were widely believed to reflect Beijing’s thinking.434  
After Xu arrived in Hong Kong in 1983, he personally courted Cha, inviting him and his family to 
dinner. The two became good friends.435 In late 1988 Louis Cha Leung-yung consulted with Chinese 
officials over his political model, which provided for an increase in the proportion of directly elected 
legislators from 27 percent during the Chief Executive’s first term of office (1997-99) to 50 percent in the 
third (2003-07) and fourth (2007-11) terms. Cha’s model postponed democratization in Hong Kong by 
proposing that a referendum by conducted in 2011 to decide whether the Chief Executive and all legislators 
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should be elected by universal suffrage. Cha himself admitted that he and the mainland Chinese officials 
had discussed the model before he made amendments. (Sing Tao Jih Pao, December 3, 1988, p. 78.) For 
Cha, his model should be acceptable to the Hong Kong people, because the ideas of the BLDC 
vice-chairman, Xu Jiatun was “more conservative”.436
After Xu arrived in Hong Kong in 1983, he personally courted Cha, inviting him and his family to 
dinner. The two became good friends. 437 Louis Cha Leung-yung claimed that Chinese officials wanted a 
much faster pace of political reform than that provided for in his original model. According to his model, 
all legislators should be directly elected by universal suffrage in 2041, forty-five years after Hong Kong 
becomes a Special Administrative Region.438  Although Cha’s model was eventually not accepted by 
drafters of the Basic Law, it was an undeniable fact that he revised his model in accordance with the 
opinions of mainland Chinese drafters and officials. Without the approval of mainland Chinese officials and 
drafters, any political model proposed by the co-opted Hong Kong elites was destined to be abandoned. No 
wonder Cha explained to the middle-class liberals, who were so infuriated by his model that they burnt 
Cha’s newspaper Ming Pao in public that he would not put forward any political model disliked by China. 
439
At the end of 1988, Xu pressured Louis Cha Leung-yung for a more conservative model on Hong 
Kong’s political system. On the basis of Cha’s model, the Basic Law drafting committee passed a 
conservative mainstream model in early 1989, which was rejected by the Hong Kong people. In Xu’s 
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memoirs he revealed that Lu Ping, Li Hou and Ji Pengfei all believed this model was too conservative. 
After the model was passed in the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Lu Ping told Martin Lee Chu-ming that 
he did not expect the conservative proposal could get two thirds of the votes, as he did not support the 
model. Afterward Li Hou also told the journalist that he abstained in the voting process.440 After the 
meeting, Ji Pengfei called for a meeting of the Communist Party members in the Drafting committee who 
held the position of directors and secretaries of the committee. Xu Jiatun revealed that the passage of 
Cha-Cha model was a surprise for the Chinese officials. They agreed to revise the model through certain 
procedures.441
In late 1988, before the meeting of the sub-group on political structure of the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee, head of the group, Louis Cha Leung-yung paid a visit to meet Xu Jiatun. In November 1988, 
Xu Jiatun was in Shenzhen, Cha introduced to Xu his proposal: he designed that the chief executive of 
Hong Kong should be elected through an electoral committee, and the proportions for the members selected 
through different methods. The most important part is that he suggested a review of the option of universal 
suffrage and direct elections to the Legislative Council. He suggested the review should take place from the 
fourth term, namely, fifteen years after 1997, they should discuss whether to elect members to the 
Legislative Council and the chief executive through universal suffrage. 442
     Xu said he did not object to the proportions of members in Cha’s proposal, but he believed that the 
review in the fourth term was too fast. 443 He suggested the review should be delayed one to two terms. Cha 
explained that if during the fourth term the situation was still immature for universal suffrage, the review 
may not be passed. In the meeting of the sub-group in Guangzhou, Cha raised his proposals. It was believed 
                                                        
440 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu, p. 414. 
441 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu, pp. 415-416. 
442 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu, p. 411. 
443 Ibid. 
 194
that he had another plan to delay universal suffrage to thirty years after 1997, but it was leaked too early 
and raised objections. According to Xu, he wondered if his opinion changed Cha’s plan. He suggested that 
the review should be delayed for one to two terms, namely five to ten years. But Cha proposed fifteen years. 
During the fierce debates at the time, Cha said: “Xu Jiatun was more conservative than I am.” Xu said it 
was the truth. 444  
     The plenary meeting of the Drafting Committee was held in Guangzhou to discuss the proposals by 
the subgroups to prepare for the draft of the Basic Law. 445 Before the meeting, Xu suggested to Ji Pengfei 
that they should first of all hold a meeting of the Communist Party members of the drafting committee to 
reach a consensus on the issue. Such a suggestion was not accepted by Ji. Ji only asked Li Hou and Lu Ping 
to talk to a few communist members. 446
The proposal of Cha Chi-ming was passed. Cha Chi-ming’s proposal added four preconditions to the 
Louis Cha Leung-yung’s proposal: if a universal suffrage should be held in the fourth or fifth term of the 
legislative council, it has to confirm with four preconditions: passed by the majority in the Legislative 
Council, consent of the Chief Executive, ratification of the National People’s Congress, 30% of votes of the 
constituencies.447 By adding these four preconditions, Cha’s proposal was much more conservative than the 
Louis Cha model. Xu Jiatun revealed that no one expected such a proposal could be passed in the 
committee. He argued that the mainland drafter and the upper class representatives of the Hong Kong 
drafters held a conservative view on the issue.448  
At that time, Even Peking officials have publicly stated that 25% of Hong Kong’s legislative seats 
could be directly elected in 1991. Instead, the white paper calls for only about 18%, or 10 seats, to be filled 
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through direct polls.449 Why at a time when the Chinese government had allowed 25% directly elected seats, 
but the Wilson report turned out to be more conservative than the official Chinese version? This perplexing 
fact perhaps had something to do with Xu’s manipulation behind the scenes. The Xinhua director pressed 
the Hong Kong government for an assurance that it would not introduce democratic elections to the 
legislative council in 1988. 450
Xu had also been making comments anonymously to shape the political landscape of Hong Kong. On 
20 June 1987, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian made a “courtesy” call on Hong Kong Governor 
David Wilson. The visit was immediately followed by an even stronger criticism of the Hong Kong 
government by a Chinese official widely identified in the local press as none other than Xu Jiatun. Xu, off 
the record, made the remarkable statement that the promise of an elected legislature had been a concession 
by Peking promoted by the desire to maintain good relations with Britain. Xu’s remark either implied 
elections were a promise not to be taken literally or that Britain had tacitly indicated it would be content 
with indirect elections.451  
In his speech before the NPC on the future political system of Hong Kong, for example, Xu Jiatun 
qualified his statements in an important way: “Given democracy is new to the territory, there has to be a 
procedure through which to develop democracy. Drastic reforms are impossible, only gradual and prudent 
changes.”452
     China’s opposition to direct elections in 1988 has remained firmed and unequivocal. This ambiguous 
stance of the Chinese government was captured by Robin McLaren, “I do not think even in April 1989, 
despite the sentence from your then report which you read out, that the Chinese were wholly in favour of 
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the faster pace of democratization. I think they were willing to contemplate a measured, gradual pace of an 
increase in democratization but would not have been in favour of a very rapid democratization. What 
hardened their attitudes was the events of May and June 1989, and that caused them to look in a distinctly 
jaundiced way at exponents, whether in China or in Hong Kong itself, of western-style democracy. It 
caused them to look with particular suspicion at those people who advocated democracy in Hong Kong and 
also, after June 1989, advocated the overthrow of the then and now Chinese Government.”453
Cha came under attack because Ming Pao gave editorial endorsement to the subgroup’s proposals – 
thus violating a pledge to keep his political and publishing roles separate. College students burnt copies of 
Ming Pao. The unprecedented protests began with a 24-hour hunger strike on 4 December by 54 
pro-democracy demonstrators outside the Xinhua news agency. The following day, 700 protesters marched 
to Xinhua to join the hunger strikers and burned a copy of the draft version of the Basic Law. Some district 
board members began staging 50-hour hunger strikes to demonstrate their anger over the conservative 
political model. 454
Chinese University of Hong Kong lecturer Joseph Cheng Yu-shek said he was surprised by Peking’s 
hard line attitude. He said the BLDC’s approval of the conservative political model would further erode 
confidence here and exacerbate the territory’s brain-drain problem. About 45,000 Hong Kong residents 
emigrated in 1988, and the government expects more to leave this year. 455
Following the increased pressure, Cha said he would submit another proposal to the BLDC plenary 
session, fostering the impression he acted without consulting fellow subgroup members. 456 A resolution 
was reached in the “mainstream” plan. Louis Cha Leung-yung was one of the head of the subgroup on 
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political structure. He raised a compromise plan, but as Hong Kong people had no consensus on this issue. 
The meeting did not go deep into all proposals, it reached an agreement which was close to the proposal of 
Louis Cha Leung-yung, and named it the “mainstream plan.”457
The meeting listed the ratio for directly elected seats in Hong Kong proposed in Hong Kong. It 
generalized that most of the proposals suggested an increase in directly elected elements in the legislature. 
The mainstream proposal suggested to increase the directly elected seats from 27% in the first term to 
38.5% in the second term, and 50% in the third term. The meeting argued that the number for directly 
elected seats in the second term range round 25% to 60%, while the mainstream proposal was around the 
middle, which was 38.5%.458
A study by the Basic Law Consultative Committee compared the mainstream plan with the political 
models proposed by the following 14 groups/organizations as they have responded to the mainstream 
political model. Since the proposal of the Hong Kong Federation of Students is similar to that of the Group 
of 190, it is not listed separately in the paper. A survey of the various models will show that the proportion 
of popularly elected members of the first legislature ranges from 25% to no less than 50%. The proportion 
of popularly elected elements as proposed in the mainstream model is 27%, which is within the scope of the 
various models. (Chart 5.2)459
 
Chart 5.2. Popularly Elected Elements in the First Terms of the Legislature 
       Proportion of popularly elected members
Model 
25% 27% 30% 33.3% 40% ≥50% 
Group of 89 X      
Federation of trade unions    X   
Mainstream model  X     
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Hong Kong People’s Association   X    
Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants’ Association   X    
Outstanding Hong Kong Persons Association    X   
Group of 38    X   
Progressive Society of Hong Kong    X   
Federation of Hong Kong & Kowloon Labour 
Unions  
    X  
University Graduates’ Association     X  
Group of 190      X 
 
From 19 to 22 November 1988, the meeting of the Subgroup on Political Structure of the Drafting 
Committee in Guangzhou passed the part on political structure in the Draft Basic Law and passed the 
proposal on the method for constituting the Legislative Council of the HKSAR – “mainstream model”. 
Some criticize the model for being too conservative, pointing out that it has never appeared in the Draft 
Basic Law, nor has there been any prior consultation. Some, on the other hand, criticize the model for being 
too radical. Some even request that the mainstream model be put to a vote so that the decision may be made 
by the Hong Kong public, thus setting off an upsurge of discussion on political structure. 460 The CCBL 
collected 41 proposals for the political structure, which were forwarded to the Drafting Committee for 
consideration. 461
     The meeting decided that “the number of directly elected seats for the first term of the legislature of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be 30 percent, namely 18 people. The ratio for other 
elements of the legislature will be decided in the next meeting.”462 According to the mainstream model, the 
Chief Executive should be elected by an election committee which comprises 25 popularly elected 
members. The rest of the membership is as follows: 25% elected by the industrial, commercial and 
financial sectors; 25% by the professions; and 25% by the labour, social services and religious 
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communities. 463
     Although the various models share common characteristics and a common spirit, there are different 
proposals on the pace of democratic development. In this respect, the mainstream model proposes a 
moderate pace of development to achieve democracy step by step (see Chart 5.3).464  
 
      Chart 5.3 Comparison of the Mainstream Model with the Other Proposals  
 
                                           Mainstream model  
 
 
Relatively                                                           Relatively  
radical                                                              moderate  
             Scope of the pace of development of the political 
structure as proposed in various models  
 
In January 1989, the eighth plenary meeting of the Basic Law Drafting Committee passed the draft 
Basic Law. In January 1989, Louis Cha Leung-yung and Cha Chi-ming of the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee proposed a “mainstream” proposal. The model had 27% of the Legco members elected in 1997, 
and 50% elected by 2007. The proposal was considered conservative and was passed by the Constitutional 
Panel of the BLDC. The proposal has to be approved later by the plenary meeting of BLDC. The Cha-Cha 
model was enshrined in the second draft Basic law.465  
 
III. Shock of the Tiananmen Incident 
1. Sino-British Contacts after the Tiananmen Incident 
The Tiananmen incident led to a suspension of formal relations between China and Britain. The 
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common stakes in Hong Kong forced the Chinese and British governments to work together at this down 
time of bilateral relations. The British kept communicating with the Chinese after the Tiananmen incident, 
paving the way for serious discussions on Hong Kong’s political structure later on.  
In May 1989 the unofficial members of the Legislative Council unanimously agreed that one third of 
the Council should be directly elected in 1991 and half in 1995. The Basic Law Consultative Committee in 
June 1989 terminated its work with an announcement: “We are temporarily unable to carry out our work as 
planned.”466 In July 1989 the unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) 
recommended that one third of the Legislative Council should be directly-elected in 1991 and not less than 
50 percent in 1993. This became known as the OMELCO consensus.422 model.  
In early October 1989, Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew advised Hong Kong “not to 
confront China”. He suggested the British should give up their democratic reforms before China’s 
resumption of sovereignty. They should use the economic strength of the colony as a bargaining chip. In an 
interview on October 7, he said the Hong Kong people “should not confront China. You can’t confront it, it 
is too big.” He said, “The British can’t confront China. Neither do the Americans want to confront China on 
Hong Kong. Nobody will do it.” He said exerting pressure on China for democratic reforms or autonomy is 
“a method to disaster” as Beijing would not allow Hong Kong to become an independent entity.467 Some 
Hong Kong democrats were against Lee’s comments. They argue that Lee were worried that Hong Kong 
people would have democracy as it would have ripple effects in Singapore and challenge Lee’s theory of 
Asian values which argued that Chinese societies should not copy the democratic models of the West.  
The British input into drafting of the Basic Law was briefly interrupted by the Tiananmen incident. On 
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June 6, in answering questions in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Thatcher expressed “utter 
revulsion and outrage” over the Tiananmen incident.468 Britain put off the next meeting of the Joint Liaison 
Group, due to be held in July.469 The British suspended all ministerial exchanges and military contacts with 
China.470 It was also one of the first countries to impose sanctions on China. With the suspension of formal 
contact, British participation in the drafting of the Basic Law naturally came to a halt. 
The British could not afford to wait for the dust to settle in China. Before the incident, the Chinese 
government had published the first and second draft of the Basic Law, the final version was scheduled to be 
completed in February 1990. The draft Basic Law provided for only 15 directly-elected seats in 1997. The 
best option for the British to guarantee the future for Hong Kong was trying to persuade the Chinese to 
agree to increase the number of directly elected seats in the Hong Kong legislature in the Basic Law.  
Hong Kong is such a peculiar bond that linked the two countries together that the Tiananmen incident 
led to panic in the Foreign Office. “The unrest in China in 1989 had nothing to do with Britain and yet 
forced the foreign office into crisis-management mode.”471 Weeks after the Tiananmen incident the Foreign 
Affairs Committee visited the colony, the chairman of the delegation David Howe, admitted that during his 
visit to the colony he noted “the enormous bitterness which has built up against the United Kingdom”.472 
The anti-British sentiment caused British worries that the situation in Hong Kong could get out of control. 
Local officials and businessmen have told the British Government that Hong Kong could become 
“ungovernable” if confidence was not restored quickly.473
Resuming dialogue and restoring trust were very difficult as the Tiananmen incident made the Chinese 
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all the more allergic to Western pressure. British Foreign Affairs Adviser Percy Cradock remarked: 
“Tiananmen did increase the difficulties facing British negotiators: it made the Chinese authorities even 
more resentful, sensitive, and suspicious of British intentions in Hong Kong and fearful of democracy and 
foreign influence generally.”474
On 19 June, Geoffrey Howe sent Qian Qichen a letter to put off the meeting of the Sino-British Joint 
Liaison Group scheduled in July. Howe argued that to restore the fragile confidence in Hong Kong, China 
should not station troops in Hong Kong after 1997. He requested China to delay the ratification of the Basic 
Law, and claimed that Britain wanted to reconsider arrangements for elections in Hong Kong in 1991.475
The Foreign Affairs Committee report was hurriedly unveiled on 30 June to coincide with Howe’s 
visit. In it, the Committee acknowledged Britain had a particularly important obligation to Hong Kong 
because it was the only British colony “whose people cannot exercise the fundamental right of 
self-determination”. The FAC felt “Hong Kong’s future is inextricably linked to that of China,” so the 1984 
Sino-British Joint Declaration still provided the best and surest base for the future. 476  
The FAC rejected the views of senior Executive Council member Dame Lydia Dunn and senior Legco 
member Allen Lee Peng-fei who argued in London that only half of Legco should be directly elected by 
1997 so that “the possible unsettling effects of full direct elections should be postponed until the transfer of 
sovereignty”. On the selection of the first Hong Kong Special Administrative Region chief executive, the 
FAC report said the person should be elected by a democratically constituted electoral college six months 
before the transfer of sovereignty on 1 July 1997. The report opposed stationing of PLA troops in Hong 
Kong and called on the Chinese NPC Stationing Committee to delegate its power to interpret the Basic Law 
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to a joint constitutional court.477   
The committee’s critical recommendations were that full democracy should be introduced before 
1997, that the legislature should be sovereign, that 50 percent of the members should be directly elected by 
1991, and that the whole legislature should be directly elected by 1995.478 However, the significance of the 
report by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee could not be overemphasized, as this was only a 
consultative report. The British government did not follow this up by immediately expanding the directly 
elected seats in the Legislative Council. They were content to let the issue froze for the time being.  
In his memoirs Qian Qichen revealed during this meeting in Paris at the end of June 1989, he agreed 
with Major that the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, the meeting of which was suspended after the 
Tiananmen incident, would resume their work later. 479 John Major reflected on the progress made in this 
first formal contact between the two sides after the Tiananmen incident. He evaluated that they readily 
identified a way ahead in this crucial meeting and “established a dialogue that was to continue –albeit 
uncomfortably from time to time, right up to the handover in 1997”. 480   
The resumption of dialogue laid the groundwork for the future persuasive efforts by Britain to keep 
influencing the drafting of the Basic Law. In June the Chinese Foreign ministry made serious 
representations to the British Embassy in Beijing over an incident in which a shot was fired at the new 
office building of Hong Kong’s Xinhua News Agency branch. The incident had taken place between 3 and 
4 June, during a demonstration staged by the “Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic 
Movement in China”.481  
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At a time of international isolation of China after the Tiananmen incident, the British took advantage 
of the situation to rally international support for democratic reforms in Hong Kong. In a speech in the 
House of Commons on July 13, 1989, Foreign Secretary Howe pointed out that the British government was 
trying to get help internationally to solve the Hong Kong issue. He said: 
 
The House will have noted what Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada said in London on Tuesday, 11 
July: “We should all be ready to cooperate with the United Kingdom in the delicate and important 
task of reestablishing grounds for confidence among the people of Hong Kong that their territory has 
a secure, viable, and democratic future well beyond 1997. The problem of Hong Kong is not only 
just a problem for the United Kingdom. The problem and Hong Kong and its security and well-being 
is a problem for the world.”482  
 
Prime Minister Thatcher brought up the Hong Kong issue in major international forums, including 
the European Summit in Madrid, the Group of Seven economic summit in Paris, and the Commonwealth 
heads-of-government meeting in Kuala Lumpur. This incurred the wrath of China, which accused the 
British of “internationalization” of the Hong Kong issue. On September 1, the People’s Daily published an 
article that warned against pinning Hong Kong’s future on foreign powers. Two month later the theme was 
taken up again, with People’s Daily claiming that such attempts to garner international support were a 
violation of international law and a breach of the Joint Declaration. It said that Britain’s motive was to use 
international pressure to thwart China’s effort to resume sovereignty over Hong Kong.483   
In July 1989 Foreign Secretary Howe paid a three day visit to Hong Kong. On political reforms for 
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Hong Kong, Howe only referred vaguely to the need for changes to those currently proposed for 1991 and 
to consider steps before 1997. On the numerous problems with the Basic Law, he only expressed concern 
over the Chinese government’s power to declare a state of emergency and the Stationing of the People’s 
Liberation Army in the territory.  
The Thatcher government attempted to bring pressure on China on such issues as the stationing of 
the PLA in the Hong Kong SAR, the political system of the Hong Kong SAR, and the relationship between 
the Hong Kong SAR and the central government. Barrie Wiggham, Secretary for General Duties, made a 
speech entitled “Picking up the Pieces” at a Rotary Club lunch meeting in mid-August 1989. He listed 
several areas in the draft Basic Law that he said needed further examination, including the proposed 
agreement for the stationing of the PLA in Hong Kong after 1997. In response to Wiggham’s comments, the 
overseas edition of the People’s Daily published a Xinhua News Agency dispatch criticizing Wiggham for 
publicly interfering in the drafting of the Basic Law. The decision on the PLA garrison in the Hong Kong 
SAR was closely associated with Deng Xiaoping personally, which meant that the Chinese officials 
responsible for Hong Kong affairs had to defend it vigorously.484 The remarks provoked a stinging response 
from the Chinese, who said Wiggham’s action had “breached basic diplomatic common sense.”485
Percy Cradock vividly characterized the deterioration of Sino-British relations after the Tiananmen 
incident. He remarked: “Tiananmen revived all Peking’s neuroses about British duplicity and the external 
threats to their socialist system. It imported a renewed element of ‘struggle’ into a relationship where 
cooperation was slowing beginning to grow. It became a more obvious Chinese goal to extend a dominant 
influence over the territory as rapidly as possible.”486
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 2. Reshuffling of Chinese Politics  
The Tiananmen incident led to reshuffling in Chinese politics. In the fifth plenary meeting of the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee at the end of 1989, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili were dismissed 
at the fourth plenum in June, while the death of Zhao’s predecessor, Hu Yaobang in April had created 
another vacancy.487 The military officers in charge during the Tiananmen incident, Yang Shangkun, Yang 
Baibing and Zhang Gong consecutively retired or downgraded. And the Party Secretary of Beijing Li 
Ximing was fired. Deng Xiaoping also resigned his post as the President of the Central Military 
Commission.  
In an address to cadres of the martial law units in the capital on June 9, Deng Xiaoping made some 
crucial remarks on the future direction of China, which determines the continuation of the reforms and 
opening up. He assessed that the editorial of April 26 in People’s Daily ascertained the nature of the 
problem as that of turmoil. “The word turmoil is appropriate.” He said, “This storm was bound to come 
sooner or later. This is determined by the major international climate and China’s own minor climate.” He 
addressed the crucial question on the future course of China: “The first question is: Are the line, principles 
and policies adopted by the third plenary session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, including our 
three-step development strategy, correct?” He said, “It cannot be said that our strategic goal is wrong 
because this happened.”488  
Deng went on: “The second question is: Is the general conclusion of the Thirteenth Party Congress of 
one center, two basic points correct? He evaluated that “There is nothing wrong with the four cardinal 
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principles.”489 He remarked, “This is the summation of our work in the past decade: Our basic proposals, 
ranging from our development strategy to principles and politics, including, reform and opening to the 
outside world, are correct. If there is any inadequacy to talk about, then I should say our reforms and 
openness have not proceeded well enough.” “What do we do from now on? I would say that we should 
continue to implement the basic line, principles, and policies we have already formulated. We will continue 
to implement them unswervingly.”490  
Deng made important comments about the consequences for China of the collapse of East European 
Communism and the “betrayal” by Gorbachev: “Everyone should be very clear that under the present 
international situation all enemy attention will be concentrated on China. They will use every pretext to 
cause trouble, to create difficulties and pressures for us.” That combined with the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen event meant that what China needed was “stability, stability and more stability”. He made an 
insightful instruction on the future course of China: “the next three to five years will be extremely difficult 
for our party and our country, extremely important. If we stand fast and make it through, our enterprise will 
develop quickly. If we collapse, China’s history will regress for several tens of years, even a hundred 
years.”491
Immediately after the massacre, Deng Xiaoping was quick to re-stress the importance of stability and 
prosperity in Hong Kong, saying: “our country will benefit more if Hong Kong is running well. Without 
Hong Kong, we would have problems obtaining enough information.”492 On the basis of what Deng said on 
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that occasion, the Beijing authorities worked out a principle of “stabilizing Hong Kong, stabilizing the 
battle front, and stabilizing the contingent”.493 In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the PRC 
government tried to stop Hong Kong’s confidence crisis from deepening. Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office 
director Ji Pengfei stated: “I, on behalf of the Chinese government, solemnly declare that the Chinese 
government’s policies towards Hong Kong and Macao, which have been formulated in line with the 
conception of “one country, two systems”, will not change.”494  
Even when he tried to dispel the fear among the people of Hong Kong, Ji could not resist reminding 
his audience that they had “done something that is impermissible by the state Constitution and law and has 
in fact added fuel to the flames of turmoil.”495 Chen Xitong, the mayor of Beijing who officially summed 
up the party-state’s verdict on the incident, was particularly bitter about the money Hong Kong donated to 
the protesters, and the support the Hong Kong media gave to the students and to Zhao Ziyang.496
Chen Xitong, the mayor of Beijing pointed out those supporters in Hong Kong had supplied tents, 
enabling the students to “to set up ‘villages of freedom’ and launch a ‘democracy university’ in the 
square.”497 On July 11, Jiang Zemin, the new party chief, had declared to three Hong Kong visitors, “We 
practice our socialism and you may practice your capitalism. ‘The well water does not interfere with the 
river water.’ We will not practice socialism in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, but you should not 
transplant capitalism onto the country’s mainland.”498
On July 21, an article entitled Ai Zhong was published in People’s Daily. The leaders of the Alliance, 
Szeto Wah and Martin Lee Chu-ming, were criticized in an article in the People’s Daily for “subversive 
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activities”. The Chinese government refused to talk to them; they were also deprived of their membership 
in the Basic Law Drafting Committee. In November 1989, before his nomination as the new director for 
Xinhua-Hong Kong, Zhou Nan warned local pro-democracy activists against using the territory as an 
“outpost” (qianshao jidi) through which to seek to change the Chinese socialist system.499
After the Tiananmen incident, the Democratic Party, and its predecessor, the UDHK became the 
internal “enemy” which the United Front would seek to isolate. As a result, the party’s private overtures in 
early 1990 for some sort of dialogue with Chinese officials were rejected. The party was rebuffed publicly 
in 1991 when Lu Ping refused to include it in the list of political groups he would meet while visiting the 
territory.500      
 
3. Xu’s Final Days in Hong Kong 
During dramatic events like the Tiananmen incident, it would be hard even for veteran Communist 
members like Xu Jiatun to judge where the tide was turning. Xu sided with Zhao Ziyang in the Tiananmen 
incident. After Zhao greeted the students on Tiananmen Square, Xu went out of the building of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong and shed tears in front of the students protesting before the building. He even agreed to 
that Wen Wei Po could use the headline of “Deeply Grieved” (tongxin jishou) to show their shock.501
Xu Jiatun misjudged the situation in Beijing and believed that Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng would 
lose their influence on the political scene. Xu Jiatun soon found that Zhao would be the victim of the 
political struggle within the CCP. He was fully aware that by siding with Zhao Ziyang, he lost the trust of 
the central leadership. During his final days in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun was exerting all his efforts to restore 
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trust of the top leaders and trying to save his job.  
     After the Tiananmen incident, Xu Jiatun encouraged some of the business tycoons that had good 
relations with the Chinese government to visit Beijing. Li Ka-shing and Pao Yue-Kong agreed to meet 
Deng Xiaoping. Pao Yue-Kong revealed that Deng insisted on taking a tough line towards the British.502 He 
also arranged other Hong Kong people to meet Jiang Zemin and Li Peng. The arrangements of these 
meeting helped the Chinese government to understand the situations in Hong Kong. But these people 
revealed that the top Chinese leaders did not understand the situation in Hong Kong. According to Xu, 
some of them revealed that “They don’t understand the situation in Hong Kong”, others said that “they 
treated Hong Kong as enemies.”503
After the Tiananmen incident, Xu Jiatun was involved in a major incident about renting Hong Kong. 
He revealed that after the Tiananmen incident, the son-in-law of Pao Yue-Kong, Helmut Sohmen came to 
the Xinhua News Agency with a proposal with the signature of about a dozen social elites and business 
tycoons. In the proposal, it recommended that the Hong Kong business people would rent Hong Kong with 
1 million Hong Kong dollars, for self-administration of Hong Kong for ten years. Su was an Austrian. Two 
months later, when Xu came back to Beijing, before he entered Ji Pengfei’s office, he heart Lu Ping 
criticized him for “being a traitor”. 504   
      In 2007, Lu Ping revealed about the shocking proposal in an interview. He disclosed that just as the 
Basic Law was to be submitted to the National People’s Congress, many Hong Kong representatives in the 
Drafting Committee were shaken. Some of the representatives tried to contact the Central Government and 
suspend the transfer of Hong Kong, and rented it to Britain. This proposal was supported by many people. 
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Lu Ping said, “Some of the upper class of Hong Kong decided to send delegates to Beijing to see how it 
goes”. The renting proposal was supported by some people in Hong Kong, Lu recalls, after investigations 
into the Hong Kong issue, Jiang Zemin told him, “It doesn’t matter, we just be firm and refuse their 
proposals.”505
On July 10, Xu Jiatun called a meeting of the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafters in Hong Kong. All 
were invited except Louis Cha Leung-yung and Reverent Peter Kwong Kong-kit, who had resigned, and 
Martin Lee Chu-ming and Szeto Wah, who had suspended their work. Twelve of the remaining eighteen 
Hong Kong drafters attended the meeting at the Xinhua headquarters on July 15. Xu explained that the 
promulgation of the Basic Law could not be postponed. Several Hong Kong members wanted to delay the 
final plenum and hold more subgroup meetings, so that the draft could be revised in light of recent events. 
Some of Huang’s colleagues felt that delaying the plenum might do more harm than good. China might 
take back some of the concessions it had made in the Basic Law. In the end, the drafters agreed to delay the 
last plenum and allow the subgroups to hold up to three more meetings.506 He felt that his position in Hong 
Kong was at risk. He staked his political career on this bicameral model, hoping to regain the trust from the 
top through his hard work. He partially contributed to the decision by the Chinese government to endorse 
the model in August, but this achievement did not change his fate.   
     On August 29, three main political groups were meeting secretly. T.S. Lo devised a scheme to check 
the power of the liberals. The Legislative Council would be replaced by a two-house Legislative Assembly. 
The Functional House would be composed of representatives from business and professional groups. Half 
of the Elected House would be returned indirectly by members of the District Boards and the two municipal 
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councils, the other half by universal suffrage. The governor would be returned by an electoral college until 
at least 2003. Lo showed his proposal to Xu. Xu liked it and arranged for Lo to see Ji Pengfei and key 
mainland Basic Law drafter in Beijing. Ji said it was worth considering.507  
     Facing the loss of confidence in Hong Kong, Lu Ping revealed that the Chinese government even 
planned to establish an insurance company in Switzerland or other neutral countries to guarantee Hong 
Kong’s future. He said that the Chinese government promised that if the investors’ business would suffer 
any losses for political reasons after 1997, the company would return all their money. Lu said they had 
every confidence in Hong Kong’s future and believed that the company would be a lucrative business.508   
When Hong Kong government officials leaked word that they intended to introduce twenty 
democratically elected seats in 1991 in accordance with the Omelco consensus, they gave Xu added 
ammunition. China had rejected the Omelco proposal. The 4-4-2 model would strengthen Britain’s hand. 
Xu pressured Vincent Lo Hong-shui, Gary Cheng Kai-nam, and members of their groups to drop the 4-4-2 
proposal on patriotic grounds. “This is between Britain and China,” he told them, “If you present this 
model, you will be helping Britain.” 509
In September 1989 a BLCC vice chairman, Lo Tak-shing, head of the New Hong Kong Alliance of 
conservative business and high professional elites proposed a bicameral legislature with 25 percent of the 
seats directly elected by universal suffrage. The rest would be returned by functional constituencies (50%) 
and by an electoral college (25%). Beijing endorsed the “T. S. Lo model” in October 1989, and pressured 
once-friendly organizations, including the HKFTU to rally behind it. 510 The bicameral proposal was 
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rejected by all of the major political groups. In the end, the Joint Committee backed the 4-4-2 model. 511  
     When Xu returned to Hong Kong, he adopted a hard line on the pace of democratization. He went 
against the advice of his subordinates and threw his weight behind Lo Tak-shing’s bicameral model. In 
early September, before the three factions went public, Xu invited Cheng Kai-nam and other leading 
moderates to Xinhua to push the bicameral model. Cheng rejected it and pointed out that no other political 
group supported it.512  
     “I am not afraid,” Xu said. “No matter how many people come out against this proposal, I will insist 
on it being adopted.” Cheng gave Xu the 4-4-2 proposal. Xu read it carefully. “Forget it,” he said. “It 
cannot be accepted.” “Why not?” “I will push for the bicameral model,” Xu said. “I don’t care about the 
cost.” Xu was worried that China would be forced to accept the 4-4-2 model. Li Hou and Lu Ping had 
promised repeatedly that they would accept any consensus reached in Hong Kong. Now, the three main 
groups were close to reaching a consensus, one Xu could not accept. He dispatched his deputies to lean on 
Cheng. “If you insist on the 4-4-2 model, then you are organizing the forces in Hong Kong, including the 
British, to oppose the Chinese government.” 513
     Xu failed to split the consensus. By late September, members of the three main political factions had 
approved the 4-4-2 model. Leaders of the groups planned to hold a press conference on September 30 to 
unveil their compromise proposal. A few days before hand, one of Cheng Kai-nam’s friends at Xinhua told 
him that if he attended, he should sit off to one side so that he would not appear on television. If he was 
seen to be publicly opposing Xu, it would destroy Cheng’s career. Cheng decided that most of the work was 
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done. He did not attend the last three meetings to finalize the 4-4-2 proposal, or the press conference. 514  
     Having failed to prevent the 4-4-2 model from being made public, Xu floated the idea that it was 
another, more surreptitious attempt by the British to put forward a model to pressure China into accepting a 
faster pace of democratization.515 Xu was fired in early 1990, before the promulgation of the Hong Kong 
Basic Law. He revealed that the final draft of the Basic Law was handled by Lu Ping and Li Hou, and he 
did not know some of the debates within the drafting committee. Xu’s retirement preceded the final 
promulgation of the Hong Kong Basic Law. He fled to the United States and faded from Hong Kong’s 
politics. 
 
IV. Seven Letters and the Through Train Agreement  
1. Britain’s Secret Diplomacy with China 
In an article on “New China’s Diplomacy: 40 Years on”, marking the fortieth anniversary of the 
PRC’s establishment in October 1989, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, claimed that China 
was still following a stand independent of the US and the Soviet Union. He also attacked “some Western 
countries” for regarding “their values as absolute truth”, and criticized them for interfering, exerting 
political pressure and applying economic sanctions. 516
In October 1989 Cradock sent a letter to Xu Jiatun. Assurances have been given to China by the 
Political Adviser to the top Chinese official in Hong Kong that the full rigor of the law will be used to 
prosecute anyone who engages in violent protests against the New China News Agency. 517  
In early December, secret negotiations re-started between Britain and China on electoral reform. In 
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late 1989, Percy Cradock and Robin McLaren paid a secret visit to China to “resume serious contacts”.518 
On 4 December 1989, Cradock won Prime Minister’s support to go to China as a Special Envoy of the 
Prime Minister. He drafted a letter in the name of the Prime Minister. As a prominent China hand, he was 
proficient in the line of persuasion to impress Chinese top leaders. The letter read, “We are two great 
powers, fellow members of the Security Council. We have worked together very well. It is very sad to have 
these rifts. We have important issues to discuss.”519  
Cradock held talks with vice-Foreign Minster Zhou Nan for a whole day in Beijing. Cradock proposed 
an increase in bilateral trade, resumption of high-level contacts and other plans to improve bilateral 
relations. At the same time he raised the demand that Britain wanted an increase in directly elected seats in 
the Legislative Council in 1991, from 10 to 20 seats.520 Cradock found the Chinese deeply mistrusted their 
wish to double the number of directly elected seats: “They saw such changes as related to the events of 4 
June and, as such, particularly suspect, in fact a sign of a conspiracy to exert pressure on China.”521
The most crucial meeting was with CCP General Jiang Zemin on 6 December 1989. Cradock started 
by making assurances to the Chinese to pave the way for dialogue on Hong Kong’s political system. 
Cradock expressed good will from the British government and “repeat the assurance the Chinese had 
already had from our ministers that we had no intention of allowing Hong Kong to be used as a base to 
subvert the authority of the Chinese government.”522 Cradock also promised that the British would not try 
to internationalize the Hong Kong issue: “I assured them, with the Prime Minister’s authority that we 
continued to regard Hong Kong as a bilateral issue between London and Peking. We had no intention of 
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allowing third parties to intervene.”523    
In return for the assurances on subversion and internationalization, Cradock asked the Chinese for help 
in rebuilding Hong Kong’s confidence. Cradock said the Chinese’s chief contribution would be “a final 
version of the Basic Law”. He reaffirmed the British government’s commitment to the idea of convergence 
of Britain’s democratic reforms with the Basic Law and asked for “Chinese help in the form of sufficient 
flexibility in the Basic Law to accommodate the new situation”.524 Cradock argued that the British needed 
to reflect Hong Kong opinion by providing “at least 20 directly elected seats in 1991 (in place of 10) and a 
correspondingly larger number in 1995 (in place of 15).”525
In making his case, Cradock tried to trade the normalization of bilateral relations with Chinese 
concessions on Hong Kong’s political system. He argued forcefully:  
 
Sino-British relations should be treated as a whole. If we come across difficulties in one aspect, 
no progress can be made in other respects. If the two sides can reach an understanding on the 
Basic Law and direct elections in Hong Kong, the door to re-establishment of sound bilateral 
relations is wide open.526  
 
Jiang was offended by Cradock’s remark. In his Foreign Affairs Diary of 2008, Premier Li Peng 
disclosed that Jiang argued that the British should not add any preconditions for normalizations of bilateral 
relations.527 Jiang Zemin declared:  
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 The Chinese nation has excellent traditions and national integrity. We will never bend under 
external pressure. If you treat us reasonably, we can try to work out a solution to anything. But 
never try to force us to give in. The harder you push, the more unyielding we will become.528  
 
Experienced as he was, Cradock committed a typical mistake of Western politicians of trying to coerce 
the Chinese with an overbearing posture. He failed to make any progress as breakthrough was impossible 
when it came to Chinese national integrity. The British were quick to make up for Cradock’s offensive 
remark. The British ambassador explained to the Chinese that Cradock was simply following instructions 
from London.529 In the afternoon of the same day, Premier Li Peng recalled that Cradock switched to a 
softer line in a meeting with Li himself by simply asking the Chinese government to support an increase in 
directly elected seats in the Legislative Council.530  
Cradock’s visit to Beijing yielded positive results: “There was agreement on 5 more seats for 1997; 
but there was no movement for 1991; we still had a way to go.”531 Cradock called his trip a “moderate 
success”: “We were back in communication with Peking and working within the same framework of the 
Joint Declaration.”532 Two weeks later, Jiang replied to Thatcher’s letter, he commented that there would 
not be much difference between the final version and the draft Basic Law. He argued: “If the British side 
increased too many directly elected seats in 1991, they will fail to converge with the Basic Law.”533 Jiang’s 
letter hinted that the Chinese did not want much change in the Basic Law on Hong Kong’s political 
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structure.   
The Cradock visit was a turning point in bilateral relations and laid the foundation for exchanges at the 
ministerial level. On the last day of his visit, Cradock met Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Before 
the meeting, Cradock sent Qian a letter from Foreign Secretary Hurd who had just taken office. Hurd’s 
letter “formally and comprehensibly raised the concrete plans of the British on the draft Basic Law”.534 This 
letter ingeniously initiated the contacts between the new British foreign secretary and his Chinese 
counterpart. In Hurd’s memoirs he spoke highly of Cradock’s visit to Beijing for being “invaluable to me in 
reaching the agreement with the Chinese on the 1991 elections”.535
The British also took advantage of a confidence crisis in the Basic Law Drafting Committee. After the 
Tiananmen incident, two of the 23 Hong Kong members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Louis Cha 
Leung-yung and Bishop Kwong Kong-kit, formally resigned. Vice Secretary of the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee, Lu Ping revealed that the period after the Tiananmen incident was the biggest crisis in Hong 
Kong before 1997. Many Hong Kong drafters lost faith in the Basic Law. Lu worked very hard to persuade 
these drafters to support the Basic Law. He estimated that the worst scenario is that the Basic Law could 
not be passed in the Basic Law Drafting Committee.536  
The British grasped this opportune moment to squeeze concessions from the Chinese. On 18 January 
1990, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote to the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that the 
British were under overwhelming pressure in Hong Kong for the introduction of 20 directly elected seats in 
1991. He asked the Chinese for help by revising the Basic Law: “It was impressed on me that failure to do 
so would risk severe damage to British authority in the territory in the period before 1997.”537 The letter 
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suggested that “if the Chinese side were prepared to increase the figure for 1997 to 24 seats”, the British 
government “would be prepared to limit the number of directly elected seats introduced in 1991 to 18 and 
to bring in 24 directly elected members in 1995”.538
Hurd’s first letter received a positive response from the Chinese immediately. The Chinese suggested 
if the British agreed that 33.3% (20 seats) of the seats would be directly elected in 1997, 40% in 1999 (24 
seats) and 50% in 2003 (30 seats), the Chinese was “ready to consider the British suggestions that the 
number of directly elected seats of the legislature in 1991 be increased from 15 to 18.”539  
After sending his first letter, Foreign Secretary Hurd paid a visit to Hong Kong in January 1990. He 
announced that development of representative government in Hong Kong should converge with the 
political system after 1997. He also said in public that Britain cannot make a unilateral decision on the 
future political system of Hong Kong, but need to discuss it with the Chinese.540  
In his second letter, Hurd explained the urgency for democratic reforms in Hong Kong. He reminded 
the Chinese that conservative political structure provisions might undermine the confidence of Hong Kong 
people in their future: “The effect on investor confidence, locally and overseas, if these provisions were to 
be widely criticized would be serious”.541 Hurd also warned that British government’s ability to maintain 
the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong could be seriously impaired, “if changes to the provisions of the 
political system are not made, I would expect resignations from the Executive and Legislative Councils.”542 
The Chinese responded by pointing out that China’s sincerity has not “received due, positive response” 
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from the British side, if the British stuck to their high demand: “I see no need for sending your colleagues 
to Beijing for another round of consultations.”543
The British readily showed sincerity in the following letter to present all the British plans on Hong 
Kong’s political system. The letter proposed the through train arrangement. It suggested that one of the best 
ways to ensure a smooth transfer of government would be “to provided that all members elected to the 
Legislative Council in 1995 should be able to continue in office until 1999”.544  
The through train agreement bridged the difference between the two countries. In the last letter on 12 
February 1990, the two sides reached an agreement on the number of directly elected seats in Hong Kong. 
It was for the British “to limit to 18 the number of directly elected seats to be introduced in 1991”. In return, 
China would agree to extend to “20 directly elected seats in the SAR legislature in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 
in 2003”.545 The agreement was reflected in Annex II of the Basic Law. 
The seven letters sealed the deal on Hong Kong’s political system in the Basic Law. Before the final 
letter was sent, the drafters had a few days leave shopping and sightseeing in Guangzhou for the two sides 
to reach a final agreement on this issue. Former Chief Secretary of the Hong Kong government, David 
Akers-Jones reflected:  
 
Although they knew something was delaying the conclusion of their work, the members of the 
Basic Law drafting committee in a plenary session were kept waiting in China to finalize the 
draft until the exchange of letters between the foreign ministers was complete. Only then did 
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they sign off on their nearly five years’ work.546
 
The seven letters narrowed the difference between the two countries. Wilson assessed: “What we had 
finished up with, and what we proposed to do was something we could just and only just persuade the 
Chinese to accept.”547 The British successfully gained Chinese consent to a steady increase in directly 
elected seats and ensured continuity in Hong Kong’s political structure. In a speech to the House of 
Commons on 16 February 1990, Foreign Secretary Hurd elaborated that the compromise plan was based on 
the idea of convergence: “If we decide to implement the arrangements envisioned by the Basic Law, 
legislators elected in 1995 will have the chance to straddle the threshold of 1997 and work till 1999.”548
The well-calculated assessment of the room for concessions on the Chinese side was the key to British 
success in securing Chinese acceptance. In Thatcher’s memoirs, she recalled she was fully aware that this 
was the wrong time to push hard. She remarked: “A powerful push could have provoked a strong defensive 
reaction that might have undermined the Hong Kong agreement.”549 Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd did 
not present the OMELCO model, a faster one which had been repeatedly rejected by China as a product of 
the British Government. A scholar on Hong Kong’s democratization, Ming Sing revealed the British 
presented to the Chinese “a program similar to the more moderate compromise “4-4-2” model – agreed 
upon by the pro-democracy movement, the BPG and Moderates – was adopted as the basic offer during 
bargaining with China”.550  
In his memoirs Douglas Hurd considered the seven letters a great achievement. He said, “To my 
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advisers and myself it seemed a big step forward to have persuaded the Chinese to accept that there should 
be any directly elected members at all.”551 Cradock confirmed his appreciation for the deal: “we succeeded 
in pushing it really quite far, given the climate in Beijing at the time. The results were embodied in the 
Basic Law. If you recall, that provides for a steadily rising curve of directly elected seats going up into the 
next century.”552 The deal was the fastest pace of democratization acceptable to the Chinese government in 
the circumstances at the time.  
Cradock’s visit moved a step forward from resumption of formal relations to being able to engage 
the minds of top Chinese leaders. He achieved a “moderate success”: “there was agreement on 5 more seats 
for 1997; but there was no movement for 1991; we still had a way to go.” 553
    The British government had a responsibility to ensure that the Basic Law, as the then foreign secretary 
Geoffrey Howe, put it, “confirms fully with the spirit as well as the letter of the Joint Declaration” (House 
of Commons, 1989: 249-50). According to Howe, the British government did raise concerns relating to 
Article 18 and the stationing of troops in Hong Kong after 1997 and the interpretation of the Basic Law 
with the Chinese government. But this appears to have had absolutely no effect.554
On 18 January 1990, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, wrote to the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen, On 18 January 1990, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote to the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that the British were under overwhelming pressure in Hong Kong for the 
introduction of 20 directly elected seats in 1991.555 Hurd’s letter pleaded for “sufficient flexibility in the 
Basic Law to accommodate the new situation”. An understanding was reached in February 1990. It was for 
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the British “to limit to 18 the number of directly elected seats to be introduced in 1991”. In return, China 
would agree to extend to “20 directly elected seats in the SAR legislature in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 in 
2003”. It would also “observe the 1991 legislature in operation” and on that basis consider a faster pace of 
democratization.556
In early 1990, Governor David Wilson went for a fence-mending mission in Beijing. Although Wilson 
was received by Premier Li Peng, the climax of the visit was a verbal exchange with Li Hou, vice-director 
of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, which centered on such meteorological 
metaphors as showers, wind, rain and typhoons to describe the uneasily Sino-British relations. Li accused 
some Hong Kong people of stirring up “rain and wind,” a reference to what Peking regards as subversive 
activities. he took particular offence at a New Year’s day march in Hong Kong in support of the Romanian 
revolution, at which some demonstrators chanted “down with China’s Ceaucescus.” Wilson retorted by 
asking him not to confuse showers with typhoons.557
The explanations made to the Chinese in these letters were generalized succinctly by the British 
White Paper of 1994, which reads, “The British side stressed the importance of responding to the clear 
desire in Hong Kong for a faster pace of democratic development by increasing the number of 
directly-elected members of the Legislative Council beyond that envisaged in the drafter Basic Law. The 
Chinese side eventually agreed to increase to 20 the number of directly-elected seats prescribed in the Basic 
Law for the first legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” 558 
     In the message to China in February 1990, Hurd’s letter pleaded for “sufficient flexibility in the Basic 
Law to accommodate the new situation”. An understanding was reached in February 1990. It was for the 
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British “to limit to 18 the number of directly elected seats to be introduced in 1991”. In return, China would 
agree to extend to “20 directly elected seats in the SAR legislature in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 in 2003”. It 
would also “observe the 1991 legislature in operation” and on that basis consider a faster pace of 
democratization.559 It was really intriguing that the most important clause in the Basic Law, the clause on 
the future political structure of the Hong Kong SAR was determined by the two Foreign Ministers.  
In her memoirs Thatcher recalled she did not put too hard for Chinese concessions on democratic 
reforms in Hong Kong. She knew too well that “this was the wrong time” to push for democratic reform. A 
powerful push “could have provoked a strong defensive reaction that might have undermined the Hong 
Kong agreement.”560
In a speech to the House of Commons on 16 February, Douglas Hurd said: “If we then decide to 
introduce the electoral arrangements envisaged in the Basic Law, it will be possible for members elected in 
1995 to carry on over the 1997 barrier to 1999. Those who suggest that whatever we do now, China would 
be obliged to accept in 1997 are out of touch with reality.” 561
Douglas Hurd addressed the House of Commons to reveal details of the agreement with China. He 
admitted that the pace of democracy was slower than many people in Hong Kong would have liked, but 
said: “I would regard the outcome as one which, although not ideal, we could reasonably recommend to the 
House and to the people of Hong Kong as a basis for the future.” 562
 
2. Adjusting Chinese Hong Kong Policy   
The Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping reiterated that “besides economic development, Hong 
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Kong’s stability depends on a stable political system, which was a crucial factor.” 563 The Tiananmen 
incident changed the perception of Beijing on Hong Kong. Before that, there was a stress on a peaceful 
transition. After the Tiananmen incident, the dominating views of the CCP on Hong Kong were to prevent 
it from becoming a base of subversion to China. 
     The mentality of Chinese leaders on democratization in Hong Kong was best characterized by Percy 
Cradock: 
They are deeply afraid of it [democracy] because they see it as a virus which will spread into their 
own territory. They were very afraid of democracy when it came up in the violent context of 1989 
and they associated the student riots of those times with democracy. I am afraid they also condemn 
Hong Kong for help which came from Hong Kong to the students at that time. They certainly fear it 
in Hong Kong because they see it as an attempt by the British to go back on the provisions of the 
Joint Declaration and make Hong Kong more independent than we had signed up to at that time. 
They see it as part of a plot to try and detach Hong Kong from the mainland and they fear that other 
countries could be involved in a kind on conspiracy on that point. 
 
There was also fear that Hong Kong might be turned into a base of subversion. In the words of Deng 
Xiaoping after the Tiananmen incident, the “western countries are staging a third world war without gun 
smoke. By that I mean they want to bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist countries towards 
capitalism”.564 Deng Xiaoping addressed debate over the threatening implications for his reforms with a 
secret 24-character prescription: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our 
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capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”565
In late 1989 members of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group also included Politburo member 
and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, and President Yang 
Shangkun, concurrently first vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. Liu Shuqing, a former 
vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, was recently appointed secretary-general of the Group.566
The Tiananmen incident led to the resignation of two democrats in the drafting committee, Martin 
Lee Chu-ming and Szeto Wah. After the Tiananmen incident, they were singled out as subversives by 
Beijing for their support of the Tiananmen incident through the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic 
Democratic Movement in China. In July 1989, the Hong Kong and Macao Work Meeting led by Ji Pengfei 
discussed the situation in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen incident. They believed that the Alliance in 
Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China which calls for “overthrowing Deng, Li and Yang” 
wanted to topple the Chinese government. The meeting decided to ask the British to ban its work.567
After the resignation of Louis Cha Leung-yung, and the termination of the jobs of Martin Lee 
Chu-ming and Szeto Wah by the Chinese government, the composition of the Basic Law Drafting 
Committee was altered. Lu Ping revealed that the most difficult and controversial part of the Basic Law 
was on the political system of Hong Kong. On this issue, the British government had been pushing forward 
democratization in Hong Kong, and proposed to develop a “representative government” in Hong Kong.568  
 
Chart 5.4 Sub-group on Political Structure in the Drafting Committee 
Head Xiao Weiyun, Wu Weiyong 
Member Xiao Weiyun, Xiang Chunyi, Cha Chi-ming, Huang Baoxin, Lu Ping, Lei Jieqiong, 
Zheng Weirong, Duanmu Zheng, Liu Yiu-chu and Maria Tam. Zhang Youyu 
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 In December 1989 China still suggested that democratization be frozen for ten years between 1997 
and 2007. The 17th meeting of the Subgroup on Political Structure was held From December 13 to 16 in 
1989. Fifteen members were present in the meeting: Mo Kwan-nin, Wu Weiyong, Xu Chongde, Li Hou, Li 
Fook-sean Simon, Xiao Weiyun, Xiang Chunyi, Cha Chi-ming, Huang Baoxin, Lu Ping, Lei Jieqiong, 
Zheng Weirong, Duanmu Zheng, Liu Yiu-chu and Maria Tam. Zhang Youyu asked for a leave. The meeting 
selected Wu Weiyong as another person in charge of the group.569
The group discussed the principles for design of the political system of Hong Kong. It argues “that 
the political system of Hong Kong should guarantee the long-term stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. 
To reach this goal, the development of the political system should develop through a gradual and orderly 
progress. It is better to keep a steady progress than risking turbulence. The political system should 
guarantee to balanced participation of all classes of society. The political system should be built on one 
country, two systems, not to allow the presence of a legislature that is against the central government.”570 
The meeting decided that the first term of the legislature of Hong Kong is “60 members, in which 30% 
percent of the seats will be directly elected, namely 18 people. The ratio for other seats remains to be 
discussed at the next meeting.” 571
On 17 to 20 January 1990, the Subgroup on political structure held its 18th meeting in Guangzhou. 
Mo Kwan-nin, Wu Weiyong, Xu Chongde, Li Hou, Li Fook-sean, Xiao Weiyun, Zhang Youyu, Xiang 
Chunyi, Cha Chi-ming, Huang Baoxin, Lu Ping, Lei Jieqiong, Zheng Weirong, Duanmu Zheng, Liu 
Yiu-chu and Maria Tam Wai-chu participated in the meeting. Li Hou participated in the meeting on 19 and 
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20. 572 The meeting decided on the formula for the second and third terms of the legislature: functional 
constituencies: 30, electoral committee: 6, directly elected: 24. Third term: functional constituencies: 30, 
direct elections: 30.573
In December, rather than softening their approach, the Chinese representatives on the BLDC took a 
harder line and introduced a number of new clauses, each of which would require new legislation by the 
first SAR government. The first new clause prohibited acts of subversion against the central government. 
This was widely seen as being directed at activists such as Lee and Szeto who had sent funds and other 
support to the Tiananmen protesters. The second new clause outlawed foreign political groups in Hong 
Kong and contacts by Hong Kong political groups with outside groups. This was thought to be aimed at 
dissidents who were using Hong Kong as a base against the Mainland. The third new clause stated that no 
law could be given status above the other laws of Hong Kong. This was directed at the Bill of Rights, 
which Britain had introduced. In spite of diplomatic pressure from Britain, arguments from Hong Kong 
members of the Committee and public opinion in Hong Kong, the Mainland Drafters did not allow any 
concessions on electoral arrangements, either. 574  
In four year and eight months of the drafting of the Basic Law, the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
held eight plenary meetings, the four sub-groups discussing different issues held more than sixty meetings. 
The mainland members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee went to solicit opinion in Hong Kong for 
many times. They formally established delegations to solicit opinions in Hong Kong for two times, it was 
called two ups and two downs. The first is from May to September 1988, the second is from February to 
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October 1989. 575
The Tiananmen incident led to the lack of faith in Hong Kong about the high level of autonomy 
promised by Beijing. In the final stage of the drafting of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong members were 
reluctant to vote for the Basic Law. For Beijing, it was not only the final draft of the Basic Law that was 
important. The drafting process itself was an opportunity to show China’s willingness to let Hong Kong 
people rule Hong Kong.576 The crisis of confidence in the final stage of the drafting of the Basic Law gave 
the British the opportunity to win concessions from the Chinese through secret diplomacy.  
In an interview with Journalists from Wen Wei Po, the former Director of the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Office, Lu Ping revealed that from the Tiananmen incident of 1989 till April 1990 when the 
National People’s Congress formally passed the Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong experienced the 
biggest crisis since the handover. Not even some of the Hong Kong representatives in the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, but also some senior officials in Beijing have reconsidered the way to deal with Hong 
Kong and considered the option of “temporarily postpone the recovery of Hong Kong and rent it to the 
British”. After difficult works and strenuous efforts, the Hong Kong Basic Law was passed. Lu Ping said he 
face the biggest pressure during the drafting of the Basic Law. Just as the Basic Law was to be reported to 
the National People’s Congress, many Hong Kong representatives in the Drafting Committee was shaken. 
Some of the representatives tried to contact the Central Government and suspend the transfer of Hong 
Kong, and rented it to Britain. This proposal shaken the foundation of the Hong Kong issue, but was 
supported by many people. Lu Ping said, “Some of the upper class of Hong Kong decided to send delegates 
to Beijing to see how it goes”. At that time the Hong Kong representatives were ambivalent and felted tear 
up by the two sides. They were afraid that the Central Government would intervene in Hong Kong affairs, 
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leading to another Tiananmen incident in Hong Kong, they were also worried that the democratization by 
Britain will be too fast, causing instability in Hong Kong. Lu Ping said the worst scenario is that the Basic 
Law was not to be passed. Lu Ping went to all these representatives and persuaded them one by one. Lu 
Ping said, just like Deng Xiaoping once said, it was impractical to win over the hearts and minds of the 
Hong Kong people overnight.577  
The final plenary meeting of the BLDC adopted a package for the first SAR Government which 
allowed for 18 seats to be directly elected, 12 seats to be elected by an electoral committee, and 30 seats to 
be elected by functional constituencies. On the final day of the meeting, there was a last minute amendment 
to what had been decided. Diplomatic negotiations between Britain and China had arrived at an agreement 
and it was now allowed that there would be two more directly elected seats in the 1997 legislature, bringing 
the number up from 18 to 20. Britain had managed to extract from the Chinese two more directly elected 
seats for the 1995 elections – a far cry from the 50 percent directly elected legislature in 1991 and the fully 
directly elected Legislature in 1995 called for by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The use of the 
expression “not less than” seemed to offer the possibility of a further increase, but this may have been 
face-saving on the part of the British, to justify their return to the policy of convergence.578  
     In the meeting of the Basic Law Drafting Committee in 19 January 1990, the subgroup discussed 
whether the legislature should be bicameral. Lu knew there were problems with T.S. Lo’s proposal. The 
liberals could check the conservatives as easily as the conservatives could check the liberals. The 
government would find it difficult to pass legislation without support from both groups, and the efficiency 
of the administration would be severely hampered. Lu was in a difficult position. He understood that Hong 
Kong was totally opposed to the bicameral system. But Xu Jiatun had pushed very hard for it in Beijing. 
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Raymond Wu Wai-yongwas furious. He had helped to negotiate the 4-4-2 model, and he wanted it to be 
accepted intact. He felt that Lu was retaining a bicameral façade so that T.S. Lo would not lose face. Angry 
that Chinese officials could have so foolishly about something that was so important, he delivered a tirade 
against the proposal, then broke down and cried. On the last day of the meeting, Chin and Britain were still 
deadlocked over the number of democratically elected seats. The political subgroup had to come to a 
decision on the composition of the legislature. Maria Tam Wai-chu raised the 4-4-2 model, and again, Li 
and Lu refused to discuss it. 579  
Lu Ping revealed that after the Tiananmen incident, some of the Hong Kong members in the Basic 
Law Drafting Committee changed their support for the Basic Law under British and political pressures. He 
said: “Afterwards we talked with them one by one and convinced them at the end. The Basic Law was 
passed with two thirds majority.”580
Democrat Martin Lee Chu-ming revealed China was in a difficult position because, although Beijing 
could still rely on its built-in majority on the Drafting Committee, it did not want to be seen to be pushing 
something through which the majority of Hong Kong drafters opposed. A compromise formula on the 
composition of the Legislative Council, both before 1997 and beyond, was agreed between Beijing and 
London through the exchange of seven secret letters. It was incredible: the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
held a three-day session while waiting for the two governments to reach agreement, before it endorsed the 
final draft of the Basic Law. [The agreement on the political structure was announced in Hong Kong by the 
then British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, following a visit to Beijing in February 1990.] The failure to 
have a truly democratic political structure I blame on the British. The future political structure, which was 
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to be spelt out in the Basic Law, was the last sticking point left unresolved up the last minute before the 
final draft was completed. The role the British Government played in determining how our elected bodies 
should be constituted was unforgivable.581
On 17 February 1990, Deng Xiaoping expressed his appreciation to the members of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee for completing the important legal document in Chinese history. He said:  
 
After almost five years of diligent work, you had written a law with both historical and international 
significance. By historical significance, I mean its status in the past, present and future; as of 
international significance, it had profound implications not only to the third world, but for the 
mankind. This is a creative masterpiece. I thank you for your work! Congratulations on the 
completion of the document.582  
 
After five years of hard work, the Basic Law was passed at the Third Session of the Seventh 
National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990. The Basic Law was voted anonymously, Lu Ping disclosed 
that two members in the Drafting Committee voted against all the clauses in the Basic Law. He said: “They 
were even against China’s resumption of sovereignty.”583 Lu Ping shed tears when the Basic Law was 
passed in the National People’s Congress. He said: “It took four years and eight months. We exerted so 
much of our sweat and hard work in it. Each word is worthy of thousands of gold.”584
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Except for Article 19 in the draft Basic Law, all other provisions, annexes and related documents 
were adopted by a two-thirds majority.585 Ji announced “The method for forming the Legislative Council 
will be worked out in the light of the actual situation in Hong Kong and applied in a gradual and orderly 
way. The ultimate goal is the election of all the members of the legislative council by universal suffrage.”586
A famous legal expert of China, a member of the Basic Law drafting committee, Xu Chongde 
recollected that the fours years and eight months of drafting the Basic Law was a learning process for him. 
As the current colonial system of Hong Kong could not pass the threshold of 1997, some Hong Kong 
members in the Basic Law drafting committee insisted on copying the “separation of three powers” in the 
British political system. Xu said Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the political system of Hong Kong should 
be conducive to its stability. According to this principle it was decided that the political system of Hong 
Kong should be an executive-led political system.587
3. Zhou Nan’s New Style  
The Tiananmen incident aggravated the differences within the top leadership on how to practice one 
country, two systems. In his interview in 2007, Xu Jiatun revealed that his retirement was related to the 
struggle within the Chinese communist party on how to implement the idea of “one country, two systems”. 
Xu Jiatun said he wrote an article entitled “Re-understanding capitalism”, Ren Zhongyi told him that the 
conservatives in the central committee wanted to criticize his article. Xu argued that he was a victim of the 
different understandings on one country, two systems within the CCP. He heard that the decision to replace 
him with Zhou Nan was supported or endorsed by Li Xiannian. 588 After his successor Zhou Nan arrived he 
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heard that Zhou Nan had organized a group to investigate him. Being a veteran Chinese politician he knew 
organizing a team require the consent from the very top. Fearing the dreadful years ahead of him, he 
decided to flee to the United States.  
In early 1990, Deng Xiaoping issued three guidelines to Zhou Nan, the newly-appointed director of 
the NCNA in Hong Kong. Deng said that the policy should be toughened up, more flexible tactics and 
methods should be employed, and the Communists should be prepared to compromise if necessary.589
In February 1990, however, Xu Jiatun was replaced by Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, indicating 
that Beijing may wish to downgrade the Work Committee to reassert more central control.590 Zhou Nan 
succeeded Xu Jiatun as secretary of the Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee and Director of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong, upon the recommendation of party elder Li Xiannian (then PRC president) and Premier Li Peng. As 
Zhou could now bypass Lu Ping, chief of the Hong Kong-Macao Office (succeeding Ji Pengfei) and reach 
Li Peng directly, a Zhou-Lu struggle for power and favor arose. This struggle was aggravated by the 
agreement reached in 1991 between Beijing and London that Sino-British communications would be 
conducted thereafter at the two levels: that of the chief of the Hong Kong-Macao Office on the Chinese side 
and the governor of Hong Kong on the British side, as well as between foreign ministers on both sides. This 
means that Zhou Nan would not be in a position to conduct talks with the governor and hence would lose 
his importance (it was then reported that Zhou requested to be transferred from his post in Hong Kong, 
partly because of his conflict with Lu.) 591
Zhou Nan’s reputation as a hawk to the British was established in the 1980s when he led the Chinese 
                                                        
589 Xianggang Jingji Ribao, February 10, 1990, p. 2, quoted in Liang Yü-ying, “Pekinmg’s Hong Kong Policy 
after Tiananmen”, Issues & Studies, vol. 26, no. 10, December 1990, p. 74. 
590 John Burns, “The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong”, Asian Survey, vol.30, no. 8, Aug 
1990, p. 752. 
591 Kam Yiu-yu, “Decision-Making and Implementation of Policy toward Hong Kong,” in Carol Lee Hamrin 
and Zhao Suisheng, eds., Decision-Making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996, p. 109. 
 235
delegation on the negotiations on the handover of Hong Kong. In early 1984, the Chinese side announced 
to change the chief representative of the Chinese delegation from Yao Guang to Zhou Nan. According to 
Xu Jiatun, it was a decision made by the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. They thought that Yao 
Guang did not fight hard enough for the Chinese decisions so that the talks did not proceed as planned by 
the Chinese side.592  
As Foreign Secretary Howe’s recollections of Zhou Nan’s sharp style at the negotiations and pointed 
out that his negotiating style was similar to the Chinese famous alcohol Mao-tai: “I remember saying at the 
end of the negotiations in Peking in July 1984 that the Hong Kong negotiations without Zhou Nan would 
be like a Chinese meal without Mao-tai, and his presence or his absence from the scene clearly would 
involve a change in style”.593
The Chinese refusal to support the British scheme was based on the notion, as one official stated in 
1989, that “there must be relations between democracy and patriotism…A guest is in no position to 
exercise the authority over his host”.594
With Premier Li Peng serving as head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Group in the State Council, the 
replacement of the popular and experienced Xu Jiatun with a reasoned diplomat like Zhou Nan is a sure 
sign that the Chinese government intended to play a bigger role in the work of the Xinhua-Hong Kong and 
would tighten ideological control over the mainland’s institutions in the territory.595 Li Peng said in his 
“Government Work Report” in March 1990 that a handful of people with ulterior motives intended to use 
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Hong Kong and Macao as a Base for subverting the Chinese Communist regime and the socialist system.596
Since his arrival in Hong Kong, Zhou Nan has clearly adhered to the “mass line” which was adopted 
in accordance with the new guidelines for the united front. He has made frequent contacts with trade unions 
and grassroots units. In his visit to the leftist Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions on February 23, 1990, 
he praised the working class in Hong Kong as the “backbone of society.”597 Zhou has maintained contacts 
with other levels of society as well. On June 21, 1990, he attended a luncheon party hosted by the Hong 
Kong Chamber of Commerce where he emphasized the importance of coordinating the interests of the 
various strata of society in Hong Kong, including industry and commerce, the professions, and the residents 
of various communities. This was tantamount to a contradiction of Xu’s policy in Hong Kong.598  
Zhou developed a style of argument combining doctrines with his mastery of English and Chinese 
poetry. After the Tiananmen incident, in a press conference when someone suggested that the People’s 
Liberation Army should change its name in Hong Kong to alleviate the concerns of the Hong Kong people. 
Zhou made a bizarre reply in quoting Shakespeare: “A rose by any other name would smell just as 
sweet”.599
After his nomination, Zhou Nan restored tight discipline to the much disturbed Xinhua Branch, but at 
the same time alienated many by his hard line “leftist” approach. 600 Xu had actively befriended many other 
anti-communist writers, but their carefully cultivated cordiality was later undermined by his hard-line 
successor.601 The Taiwan Minister of Xinhua-Hong Kong, Wong Man-fong, who had been working in 
Xinhua-Hong Kong for decades before his retirement in 1992, had a very low appraisal of Zhou Nan. Wong 
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described Zhou as a typical conservative foreign affairs diplomat. Wong said, “He implemented his policies 
rigidly by judging the situation in Beijing. He is exactly the opposite of Xu Jiatun.”602
In a speech on relations between Hong Kong and China, Zhou Nan said Hong Kong would play an 
important role in China’s open-door strategy, acting as a key link in the nexus of Special Economic Zones 
and development zones, already established on the mainland. Zhou Nan’s insistence that Beijing and Hong 
Kong should not interfere with each other’s “system” was interpreted locally as a further warning against 
the Crown Colony becoming an “outpost” for subversion against the Chinese government. According to an 
unconfirmed report, such concern was expressed in more forthright terms at a four-day conference on Hong 
Kong and Macao which had taken place during the previous quarter.603  
Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders were said to have been angered by mass demonstrations 
which had taken place in the recent past, and determined to prevent Hong Kong from becoming an 
anti-communist base. Among the resolutions passed at the conference was one elevating the status of the 
State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office in order to make it the principal decision-making 
organ for local developments.604
 
V. Conclusion  
In this case, the British were able to influence the Hong Kong Basic Law drafting process through 
patience and keeping their consultations with the Chinese through private channels. The first draft of the 
Basic Law was published in early 1989, followed by the Tiananmen incident which led to formal 
suspension of bilateral relations. The British engaged in serious discussions with the Chinese on the Basic 
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Law in late 1989. In the end, the Chinese made concessions to the British by accepting a steady increase in 
directly elected seats in the Hong Kong legislature. The agreement was reflected in the Hong Kong Basic 
Law.  
In the drafting of the Basic Law, though Deng Xiaoping were taking hold of the whole picture and 
stressed that Hong Kong’s political systems should not completely copy the West, he did not deal with 
specific issues. The pace of democratization in Hong Kong was to be decided through votes in the drafting 
committee, which led to an intriguing process of people with different political ideas pushing for different 
political models for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.  
Xu Jiatun had a very conservative idea on Hong Kong’s democratization process and he had a strong 
will to prevent the Drafting Committee in reaching a consensus on a faster pace of democratization in Hong 
Kong. Xu was a good friend of the head of the subgroup on political structure of the Hong Kong SAR, 
Louis Cha Leung-yung. At the end of 1988, he persuaded Cha to table a very conservative political model 
on the drafting committee, the so-called “mainstream model” which was very conservative. Through 
influencing these figures and advocating against reforms in Hong Kong, Xu exerted a significant influence 
on the draft Basic Law of 1989.  
     The drafting of the Basic Law was interrupted by the Tiananmen incident of 1989. The shocking 
event shattered confidence in Hong Kong and led to an upsurge of the calls for democracy in the territory. 
The Tiananmen incident led to reshuffling in Chinese politics. Xu’s handling of the crisis and his 
misjudgment of the situation in Beijing led to his retirement before the completion of the drafting of the 
Basic Law. Xu withdrew from Hong Kong politics and fled to the United States in 1990. In early 1990, 
Zhou Nan, a vice Foreign Minister of China was nominated to replace Xu Jiatun. Zhou’s nomination 
marked another important adjustment in China’s Hong Kong policy.  
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After the Tiananmen incident, Xu lost the trust of Deng Xiaoping for siding with Premier Zhao 
Ziyang in Hong Kong. At a time when he was on the verge of losing his job, Xu lobbied vehemently for a 
bicameral model which was rejected by the three main political groups in Hong Kong and in Beijing. Xu 
faded from Hong Kong’s politics in early 1990, when his successor Zhou Nan arrived in early 1990. At a 
time when the members of the drafting committee could not reach an understanding on Hong Kong’s 
political structure, the final decision on Hong Kong’s political structure in the Basic Law was reached by an 
agreement between China and Britain through the exchange of seven letters at the ministerial level. The 
two governments reached an understanding to introduce 18 directly elected seats in the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council in 1991, 20 in 1997, 24 in 1999, and 30 in 2003.605 The agreement on the future 
political system of Hong Kong was reflected in Annex II of the Basic Law. 
 
 
Chapter Six: Patten’s Electoral Reforms and 
the Breakup of Negotiations  
 
I. Background    
After the Tiananmen incident, the Hong Kong people felt betrayed by the British government. 
Governor Wilson was criticized for succumbing to the Chinese government after the completion of the 
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Basic Law. His efforts to maintain a good relationship with Beijing aroused harsh criticisms in Hong Kong. 
Facing the rising pressure from Hong Kong for more democracy, Prime Minister Thatcher made the 
decision to replace Sir David Wilson with a politician in 1990.   
Weeks after the Tiananmen incident the Foreign Affairs Committee visited the colony, the chairman 
of the delegation David Howe, admitted that “during his visit to the colony he noted “the enormous 
bitterness which has built up against the United Kingdom”.606 The anti-British sentiment made the British 
worry about their rule of the colony. By June 1991 Foreign Secretary Hurd decided that the next and last 
governor of Hong Kong should be a British politician. He argued that the last years of the colony would be 
“different, perhaps dramatically different” from those that went before. “Either the Chinese authorities or 
some groups in Hong Kong might have overplayed their hand. This danger increased sharply after the 
killings in Tiananmen Square in Peking in 1989 which shocked and alarmed the people of Hong Kong.”607 
To handle the thorny situation in Hong Kong, it was all the more important to nominate a politician as the 
Governor of Hong Kong. 
The first of the three rounds of 1991 elections were the District Board Elections in March. The 
liberal-democratic parties and groups won 98 seats, in excess of a third of all possible seats. The 
conservatives and the pro-China candidates won only 44 and 29 seats respectively. Independent candidates 
won the remaining 103 seats.608  
According to the understanding with the Chinese on the number of seats in February 1990, the Hong 
Kong government increased the number of directly elected seats in the 60-seat Legislative Council in 1991 
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from 10 to 18.609 In the first direct election to the Legislative Council in September 1991, Liberal, 
pro-democracy United Democrats of Hong Kong candidates and their allies won 16 of the 18 seats and over 
58 percent of the vote. The two seats that did not go to the United Democrats and their allies were taken by 
a conservative pro-business candidate and an independent.  
The sweeping victory of the democratic camp in the 1991 elections for the Legislative Council 
intensified the pressure on the Hong Kong government to speed up the process of democratic development. 
A more complex problem – the declining support offered to the Hong Kong government by the 
conservatives in the Legislative Council. Although traditionally local to the government, these people 
started shifting their allegiance to Beijing from the early 1990s onwards. Lo Chi-kin, the political 
commentator, argues that by early 1992 “it became obvious to the Hong Kong government that a 
conservative package for constitutional development in 1995 [the next Legislative Council elections] would 
not guarantee stability of its rule”.610
Facing the rising pressure from Hong Kong for more democracy, the British Foreign Office 
announced that Governor Wilson would be replaced in 1992 but did not announce the name of his successor. 
The early announcement of the replacement of Governor Wilson was related to the changing political 
situation in Hong Kong. Governor Wilson’s efforts to maintain a good relationship with Beijing aroused 
harsh criticisms in Hong Kong: 
 
The governor, Sir David Wilson, has not lived up to expectations in his first year’s work. A scholar 
and diplomat by training, who gets on well the Chinese in Beijing, he has increasingly appeared to be 
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a careerist, interesting in pleasing London and Beijing but weak and aimless in his attention to Hong 
Kong’s situation.611  
 
The changing political environment in Hong Kong reinforced Prime Minister John Major’s idea to 
change Britain’s original policy handled by the old China hands in the Foreign Office. He argued that as 
Hong Kong changed, Britain’s policy should change too. “The citizens of Hong Kong were now eager for 
political reform, and it would have been wrong to deny it, although the changes we implemented had to be 
within the terms of the Joint Declaration.”612 Foreign Secretary Hurd stressed Hong Kong was emerging, “I 
had been exposed on several visits to the reality of modern Hong Kong and the rapid growth of its civil 
society.”613 Such is the background for the early retirement of Governor Wilson and the nomination of 
Patten.    
The nomination of Patten signals a change in British Hong Kong policy in which the British 
government wanted to nominate a British politician to have an honorable retreat from Hong Kong under 
mounting pressure from Hong Kong that Britain was “kowtowing” to Beijing. Britain’s change of 
negotiating tactics aroused the concerns of the Chinese government and led to continuous arguments over 
the interpretations of the past agreement and a deterioration of bilateral relations after Patten unveiled in 
democratic reform proposals in October 1992.  
 
II. Patten’s Reforms and Deterioration of Relations  
1. Patten’s Reforms and the War of Words  
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The arrival of Patten in Hong Kong signaled a change of negotiating style of the British and an 
adjustment of the British policy after the Tiananmen incident. Chris Patten tried to exploit the loopholes in 
the Basic Law and adopted a tougher approach in his negotiations with the Chinese government. His refusal 
to establish personal relations with his Chinese counterparts and his reform proposals were interpreted as 
confrontational gestures by the Chinese government and led to a deterioration of relations between the two 
countries.  
British Prime Minister John Major visited Beijing in September 1991 and signed a memorandum of 
understanding over the airport, which was a confidence building measure by Governor Wilson. The 
memorandum, often called the second Sino-British Joint Declaration, established a mechanism of biannual 
meetings between the Foreign Ministers and a mechanism of direct contact between the Governor of Hong 
Kong and Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of China. The memorandum of 
understanding required the British regime to “consult” Beijing on all key decisions that transcend the 
retrocession date or affecting transition. It was seen as a British concession to give the Chinese a veto 
power on the running of Hong Kong.  
It was speculated that Major’s trip to Beijing further strengthened his decisions to change the Hong 
Kong policy of Britain. On 31 December 1991, the British government suddenly announced that the British 
Government would be replaced when he finished his term of office. The timing of the announcement was 
unusual as the British government never announced that the present governor would step down before the 
result of the general election months later. A legislator in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Yang 
Xiaohua wrote an article questioning the British decision. He argued: “The British government made a 
sudden announcement to replace the governor, but did not reveal his successor. Such an announcement was 
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irresponsible.”614
During Patten’s governorship he had made “sixteen overseas trips (excluding his eighteen visits to 
London on Hong Kong business) and had been granted audiences with one emperor, three presidents and 
eight prime ministers”.615 Patten started his work in Hong Kong with a new style of governorship. He 
wanted to exploit all the “elbow room” in the Basic Law to expand democracy for Hong Kong. As a 
politician, he adopted a tougher approach to the Chinese than his career diplomat predecessors. The British 
changed their negotiating tactics by asking for “open” negotiations, exploiting deadlines and frequently 
issuing ultimatums to the Chinese, and were determined to implement Patten’s reforms even without 
Chinese consent.  
In an interview with South China Morning Post immediately before his departure to Hong Kong, 
Patten explained his political strategy. He pointed out that his style of governorship was different from his 
predecessors as he would act as he preached. “I would spend most of the times outside my office.” Patten 
said, “I would be the same either in public or in private. People will be familiar with my style. This style 
caused me troubles in the past, but I have no secret agendas. I hope people will know I will act exactly as I 
speak.”616  
The nomination of Patten marked a new approach by the British government’s Hong Kong policy. 
Patten was “a heavyweight British political figure on close terms with the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary”.617 In May 1992, Patten and the prime minister received at 10 Downing Street Hong Kong 
democrats Martin Lee Chu-ming and Yeung Sum. At the same time, British officials said that they would 
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ask China to increase the number of directly elected seats in the legislature. Lu Ping, director of the Hong 
Kong and Macao Affairs Office of China’s State Council, immediately dismissed such calls by saying that 
an increase “was totally out of the question.”618
Before Patten’s departure to Hong Kong, he refused an invitation by China to come to Beijing for 
talks. Refusal to visit China was certainly interpreted by the Chinese as a gesture of rejecting good personal 
relations with the Chinese. Later the Chinese made it clear on many occasions that a visit by Patten to 
Beijing would be welcome. The Governor, perhaps sensing that China would try to put pressure on him, 
studiously avoided any such commitment. It was usual practice for a Hong Kong governor to liaise with 
China on matters of importance to both sides. By rejecting Chinese invitations, Patten alienated the Chinese 
who believed that personal relations were crucial elements in a harmonious political relationship. During 
his first five weeks in Hong Kong Patten made no official move to visit the director of Xinhua-Hong Kong 
Zhou Nan.  
In June, the British side expressed their wish that China should revise the Hong Kong Basic Law to 
tailor to the growing demands for democracy in Hong Kong. Alastair Goodlad, the newly appointed British 
Foreign Office minister responsible for Hong Kong, told the press that if the Hong Kong people wanted to 
increase the directly elected members in the Legco, China’s NPC could amend the Basic Law.619  
From the beginning Patten made perfectly clear that he wanted to have an open approach in running 
Hong Kong. This idea seems to have first appeared in an interview after his first press conference with the 
Sunday Morning Post, when Patten said that an Exco accountable to Legco was provided for in the Joint 
Declaration and Basic Law. Patten was quoted as stating:  
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 I’m the head of the executive authorities so I’d better be accountable… A government is stronger if it 
is prepared to be more open and accountable. A government is stronger when it is able to mobilize 
support and consent for what it is doing. I’m increasingly interested in what executive-led 
government accountable to the legislature means and I want to explore that. 
 
Later, Patten floated the idea of standing committees in Legco, which would be able to 
cross-examine officials in the executive government. This idea was strongly resisted by China. The 
pro-Beijing Bauhinia warned the governor on 29 September to retain the executive-led system and not 
introduce standing committees to Legco.620 Patten’s new style of governorship was warmly welcomed in 
Hong Kong. “In his first ten days, he earned more and more public credits-the most outstanding 
performance being his unprecedented openness.”621 The Governor’s popularity in Hong Kong grew; the 
Legislative Council approved his plans; the British government gave him total support.622
The talks on the airport were deadlocked after Patten’s arrival. Trying to achieve some progress, 
Patten tried to exert some pressure on the Chinese side. Patten’s comments led to harsh criticisms from the 
Chinese side. On 12 July Patten stated:  
 
I don’t want to spend my time on a lot of hassles on big projects if we can’t get agreement. I think 
we’ve got to say to our colleagues in the People’s Republic of China this is what we intend to do, 
that we think this is in the best interests of the people of Hong Kong, but candidly I don’t want to 
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get stuck into this if you’re going to then pull the plug on it.623
 
In late September, Patten again expressed his frustration over the airport talks, saying that the 
Chinese side needed to be reminded that they were getting cash reserves from the handover amounting to 
“the greatest dowry since Cleopatra”.624 This kind of talks was not well received by the Chinese side, which, 
through its mouthpieces in Hong Kong, labeled his remarks as “unreasonable, rude and childish”625 and 
“improper and acrimonious”.626
Lu Ping, the head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council in Beijing 
warned on 27 August 1992 that: “China will dissolve the Legislative Council in 1997 if it does not comply 
with the Basic Law.”627 Lu Ping’s warning was a message to the British side on the Chinese dominant role 
on this issue.  
Two weeks before Patten’s speech to the Legislative Council, Foreign Secretary Hurd had given his 
Chinese counterpart an outline of the scheme when they met in New York.628 It took the Chinese a week to 
respond. Patten was asked to defer announcing his proposals until he had discussed the matter with the 
Chinese government. Trying to adopt a different approach than his predecessors from the Foreign Office, 
Patten openly stated that he expected to hold “serious discussion with Peking” over them.629 He planned to 
visit Beijing shortly afterwards. 
During their meeting in New York on 25 September, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd had 
given his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, a brief account of Patten’s policy speech. On 25 September, 
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Sir Robin MacLaren, British Ambassador to China, passed a message from Patten summarizing the speech 
to a Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Deputy Director. 630  
According to David Lampton, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Lu Ping 
complained to him that Beijing had received a text of Patten’s speech with so little time to react that it was 
clear that the PRC’s input was not genuinely desired.631 On 3 October, Lu Ping sent a letter to Chris Patten 
asking him not to publish his reform proposals. He argued that the proposals should be announced after 
sufficient consultations between the two sides to ensure a smooth transfer of regime and reduce political 
repercussions to Hong Kong.632
Shortly before the Governor’s address to the Legislative Council, the Chinese side asked that the 
announcement of the proposal be delayed until agreement had been reached through consultations. Such a 
demand was rejected squarely by Patten. In his first address to the Legislative Council on 7 October 1992, 
Patten claimed that he wanted to ensure “the widest democratic participation by the people of Hong 
Kong”.633 Such a speech was seen as a declaration of war to the Chinese side. Patten had not even provided 
the Xinhua-Hong Kong with advance copied of the speech, as had been in the past practice. All of this 
indicated to the Chinese that Patten was lacking in “sincerity”, a word which would be much used in the 
coming months with regard to Sino-British Hong Kong relations.634
Perhaps equally worrying as the actual proposals, from China’s point of view, was the rhetoric which 
Patten used to present them. He devoted extensive passages in his speech to the theme of democracy, 
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avowing it to be an essential part of his personal system of belief. He proclaimed democracy to be “an 
essential element in the pursuit of economic progress.” This is exactly what the Chinese government did 
not want to hear. Although Patten had stated in his speech that China had been told by Douglas Hurd before 
hand about the contents of the speech, china had only been notified and not consulted, an unnamed Chinese 
source claimed.635  
Patten’s proposals were a clear violation of the secret letters between the Foreign Ministers. What 
was more tragic was that he had never been shown the content of the letters. This was a mistake by the 
Foreign Office. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd revealed that when the Foreign Office examined Patten’s 
proposals in September 1992 before he put them to ministers, “none of my advisers drew my attention to 
any correspondence with the Chinese Government in 1990. Nor had they briefed Chris Patten on the point 
or shown him the correspondence before he left for Hong Kong in the spring.”636 It was “surprising” even 
for Patten himself “that these letters had never been mentioned” to him in London or when they worked up 
the reform proposals in Hong Kong.637  
Patten’s reform proposals were denounced by the Chinese as a “three violations political reform 
package,” namely violating the Joint Declaration, the principle of convergence with the Basic law, and a 
series of letters exchanged between the two foreign ministers.”638 An unnamed source argued that Patten’s 
reforms were negative changes in the relationship between the two countries. He said: “Such changes will 
have a very serious impact on the stability of Hong Kong over the next few years and on the smooth 
transition of sovereignty in 1997.” 639  
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An editorial made an accurate appraisal of Patten’s reforms. It pointed out that Patten ingeniously 
exploited the loopholes in the Basic Law by “actually increasing 19 more directly elected seats in the 
Legislative Council through elections which were direct elections in nature”. The editorial expected 
Patten’s maneuver “will inevitably lead to tensions between the two countries”.640
On 20 October, Patten paid his first and only visit to Beijing in his governorship to discuss his 
proposals with the Chinese. The most senior person he met was Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Patten’s 
blunt and direct approach strengthened the Chinese officials’ judgment that he wanted confrontations with 
the Chinese. When meeting Patten, Director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Lu Ping emphasized 
the importance attached to personal relations in Chinese culture: “Since beginning work on Hong Kong I 
have dealt with four governors: Lord MacLehose, Sir Edward Youde, Lord Wilson and now you. I have 
also worked alongside four ambassadors…They are all old friends of China.” Lu expressed his wish that 
Patten, too, when he left Hong Kong, would join this illustrious group. Patten declared that history would 
judge him not according to his friendship with China, but by “how successfully I have helped to implement 
the Joint Declaration to ensure the stability, the prosperity and the way of life of Hong Kong.” 641  
On October 23, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made the first public statement by accusing Patten’s 
proposals violated the Basic Law. Lu Ping spelled out on the same day the three important parts in Patten’s 
reform package that violated the Basic Law. The functional constituency elections were against the 
principle of direct elections, the electoral committee was constituted by directly elected members of the 
districts, and the separation of the executive and legislative councils.642 On the same day, Lu Ping 
announced the formation of the Preliminary Working Committee and the appointment of three tiers of 
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advisers.  
When the governor was still in Beijing, Lu Ping held a press conference in which he claimed that 
“China will form the SAR legislature, judiciary and government unilaterally if Britain reneges on its 
previous commitment to policy convergence on the Basic Law.”643 This is the first public warning of China 
to set up a new stove in Hong Kong.  
One hour after Patten left Beijing, Lu Ping held a press conference in which he virulently attacked 
Patten and his constitutional proposals. Whereas until now the Chinese side had rejected the proposals on 
the grounds that they were contrary to the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, Lu now introduced another 
bombshell, claiming that the proposals were also in conflict with a series of secret Sino-British 
understandings made two years previously on the question of political convergence, and threatening to 
make public the content of an exchange of letters between the two governments on this matter.644  
At the end of Patten’s meeting with the foreign minister Qian Qichen in Beijing, Patten was told, 
“After our prime minister, Li Peng, saw your prime minister in Rio, we had great hopes of you. But it is 
clear we have to discuss these matters at foreign secretary or prime-ministerial level in order to resolve 
these problems.”645 After the warning the Chinese government had been concentrating their attacks on 
Patten. China’s leaders evidently thought that they could have him replaced by exerting sufficient pressure 
on what they judged to be the domestically weak government of John Major. An official of the Foreign 
Office privately confirmed that that was the Chinese view and, for good measure, they had hinted that they 
would make some concessions if he were to be recalled.646
On 3 October, Lu Ping, Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, made objections over 
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Patten’s message in a meeting with Ambassador McLaren. On the same day, Patten met a Deputy Director 
of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua, but gave only a brief account of what he would say in his speech. The 
complete transcript was delivered only five hours before Patten actually delivered the speech, and none of 
the objections made by Lu Ping and Qian Qichen had been taken into account. Vice-director of the Xinhua, 
Zhang Junsheng stated that: “It looks as if the new airport and democracy are gifts from the savior. But can 
we find democracy in Hong Kong throughout the past 150 years.”647
As the governor’s party departed for Hong Kong, Lu Ping held a press conference in which was the 
declaration of the war of words on Patten. He said:  
 
We do not want to make public the differences between our sides. Before Mr Patten made public his 
policy address, the Chinese government said he should not make public his proposals. He should not 
engage in microphone diplomacy and he should not stir up a public debate between the two 
sides…Regrettably, however, Mr Patten simply did not take into account the views of the Chinese 
side. He believed he should make public our difference. Since he did that we have to do the same. In 
my letters to him I told him that if he starts to stir up an open debate then we have to participate in 
this debate…The essence of our differences is not whether the pace of democracy should be 
accelerated but whether there will still be cooperation or confrontation. If the other side insists on 
confrontation we have no other choice.648
 
When the British raised the issue of the reform in the JLG, on 3 November 1992, the Chinese refused 
to discuss it. The Chinese Premier Li Peng stated: “any counter proposal or any compromise plan on the 
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basis of the Hong Kong Governor’s plan is unacceptable. This is a matter of principle...the Chinese 
Government will never compromise or make any concession on matters of principle.”649
During his visit to London in November 1992, Chinese Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji suggested that the 
whole basis of the Joint Declaration might have been undermined: “People cannot help but ask,” he said, 
“whether we still have to stick to the Joint Declaration between us, whether the important understanding 
and agreement that we have reach should go with the wind.”650 Zhu Rongji stressed that China wanted 
“cooperation, not confrontation, no one should expect confrontation to force us into concessions from our 
stand on the matter of principle.”651
On 30 November 1992, the Hong Kong and Macao Office of the State Council made a statement, 
announcing that all the contracts and agreements signed by the Hong Kong government ungratified by the 
Chinese side will be nullified after June 30, 1997. After the announcement of the declarations, people from 
all walks of life thought that contention over the political systems had forced the Chinese side to take 
extreme measures, causing major administration crisis in 1997.652
The immediate Chinese objective is to discredit Governor Chris Patten and, if possible, get rid of him. 
“They’re trying to shoot the rider without hitting the horse,’ a British diplomat said, with Patten being the 
rider and Hong Kong the horse. “But the horse is scared because it knows shots are being fired in its 
direction.”653
 
2. Beijing’s Interpretation of the Patten reforms 
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Patten’s reform proposals and his refusal to consult with the Chinese government offended the 
Chinese government. His proposals were also different from the Chinese government’s interpretation of the 
Basic Law. Patten’s tough approach led to the triumph of hardliners within the Chinese government.  
The Tiananmen incident toughened the Chinese stance to the British. In February 1991, Deng 
Xiaoping encouraged his officials not “to be afraid of tension” in the relationship with Britain because the 
period of transition would require resolute behavior.654 Cradock revealed that the announcement in April 
1992 of Mr Patten’s appointment as Governor of Hong Kong also “aroused all Peking’s latent suspicions”. 
Cradock explained: 
 
Patten was recorded as speaking at an inaugural press conference, not just about Hong Kong’s 
stability and prosperity, but also about Hong Kong’s freedom. What lay behind the extra word? On a 
farewell visit to Peking in May I was repeatedly asked to explain. I told the Chinese leaders that the 
reference was, of course, to the many rights and freedoms enshrined in the Joint Declaration. They 
should not disturb themselves. 655  
 
At the beginning of Patten’s nominations, the Chinese officials in charge of the Hong Kong issue tried 
to cultivate relations with Patten and make him follow the path of cooperation with China like his 
predecessors. It was clear that the Foreign Ministry and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office wanted 
to sustain the cooperation in the bilateral relations as before. After Patten came to Hong Kong, the Chinese 
original policy was to try to make him follow the path of cooperation as his predecessors. In a testimony 
before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Patten revealed that he was engaged in discussions with the 
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Chinese side on his reform proposal. He revealed that shortly after he had been appointed the Chinese 
officials expressed to Patten that “there could be no question to their agreeing to an increase in the number 
of directly elected seats in Hong Kong”.656
Some Chinese officials professed to see not only a linkage but also evidence of a carefully 
coordinated new British strategy in late May 1992 when, first, the newly appointed designate governor, 
Chris Patten, stated at his first press conference that he wanted freedom as well as stability and prosperity 
for Hong Kong; second, the British minister with responsibility for the territory stated publicly in his first 
visit to the island that the only obstacle to amending the basic Law was political; and third, that John Major 
was photographed with Martin Lee Chu-ming outside No. 10 Downing Street. (Ta Kung Pao, 31 May 
1992)657  
Patten’s reform proposals though loyal to the words of the Basic Law, violating the basic design for 
the Hong Kong Basic Law, especially the spirit to maintain an executive-led system in Hong Kong. A 
member of the Basic Law Draft Committee, Maria Tam Wai-chu pointed out that the executive-led political 
system in Hong Kong was implicit in the Hong Kong Basic Law. She argued: “The political system 
designed by the Hong Kong Basic Law was executive-led, though these words did not appear in the 
document. The executive was responsible for proposing policies, in charge of finances and the laws in 
Hong Kong. The Chief Executive signs all the budgets.”658
Chief Secretary of Hong Kong Sir David Akers-Jones, who was actively following the drafting of the 
Basic Law at the time, argued that Patten really deviated from the spirit of the Basic Law. According to 
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Akers-Jones, Patten’s object to increase the size of the constituencies which represented special interests 
and professions “did not conform to the original intention when these constituencies were first introduced. 
Nor did it conform to the intention of the drafters of the Basic Law”. 659 This gave rise to a prolonged 
dispute which could have been settled by asking those of us who had written the Green and White Papers 
on representative government which “It was not right just to exploit the grey areas in the Basic Law and 
tried to enforce anything that was not written in paper. Nor did it conform to the intention of the drafters of 
the Basic Law. This gave rise to a prolonged dispute which could have been settled by asking those of us 
who had written the Green and White Papers on representative government.”660  
Patten revealed that Lu Ping had been publicly suggesting electoral proposals different from those 
considered in the letters long after they had been exchanged. And when he discussed his proposals with 
British officials including those with a close relationship with China like former Prime Minister Heath and 
Geoffrey Howe and his predecessors Lord MacLehose and Lord Wilson, most were supportive.661  
Patten’s change of approach convinced the Chinese that he had a secret agenda. Patten’s reform 
proposals were unacceptable to the Chinese as they would lead to big changes in the current system of 
Hong Kong and violate the “gradual and orderly progress” described in the Basic Law. The Chinese 
perception of the Patten proposals was best explained by director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office, Lu Ping. Lu pointed out three major changes in the Patten proposals: First of all, Patten’s proposals 
changed the indirect elections in the functional constituencies into de facto direct elections. Secondly, 
according to his proposals, all the workers in a factory have a vote. As a result, the person elected from the 
business in Hong Kong may not represent the interests of the business leaders. Members of the District 
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Boards usually consisted of both appointed and directly elected members. Patten changed all of them into 
direct elections. Thirdly, the 400 member Election Committee of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong 
consisted of four parts. Patten overthrow all the past agreements, and turned it to a committee consisted of 
legislators in the districts selected by direct elections.662
Patten’s different negotiating styles and his refusal of Chinese invitations to Beijing seemed to push 
those stressing cooperation with the Chinese into a more and more awkward situation. Lu Ping’s revealing 
of the secret understandings between the two countries was intended to force Patten to withdraw his 
proposals, but as this countermeasure did not work, Lu Ping faced great pressure from the hardliner 
Premier and made it more difficult for him to stress cooperation with the British. Patten speculated that Lu 
Ping had been sharply criticized by his superiors for the fact that the combination of the two documents did 
not seem to have lashed the British as firmly to the Chinese wagon as had probably been claimed was the 
case in Peking.663
Due to his public statements and his ignorance of how to deal with the Chinese bureaucracy, Patten 
confirmed the Chinese leaders’ suspicion that the new governor was determined to march on the path of 
confrontation. As Patten demonstrated his resolve to do things differently, the Chinese government 
gradually toughened their stance. And Patten’s speech to the Legislative Council in October 1992 was the 
last straw, which led to the triumph of the hardliners within the Chinese administration. 
Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, Liu Huaqing revealed that the decision to be 
tough to the British was made at the end of October 1992. He said that from 21 to 22 October, Deng 
Xiaoping were preoccupied with the Hong Kong issue. He said, “The Hong Kong issue, in a nutshell, is 
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that who should not shrink a bit to the British. I am familiar with the situation in Hong Kong, but I want to 
see our proposals.”664  
Liu Huaqing submitted “Summary to the Reform Proposals of Governor Patten and Our 
Countermeasures”. Liu said Deng was very unsatisfied with the proposal. He said, “It is too soft, we can be 
gentle in attitude, but we should make our points clearly to the British.” Deng brought out the military 
option in the meeting. He said, “As I told Mrs Thatcher before, if we fail to reach an agreement, we will 
consider solving the problem at other times and through other means. Such an option is definitely not a 
peaceful evolution. Only when we are prepared can we deal with all the possible scenarios.”665
Deng’s encouragement strengthened the hawkish attitude of the military on the Hong Kong issue. At 
the first meeting of the new military leading group on 26 October 1992, the military leaders discussed the 
instructions by Deng Xiaoping. The military men toughened their stance on the issue. The meeting reached 
a consensus:  
 
Our next step is to speed up the work on sending the People’s Liberation to Hong Kong peacefully, 
and to make the preparations to deal with a state of emergence. The proposal has to consider all sorts 
of complicated situations. We have to take the issue seriously and take a bold approach. This issue 
should not drag on for a long time, but settled once and for all. The military should prepare several 
proposals, and ask President Deng and President Jiang for permission. With those proposals ready, 
any scenario can be handled. On November 2, I discussed the instructions of President Deng and the 
opinions of the masses on the First Military Committee Standing Meeting. President Deng had a wise 
proposal: we should be prepared for the best and the worst for anything. Only in this way can we be 
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prepared and fully grasp the course of events.666
 
After Deng’s instructions, other Chinese leaders sided with Deng in their speeches. At least three 
members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the apex of the Communist Party leadership, 
delivered internal speeches denouncing British “colonialism” during November and December, after Deng 
himself had reportedly laid down this new general policy line for Hong Kong in late October: “Should the 
British Hong Kong government take one false step, we shall issue a reminder. Two false steps and we shall 
issue a warning. Three false steps and we shall start all over again by asking them to go home.”667
At a time when the newly nominated Governor Patten was trying to put his new ideas on negotiating 
tactics with the Chinese into practice, he made two blunders which doomed his reform proposals. On the 
one hand, he did not master the language of communicating with the Chinese, in expressing his ideas 
frankly he simply provided bullets for the hardliners within the Chinese government that convinced Deng 
Xiaoping that Patten wanted to create turbulence in Hong Kong. On the other hand, Patten focused only on 
the negotiating tactics to deal with the Chinese but failed to take into account the intricacies of Chinese 
politics. By making these blunders he not only pushed those wanting cooperation with the British in the 
Chinese government into an awkward situation but also provoked a large scale war of words between the 
two countries which led to a deterioration of bilateral relations.  
 
3. Zhou Nan’s Encounters with Patten 
Patten’s reforms and the deterioration of Sino-British relations pushed the director of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong in an award situation. Zhou Nan’s predecessor Xu Jiatun also argued that it was difficult for directors 
                                                        
666 Ibid., pp. 17-18.  
667 Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, p. 193.  
 260
of Xinhua-Hong Kong to handle the relations with Britain during Patten’s governorship. A journalist from 
Taiwan asked Xu Jiatun if he would adopt a different policy than Zhou Nan if he were still the Director of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong. Xu argued that the change of policy by Chris Patten was the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen incident. He said: “After the Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping adopted the tough line 
approach to the Western powers. The tougher the British, the tougher the Chinese would be in response.”668
Before the arrival of Patten, Zhou Nan had been highly suspicious that the new governor had a secret 
mission in Hong Kong. John Major himself gave a high profile reception to the visiting leaders of the 
United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), Martin Lee Chu-ming and Yeung Sum. Hence, before the 
arrival of Chris Patten, the local Xinhua News Agency had conveyed the message to its organs, and the 
united front, that the new Governor “had to be taken seriously”.669  
During his first five weeks in Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten made no official move to visit Zhou 
Nan, the highest Chinese official in Hong Kong. Chris Patten did not get along with Zhou Nan. In Chinese 
Ambassador Ma Fuzhen’s visit to Hong Kong, Patten expressed his frustrations to Ma that he needed a 
Chinese official in Hong Kong to whom he could talk frankly, as Zhou Nan did not fall into this category. 
Patten described Zhou Nan with the word “combative”.670
Zhou was a loyal implementer of Deng’s instructions in Hong Kong. In an interview in 2008, a 
CCTV anchor asked him to define his role in Hong Kong as director of Xinhua Hong Kong. Zhou called 
himself “the guard” of Deng Xiaoping.671 The word “guard” was a vivid characterization of the strong 
influence of the “struggle diplomacy” mentality of Zhou Nan which simulated foreign affairs work to a 
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fierce battle with enemies.  
After the instructions of Deng on being tough to the British, Zhou’s relations with Patten worsen. 
Zhou disclosed that after the deterioration of bilateral relations, the contacts between himself and Patten 
had been reduced to the annual National Day anniversary party, and he did not have any private meeting 
with the British governor.672
In his memoirs Zhou Nan devoted a passage to analyze the reform proposals of Patten in his policy 
speech of October 1992. His analysis of the nature of the Patten proposals had the tone of typical 
communist propaganda. He argued:  
 
Patten’s proposal discarded the method of gradual and orderly progress. He wanted to turn the one 
third of directly elected seats [in the Sino-British agreement] into all direct elections in disguise. He 
was also providing great advantages to the anti-China people cultivated by the British. In addition, 
the Patten proposal also suggested canceling all the appointed members in the district boards and 
municipal councils. In this way, he would continue British rule after 1997 and retain British 
influence and manipulation of the politics of Hong Kong. When the time was mature, he could turn 
Hong Kong into an independent and semi-independent entity, namely, a second Singapore. As a 
result, the difference between China and Britain was not the difference between the number of seats 
but whether Hong Kong should have an executive-led political system and whether to overthrow 
original agreements and whether Britain should dominate the political scene in Hong Kong after 
1997.673  
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In this passage, Zhou Nan made three major accusations of Patten in his evil plans, Patten’s violation 
of the earlier agreements, Patten’s evil plan for Britain to control Hong Kong politics and Patten’s efforts to 
seek independence of Hong Kong. These accusations reflected the Communist Party’s judgment of the 
nature of Patten reforms and their negative consequences on Hong Kong.  
In the first charge of violation of Sino-British agreements, Zhou Nan accused Patten of trying to 
control Hong Kong politics. A major change in the reform proposal of Patten was that he “changed the 
basis of the so-called functional constituencies under which groups representing the different professions of 
Hong Kong chose councilors to represent them. There were to be thirty of these legislators from functional 
constituencies, half the total.”674 The past representatives from the functional constituencies were leaders 
from the professionals. Such a policy changed the constitution of the representatives of the functional 
constituencies.  
In the second charge, that Britain was introducing democratic reforms to manipulate Hong Kong’s 
politics, Zhou Nan tried to impress Beijing by showing the evil intentions of the British. Zhou pointed out 
that Britain wanted to manipulate Hong Kong’s politics and maintain influence in Hong Kong.   
The third charge that Britain was seeking to give Hong Kong an independent status showed the 
interpretation of the Chinese government on the nature of the British reform. The democratic reforms were 
interpreted as British efforts to control the territory after their retreat from Hong Kong. Zhou Nan was a 
firm hardliner on the democratization of Hong Kong. When the row occurred over Chris Patten’s 1992 
political reform package, Beijing’s suspicion of the motives of the British colonial government was fueled 
by “hard evidence”. In the words of Zhou Nan, Director of Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch, the 
retreat of colonial power would never be a voluntary act, and a smooth transfer of power had to be fought 
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for.675
     After the war of words started, Zhou Nan and Xinhua-Hong Kong under his leadership actively 
joined the battle and made harsh accusations of the governor. When Zhou Nan’s hawkish attitudes 
encountered Patten’s way of communication dominated by blunt words. It was all the more convenient for 
Zhou Nan to sensationalize about Patten’s ulterior motives in his reports to Beijing. In a sense Zhou’s hard 
line approach helped the triumph of hardliners and led to the final decision by Deng to be tough to the 
British.  
 
III. Back to the Negotiating Table 
1. Talks about Talks and 17 Rounds of Negotiations  
Following Patten’s meeting with Lu Ping in Beijing, China refused any direct Sino-British discussion 
on the issue. When the British raised the issue of the reform in the Joint Liaison Group, on 3 November 
1992, China refused to discuss it. On 21 December, over 250 labour and community organizations 
denounced Patten’s reforms in advertisements in the Chinese language newspapers. The Chinese 
Government’s line was that because it was a matter of principle they would not even consider any 
negotiation or compromise. This view was articulated by the Chinese Premier, Li Peng, when he stated: 
“any counter proposal or any compromise plan on the basis of the Hong Kong Governor’s plan is 
unacceptable. This is a matter of principle...the Chinese Government will never compromise or make any 
concession on matters of principle.”676  
The final months of 1992 and the early part of 1993 were marked by continued dispute between 
Britain and China over the electoral reform package. As Lu Ping stated in January of 1993, “[T]he Chinese 
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side will not accept any proposals that are patched together on the basis of the Patten package. All such 
proposals are not proposals for convergence and will not be allowed to take the through train to beyond 
1997.”677 From Lu’s comments, it seems that the 17 rounds of talks were doomed from the beginning. 
Similarly, on 31 January, attacking Britain, Director of Xinhua-Hong Kong Zhou Nan vowed that China 
would never “barter away principles”. JLG team leader Guo Fengmin cast doubt, for example, on there 
being any value in holding JLG meetings if Patten insisted on going ahead with his plans for political 
reform.678  
A three-day session of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group opened on 8 December, but neither side 
expected to see any progress. Chinese representatives insisted they would not take Patten’s proposals as a 
basis for negotiations but Anthony Galsworthy, the British team leader, declared: “The subject of 
constitutional reforms will certainly be discussed at the JLG meeting. We will be doing our best, but 
everyone can see that the atmosphere is not good at the moment.” As soon as Galsworthy disclosed 
constitutional reforms would be discussed, the Chinese side charged that disclosing the agenda of JLG 
meetings was a breach in confidentiality.679
Lu Ping stated in January of 1993: “[T]he Chinese side will not accept any proposals that are 
patched together on the basis of the Patten package. All such proposals are not proposals for convergence 
and will not be allowed to take the through train to beyond 1997.”680 In early 1993, the British government 
worked really hard on damage control and tried to start negotiations with the Chinese government. The 
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talks about talks were mainly conducted by a prominent China hand, the British Ambassador to China at 
the time, Robin McLaren, who became the chief British representative in the later 17 rounds of formal 
negotiations. This stage of pre-negotiations was conducted through “intensive diplomatic contacts” in 
Peking to “explore whether a productive basis for formal talks could be found”.681 The talks were 
conducted between Robin McLaren and Jiang Enzhu.    
McLaren explained that the talks about talks were “almost like the talks which led to the Joint 
Declaration only on a more limited topic”.682 On 6 February 1993, Robin McLaren, the former political 
adviser who had succeeded Alan Donald as British ambassador to China, passed a copy of Patten’s reform 
bill to the Chinese foreign ministry. The Chinese took their time in responding, perhaps reflecting a split 
within the Chinese government over how to deal with it.683  
The principal obstacle to holding “talks about talks” was the issue of Hong Kong’s participation. The 
Chinese side argued that the British were involved in a conspiracy of “three-legged stool”. They pointed 
out that the British were trying to create a three party structure of the negotiations to use Hong Kong as a 
bargaining chip against the Chinese. It was surmounted by the principals agreeing that the two sides would 
be represented by the British Ambassador and a Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively, 
while the Hong Kong Secretary for Constitutional Affairs could attend as a non-negotiator.684
It took a message from Hurd to Qian Qichen to bring the Chinese back to the negotiating table. A 
few hours before this deadline, the Chinese Foreign Ministry delivered their response to Douglas Hurd’s 
letter. Beijing was willing to talk “on the basis of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law and the 
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understanding between us.”685 MacLaren revealed that the Chinese insisted on that wording because they 
wanted a specific reference to the 1990 correspondence, which, in their view, constituted an agreement.686 
Patten decided to postpone publication of the bill. The agreement to enter into talks was announced in April 
1993.  
Before the start of formal negotiations, in response to McLaren’s own insistence that Chris Patten’s 
proposals should be the starting-point of the forthcoming talks, Lu had accused the British government of 
destroying the atmosphere surrounding the discussions even before they began.687 The first round of talks 
was duly held in Beijing between 22 and 24 April. The content of the discussions was deliberately kept 
secret and apart from routine protestations of sincerity by the two sides, little was revealed of their progress. 
Lu Ping justified such secrecy by arguing that publicizing the proceedings would make it even more 
difficult to achieve positive results. 688
During this first phase of talks, the Chinese side insisted that before discussions could move on to 
matters of substance, it was necessary for the two sides to reach agreement on a list of principles.689 The 
British refused the Chinese suggestion that they should agree on some principles before proceeding to talks 
on substances.   
In rounds four and five, the British side noticed that the Chinese negotiators had quietly dropped their 
insistence on establishing principles as a precondition for progress and agreed to proceed to matters of 
substance.690 Around May Patten had identified two areas for compromise, on both the composition of the 
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Election Committee and the size of the electorate for the functional constituencies.691
By the second half of May, Zhang Junsheng, deputy –director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua 
News Agency was expressing cautious optimism about the prospects arising out of the discussions. By the 
end of the same month the Hong Kong government’s stated intention to submit its Boundary and Election 
Commission Bill as a “component of the 1994 electoral arrangements” – to LEGCO led official Chinese 
sources to warn the British sides not to place new obstacles in the way of the on-going talks.692  
In mid-1993 when Patten got a bill on the initial procedures for elections passed by Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council, China was convinced that Patten had turned its back on the 1984 Joint Declaration.693 
The passing of the bill in Legco seemed to have been the signal for the renewal of more vituperative 
comment from Chinese officials and sources sympathetic to the Chinese side, including accusations that 
Britain lacked sincerity and was indulging in “little tricks”. 694
The tabling of the bill added to Chinese reversion against Patten. The fifth talk was scheduled two 
weeks later on 14 June. Clearly, the governor was being forced to renege on his legislative timetable. 
Beijing “rebutted any and every attempt to introduce any part of the Patten package into the discussions.” 
The Chinese side did later show some interest in presenting their alternative proposal in coming talks. 
Britain suddenly became optimistic while the governor was still frustrated at being unable to go it alone. 
On the other hand, the local community in Hong Kong was neither optimistic nor pessimistic, for they had 
lost trust in both sides. Patten’s personal popularity was now on the decline because of his “untimely step” 
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in publishing his reform proposals.695
At the end of the fifth talk, nothing of substance relevant to the 1994-95 election arrangement had yet 
been mentioned. Jiang Enzhu blamed the British for lack of good faith because of the little progress made 
in the talks. Ambassador MacLaren acknowledged that some progress had been made. On 14 June 1993, a 
serious episode occurred: the Britain announced in Hong Kong that the “exchange of seven letters in early 
1990 between the two foreign ministers had no force of constraint”.696 On the same day Beijing countered 
and demanded good faith on diplomatic agreement.697
The Foreign Secretary took the opportunity of his presence in the region for the Tokyo Summit to visit 
Peking for talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister on 8-9 July 1993. The Foreign Secretary set out the 
principles which would need to apply if revised electoral proposals were to meet out requirements: On the 
Election Committee, that its members should be elected fairly and openly in Hong Kong, not selected, and 
that the arrangements for election which took place within the Election Committee should themselves be 
open and fair. On the functional constituencies, the electorates should be of substantial size. Experience had 
shown that corporate voting could lead to an individual having control over several notes in functional 
constituencies. With very small electorates, there was a risk of corruption, of which there had been a recent 
case in Hong Kong. The British side therefore proposed to maintain the gradual development of the 
existing 21 constituencies, and would be willing to examine proposals which could meet the requirements 
of both sides. The Foreign Secretary also underlined that the whole purpose of holding talks was to achieve 
continuity, and that it was therefore essential to reach agreement on objective criteria for the through train. 
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698
Qian suggested that the two sides should write a summary of the principles in the negotiations. Hurd 
said it was better to be discussed the details, when the positions of the two sides are closer, then they can 
work on the text. No agreement was reached on this point.699 Later Qian stressed the importance of the 
concept of the through train. He hoped the British side could treasure the fruits of years of consultation. 
Qian told Hurd, the two parties of a country, like the Conservatives and Labor Parties in Britain, when they 
change the administration, there will be changes in all aspects. It was impossible for the two parties to 
discuss the “through train” of the administrations, however, on the Hong Kong issue, through train was 
possible despite the transfer of sovereignty. This is unprecedented work, very innovative. Hurd reasserted 
the British position that the through train needs clear and objective criteria.700
On 14 June 1993, a serious episode occurred: the British announced in Hong Kong that the 
“exchange of seven letters in early 1990 between the two foreign ministers had no force of constraint”.701 
On the same day Beijing countered and demanded good faith on diplomatic agreement.702 The British 
claimed they made two major concessions to China in July-August 1993-reducing the franchise for 
functional constituency election by two-thirds of Patten’s proposal and appointing an electoral committee to 
select district board members in place of election-in the hope that China would reciprocate by providing 
these standards.703  
On 9 July 1993, following “whirlwind visit” of the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd to Beijing, Patten says it is better for Britain to take unilateral action 
on constitutional reforms in Hong Kong than surrender on principles.704 In an effort to exert time pressure 
on the Chinese to push for a concession, Patten’s statement led to the conclusions from the Chinese side 
that the British did not want to have the negotiations in the first place. Such a statement made the Chinese 
formally started their preparations for the breakup of the negotiations. One week later, on 16 July 1993 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, formally inaugurated a 57 member Preliminary Working 
Committee for the Hong Kong SAR Preparatory Committee, but suspended implementation until its second 
plenary meeting in December.  
Ten days before their meeting in New York, Hurd sent Qian a message on September 10, he stressed 
that the criteria for the through train was a “fundamental” problem for the British side. It was “crucial” for 
the two sides to discuss the issue in the next round (the 12th round on September 26) of negotiations. As it 
would ensure that their can have an overall discussion of the prospects of the talks. If the discussions are 
delayed, no progress could be made on detailed election issues.705 On 25 September 1993 Xinhua News 
Agency releases Deng Xiaoping’s speech of 24 September 1982.706
On 1 October, in the course of a visit to New York to attend the 48th session the UN General 
Assembly, Qian Qichen had a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, during which he 
called for an acceleration of the ongoing bilateral talks on Hong Kong. Qian later admitted that his meeting 
with Hurd had – as expected – produced no positive result. 
On 6 October 1993, in his second annual policy address to Legco, in October 1993, Patten pressed on 
China to conclude discussions on electoral arrangements and Hong Kong to support democracy. He warned: 
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“We now have only weeks rather than months to conclude these talks…We are not prepared to give away 
our principles in order to sign a piece of paper.”707 At a press conference afterwards, he was challenged by 
pro-Beijing reporters who accused him of delivering an ultimatum to China. He said that a few more rounds 
of talks could deliver a solution.708
At this time, the majority of the Hong Kong people were convinced that Patten’s confrontational 
tactics were bound to fail. On 8 October 1993, poll of 605 adults indicates 78 percent agree with Patten’s 
call to stand up for democracy but of these 16 percent would leave it to others to take the stand. 709
In early November the British returned to the negotiating table for round sixteen with a revised 
“memorandum of understanding” based on the Chinese document submitted in the previous round. The 
Chinese retreated from what the British believed to be their stated position on the appointment of members 
to the District Boards and Municipal Councils. Although Robin McLaren though he had elucidated the 
Chinese view, they insisted during rounds sixteen and seventeen that there had been a misunderstanding. 
According to Patten, the Chinese were only prepared to explain what they had really meant if the British 
were willing to give up a point of substance in return. They also rejected the British proposal that a 
first-stage agreement should incorporate a commitment to the single-seat, single-vote formula for Legco 
elections as well as the local elections, without which Patten was sure any agreement would be rejected by 
a majority of Hong Kong’s legislators.710  
A few days later, the two chief negotiators – Jiang Enzhu for China; Sir Robin McLaren for Britain – 
agreed that the discussions had reached a “crossroads”. Jiang warned that failure to reach agreement would 
mean that “the terms of the bodies to be elected in 1994 and 1995 would terminate on 30 June 1997” and 
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reaffirmed China’s view that the key to progress lay in adherence to the principles enshrined in the Joint 
Declaration…711
In the course of October the British side put forward a further revision of their proposals for the nine 
new functional constituencies, taking account of the points made by the Chinese side. They also put 
forward new proposals on the Election Committee, accepting the Chinese position that the Committee’s 
size should be about 600, and confirming that Hong Kong residents who were deputies to the NPC and the 
CPPCC would be free to stand for election to the Election Committee.712 
In late October the Chinese side proposed that the two sides record an interim understanding on five 
points: that there would be no change in the nature or functions of the District Boards and Municipal 
Councils; that the voting age in all three tiers of elections, including the Legislative Council, should be 18; 
that the restriction on Hong Kong residents, who are members of Chinese Peoples Congresses serving in 
Hong Kong’s representative bodies should be lifted for all three tiers; that the voting method for the District 
Boards and Municipal Councils should be single-seat, single-vote; and that the two sides should record 
their differing view on the question of abolishing appointed members in the District Boards and Municipal 
Councils. On the last point, they proposed that it should be for the SAR713 Government to determine on its 
own the number of appointed members in the District Boards and Municipal Councils. The British side 
responded rapidly by developing these points into a draft Memorandum of Understanding. This draft was 
handed over on 3 November, in advance of the following rounds of talks. The British ambassador followed 
this up by calling on the Chinese side’s representative on 5 November. The British side explained that they 
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had added one point of substance to the original Chinese proposal: that the single-seat, single–vote method 
should also apply to the Legislative Council geographical elections. The Chinese side made no attempt 
either on 3 November or on 5 November or at any point prior to Round 16 to contest this understanding.  
In late October the Chinese side proposed that the two sides record an interim understanding on five 
points: that there would be no change in the nature or functions of the District Boards and Municipal 
Councils; that the voting age in all three tiers of elections, including the Legislative Council, should be 18; 
that the restriction on Hong Kong residents, who are members of Chinese Peoples Congresses serving in 
Hong Kong’s representative bodies should be lifted for all three tiers; that the voting method for the District 
Boards and Municipal Councils should be single-seat, single-vote; and that the two sides should record 
their differing view on the question of abolishing appointed members in the District Boards and Municipal 
Councils. On the last point, they proposed that it should be for the SAR Government to determine on its 
own the number of appointed members in the District Boards and Municipal Councils.714  
The British side responded rapidly by developing these points into a draft Memorandum of 
Understanding. This draft was handed over on 3 November, in advance of the following rounds of talks. 
The British ambassador followed this up by calling on the Chinese side’s representative on 5 November. 
The British side explained that they had added one point of substance to the original Chinese proposal: that 
the single-seat, single–vote method should also apply to the Legislative Council geographical elections. 
The Chinese side made no attempt either on 3 November or on 5 November or at any point prior to Round 
16 to contest this understanding. Following a ministerial meeting, attended by the Governor, on 10 
November, the Prime Minister sent Premier Li Peng a message. He welcomed the progress which had been 
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made towards an understanding on the most immediate issues, and indicated that for practical reasons it 
would be necessary to reach agreement on them very soon. The Prime Minister also noted that if it was 
possible to reach early agreement on these matters, there would be little more time to tackle the more 
difficult issues, and proposed a more intensive final phase of the negotiations.  The British side therefore 
sought in the two rounds following this message (16 and 17) to reach agreement on the text of a 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
A spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office claimed that China had on a number of 
occasions made suggestions designed to facilitate progress, but these had been rejected by the British side. 
During the 15th round of discussions, for example, China had put forward proposals which should have 
satisfied British demands on three issues relating to elections in Hong Kong’s district boards and municipal 
councils. Britain’s response had alleged been merely to complicate the matter by adding fresh demands, 
which China could not meet. Jiang Enzhu later referred to the 15th round of talks as the point at which 
agreement should have been reached. On 15 December Chris Patten took what Xinhua described as a 
“grave step towards confrontation with China” in introducing a part of his electoral package to LEGCO 
members. 715  
Following a ministerial meeting, attended by the Governor, on 10 November, the Prime Minister sent 
Premier Li Peng a message. He welcomed the progress which had been made towards an understanding on 
the most immediate issues, and indicated that for practical reasons it would be necessary to reach 
agreement on them very soon. The Prime Minister also noted that if it was possible to reach early 
agreement on these matters, there would be little more time to tackle the more difficult issues, and proposed 
a more intensive final phase of the negotiations.   
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On 1 November 1993, Chinese Premier Li Peng, in interview with Wide Angle magazine, accused 
Britain of violating past Sino-British agreements on Hong Kong and called for the PWC to speed up its 
work so as to advance the operation of the Preparatory Committee scheduled in the Basic Law for 1996.716 
On 24 November 1993, a day before the 17th round of talks between China and Britain on Hong Kong’s 
elections, British Foreign Secretary Hurd had an appointment with Chinese Ambassador to Britain Ma 
Yuzhen. The British press suddenly released the news and said Hurd was “trying to show the Chinese side 
the seriousness of the issue”, the British were “outraged” at the result of the negotiations, and if they still 
could not reach an agreement in the next round of the negotiations, the British side will decide in the 
following month on whether to cancel the negotiations.717
At the end of round sixteen, Christopher Hum, a Foreign Office official deputizing for Robin 
McLaren, who was ill, was instructed to inform his Chinese counterparts that if they reneged on the 
agreement the British thought they had made in round fifteen, then it would not be possible to go on 
discussing these so-called first-stage issues in round seventeen.718 Chief Representative of the Sino-British 
Joint Liaison Group, Hugh Davies revealed:  
 
The task of telling the Chinese that we had no more room for maneuver, or time, fell to Christopher 
Hum, replacing Robin McLaren. This was a turning point. The Chinese announced their intention of 
ignoring the arrangements put in place by the British and of setting up a provisional working 
committee to lay the groundwork for the preparatory committee to be constituted under the terms of the 
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Basic Law to help ensure a smooth transition.719  
 
On 17 December a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated that any legislation passed by 
Legco in the absence of a Sino-British accord would not straddle 1997. He added that trade relations 
between the two sovereign powers would be adversely affected, although he did not specify in what way or 
to what extent. Patten reacted swiftly by pointing out that China enjoyed a trade surplus with Britain he 
could not imagine that Beijing would wish to damage that advantageous imbalance. On 27 December, the 
Chinese issued a formal warning that there would no be “through train” for the legislative assembly, or for 
the two tiers of local government, the District Boards and the Municipal Councils. 720
The talks stretched over the whole of 1993, and involved some 14 rounds. They were almost entirely 
unproductive, although substantial concessions were offered by the British/Hong Kong side, and there was 
a moment when at least partial success looked conceivable.721 After 200 hours of negotiation, the two sides 
had managed to agree that, whatever form elections might take, the voting age should be reduced from 
twenty-one to eighteen. And that was it.722
In an article in the South China Morning Post of 30 September 1996, Percy Cradock, Britain’s chief 
negotiator over the Joint Declaration, in a swinging attack on Patten, stated categorically that: “The facts 
are that there is no reference to democratization in the Joint Declaration. There is a general statement that 
the legislature shall be constituted by elections and the executive shall be accountable to the legislature, 
nothing more. There was no bargain or agreement between Britain and China for anything like the Patten 
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reforms.”723  
When asked about the term “elections” when interviewed for this book, Patten cited the debate in the 
British Parliament and statement made by British ministers at the time of the Joint Declaration about 
developing representative democracy in Hong Kong. “I am sure that when people were talking to Lady 
Thatcher or Geoffrey Howe about the draft that had been agreed in the Joint Declaration, they didn’t say to 
them this bit about elections, it doesn’t mean of course fair elections or democratic elections; it means the 
sort of elections that Chinese officials like when your know the result in advance.” ?Interview with the 
author, Government House, 16 September 1996.?Perhaps Cradock and his Foreign Office acolytes knew all 
along that the Joint Declaration did not really mean there would be democratic elections in Hong Kong, as 
Cradock’s statement about there being no provision for democracy in the Sino-British document suggests. 
But they may not have felt the need to spell it out to their political masters.724
 
2. Chinese at the Negotiating Table  
     Patten’s change of negotiating style added to Chinese suspicions of the hidden agenda behind his 
democratic reform proposals. Deng Xiaoping was closely observing the negotiations and instructed the 
Chinese team not to bend under British pressure, the triumph of the hardliners in the Chinese government 
made it very difficult to achieve progress at the negotiating table.  
Before the start of the negotiations Deng Xiaoping was concerned over possible “unexpected small 
British traps”.725 The months of confrontations hardened Chinese stance on the issue. In January 1993, 
Deng Xiaoping made instructions to the officials in charge of the Hong Kong issue on how to deal with 
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Patten’s reforms. He said:  
 
British plans to ‘mess up’ Hong Kong before their retreat had been deliberately planned over a long 
period of time. We should clearly understand that the struggle was inevitable. We should not give up 
on matters of principle. We should never surrender on an inch, even a mini-meter. Concessions can 
only force us into a more passive position, and leaving the situation more complicated and 
chaotic…But if the British government and the Hong Kong authorities really wanted confrontation, 
then we will have no option but join them.726
 
The talks about talks were a period of heated debate within the Chinese administration on whether to 
return to the path of consultations and cooperation with the British. In a report from the Central Military 
Commission, published on 17 February 1993, Deng Xiaoping himself issued a warning that China might 
break its pledges on Hong Kong if Patten refused to withdraw his reforms. The Chinese leader was further 
quoted as saying that the proposals were part of a Western “plot” to wage a “new cold war” against China. 
He had ordered a harsh policy towards Britain because he believed London’s aim was to “internationalize” 
Hong Kong and to turn it into a political entity that could not be controlled by China.727 
The conflicting signals from the Chinese side in the period showed the great division between those 
who stressed cooperation with the British and the hawks in the Chinese government. On February 6, Robin 
McLaren, the former political adviser who had succeeded Alan Donald as British ambassador to China, 
passed a copy of Patten’s reform bill to the Chinese foreign ministry. The Chinese took their time in 
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responding, perhaps reflecting a split within the Chinese government over how to deal with it. 728  
Two days after McLaren’s initiative, the Foreign Affairs Committee received a letter from the 
Chinese Ambassador in London. Mr Ma stated: “You may be aware of a prevalent view expressed by some 
senior British officials that they do not believe China will re-establish Hong Kong’s three-tier councils for 
fear of international pressure. May I say that they are grossly mistaken if they really think so. In the 
absence of an agreement between China and Britain, China will definitely disband and re-establish Hong 
Kong’s three-tier council on 1 July 1997…As a matter of course, China will re-establish Hong Kong’s 
three-tier councils in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law. To say otherwise and dismiss 
China’s justified action as something impossible of achievement is irresponsible and misleading to the 
British public and the people of Hong Kong.”729
On 16 February, the British contacted the Chinese Foreign Ministry to express their pleasure at this 
development and to inform Beijing that the British team would be led by Robin McLaren and would 
include a number of named officials of the Hong Kong government. At this point the diplomatic lines to 
Beijing suddenly went dead. According to Patten, “It was like throwing a pebble into a black hole. There 
was obviously a debate going on in Peking, and I think there were some efforts by Zhou Nan to kibosh the 
whole process.” The governor now postponed publication of the bill for the second time. He decided on 26 
February on yet another postponement. 730  
In his role as an official adviser, the DAB leader Tsang Yok Sing had attended a “summit meeting” 
in Guangzhou, when it became clear that the “doves”, led by Lu Ping, were keen to development the 
dialogue with the British the “hawks”, led by Zhou Nan, wanted to end it. It was another two weeks before 
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the Chinese broke silence to reiterate their willingness to negotiate. They insisted, on a number of 
preconditions – “trivial debating points”, they seemed to Patten – which included the demand that the 
proposed talks should not merely be confidential, but that their very existence should remain a carefully 
guarded secret. The British responded to this with some impatience. 731 Throughout this period, all the steps 
taken in Hong Kong preparing for the democratic reforms became good excuses for the hardliners led by Li 
Peng to push for the setting up of the second stove.  
The British were deeply worried that a sudden deterioration of Deng’s health could be a setback for 
the negotiations. Michael Yahuda pointed out: “The old man (Deng Xiaoping)’s advanced age may have 
taken its toll on his physical capacities, but his political will and authority remain undiminished. So that 
even now the premier or general secretary would first have to wait for one of Deng’s economic statements 
as conveyed by his secretary or by one of his daughters before authorizing any new step. The officials 
nominally in charge of Hong Kong affairs such as Lu Ping or Zhou Nan have little to gain except by 
staying put and denouncing alleged British schemes.”732  
The organization that eventually took charge of the negotiations with Britain when they were 
resumed in April 1993 was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the whole, its officials, unlike those from 
HKMO and Xinhua HK, had refrained from indulging in personal abuse of Governor Patten and they had 
gained merit from their success in arising China’s regional and international prestige.733
On that basis Patten decided to extend his deadline by one more day. That same afternoon, the 
“hardmen” in Beijing regained the upper hand: Jiang Enzhu contacted the British embassy to inform 
McLaren that the Chinese side had decided to withdraw their “concession”. His government was not now 
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willing to permit the Hong Kong members of the British team to be treated on an equal footing in the 
negotiations.734 To break this deadlock, Patten suggested a compromise: If the Chinese wished to describe 
McLaren’s team as advisers and experts, the British would refrain from contradicting them. The Patten bill 
was duly published on 15 March to a predictable display of outrage from the Chinese. A spokesman from 
the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong declared that there was now no basis for talks between the two 
sides. The following day, Li Peng in the strongest language yet publicly deployed by the Beijing leadership, 
denounced Patten for “perfidiously and unilaterally” crafting proposals designed to alter Hong Kong’s 
political system.735
On 12 March 1993, the Hong Kong government published Patten’s draft reform bill in the official 
gazette, but then Britain said this could be delayed. China’s response was ambivalent, with officials 
claiming that the British had closed the door to talks but “the door was not yet locked.” They warned, 
however, that if the bill was submitted, “the door would be locked and the key thrown into the sea.”736
The next day after Patten’s draft was published, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi and Liu Huaqing 
reported to Deng on the present situation in Hong Kong. Deng defined the nature of the dispute between 
China and Britain with the following instruction. He explained:  
 
The British were obviously challenging and confronting us. This is unavoidable. This is also the 
British Chinese policy and strategy. They were trying to test if we would recover Hong Kong ahead 
of schedule, and how we would handle the current political and economic situation. They were 
making a political gamble using the interests of millions of people in Hong Kong.737
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 After explaining the nature of the challenge ahead, the father of “one country, two systems” laid out 
the guidelines for the works in the following words. He pointed out that the British had two plans: one is to 
turn Hong Kong into a political entity manipulated by the British, that is what they meant by exchanging 
sovereignty for administration by proxy. The other is to mess up Hong Kong to trouble us. Deng instructed 
the negotiators not to allow the British to get what they wanted: “They will achieve neither of their 
objectives! Judged from the British strategy, the struggle is inevitable.”738
After Deng’s instruction, the Chinese government was resolved to harden its negotiating position and 
to make nationwide propaganda against Governor Patten’s “future traps”. It was clear that China took great 
advantage of Patten’s “small step on 12 March” and made a little crisis of it. The episode, helped to explain 
Deng Xiaoping’s earlier suspicion or insight in his dealing with Britain in the early 1980s. He was reported 
to watch closely the daily developments in Hong Kong’s experiment with his “one country, two systems”. 
The first of the diplomatic talks took place on 22 April 1993. Little was agreed upon in the early rounds. 
Refusing to discuss it, the Chinese side never officially acknowledged the existence of Patten’s reform 
package. Beijing’s chief negotiator was Vice Foreign Minister Jiang Enzhu, who repeatedly warned that a 
confrontational approach with China would achieve nothing and that Patten’s unilateral reform would not 
last long. Britain’s chief delegate was Ambassador Robin MacLaren. When the rounds of talk continued 
accomplishing nothing at all, the LEGCO in Hong Kong passed the bill on Boundaries and Electoral 
Commission. China immediately criticized the “unilateral action as a new obstacle to Sino-British talks on 
electoral arrangement.”739  
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By early June 1993, Patten was pessimistic about the progress of the talks in relation to the 
legislation timetable for his reform bills through the LEGCO.740 His draft reform bill was published in the 
Gazette on 12 March. He was held responsible for causing the Chinese to harden their position. Beijing was 
all along able to remain in full control of the talks. Both London and Patten, proved to have no power at all, 
unless by unilateral reform, to confront China’s unilateral “second stove” counteraction.741  
On 15 March 1993, Premier Li Peng read the Government Work Report in a meeting of the National 
People’s Congress. The representatives were surprised to find that the sections of Sino-British negotiations 
were changed from the original version sent to the members in advance. The earlier version reads: “The 
British government should change course and come back to the track of the earlier documents and 
understandings of the two countries. That is the only way out.”742  
The changed version made more compelling accusations of the British government and won four 
applauds. It reads: 
 
The British government created obstacles for the cooperation, and will be responsible for all the 
serious consequences. The essence of the political reforms is an issue of sovereignty. The Chinese 
government will never give up on matters of principle. China made concessions to the British for the 
past 150 years, we will never make any concessions now.743  
    
In the meeting on March 13, Yang Shangkun said, we should use the “Government report” of this 
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year to inform the Chinese people of the current situation in Hong Kong. So as to made them understand 
the deterioration of Sino-British relations. The meeting endorsed Yang’s suggestions. 744 Premier Li Peng, 
in an NPC work report, attacked Patten’s “perfidious and unilaterally crafted proposals to violate previous 
Sino-British Agreements”. On 17 March, Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Lu Ping, in 
a press conference in Beijing, said that Patten would be condemned by history as a “sinner of a 
millennium”. Epithets included “a man to be cursed by history for a thousand years”, “a whore”, “a 
shyster”, “a snake”, “a robber”, “a thief”, “a prostitute” and “a tango dancer”. 745  
The Patten bill was published on 15 March to a predictable display of outrage from the Chinese. A 
spokesman from the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong declared that there was now no basis for talks 
between the two sides. The following day, Li Peng in the strongest language yet publicly deployed by the 
Beijing leadership, denounced Patten for “perfidiously and unilaterally” crafting proposals designed to alter 
Hong Kong’s political system.746
Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Lu Ping publicly accused 
Patten as “sinner of a millennium”. General Secretary Jiang Zemin gave the following speech after the 
meeting with Deng Xiaoping: “We want to send this message to the British authorities: This is very 
dangerous…The British government should know that Hong Kong was not the Falklands, and China is not 
a second class state living submissively under a great power. Even if the British government turn the Joint 
Declaration into blank paper, China will not be at loss or afraid. We are prepared for the worst: that is to 
take back Hong Kong in advance…”747  
The next day after the publication of Patten’s reform bill the Standing Committee of the Political 
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Bureau of the Communist Party held an emergency meeting on Hong Kong. Chairman Jiang Zemin told 
them: “never to hold any false hope from Britain. China must begin to organize our own stove.”748
Jiang’s remarks led to ripple effects within the Chinese military. Some of the soldiers in the Guang 
Zhou military region and the soldiers of the South China Fleet even asked the Central Military Committee 
for missions to handle the British provocations. Jiang Zemin told the representatives of the military not to 
settle the issue by force:  
 
Comrade Xiaoping and the Central People’s Government want a smooth transition. If the British 
government made severe damage to the Joint Declaration, or some abrupt changes happen in Hong 
Kong, we will inform the British of our following moves through diplomatic channels. Generally 
speaking we will not use force to settle the problem.749  
 
In March 1993, the Chinese National People’s Congress passed a resolution claiming that the British 
were violating original agreements and decided to set up a second stove to replace what had been put in 
place by Patten’s reforms. McLaren recalled, “Premier Li Peng already had a pretty unfriendly passage 
about Hong Kong and Britain and in the version of his ‘work report’ made available to the delegates, 
observers and the media he then changed and toughened it still further on delivery.”750
At this point, a number of contradictory signals began to emerge from Beijing. Lu Ping was “still 
trying to flag up their interest in talks”. Making a distinction between publishing and tabling the bill, the 
                                                        
748 World Journal, 18 March 1993, quoted in David Wen-wei Chang and Richard Y. Chuang, The Politics of 
Hong Kong’s Reversion to China, p. 104. 
749 Dou Yingtai, “Jin Xi Peng Dingkang”, p. 48.  
750 Jane Barder, “Interview with Sir Robin McLaren”, 31 July 1996, British Diplomatic Oral History Program, 
Churchill Archives Centre, p. 25. 
 286
Chinese leaders had indicated informally that they had not yet entirely abjured talks of “cooperation”. 751  
The governor’s strategy calculated to influence the coming talks failed. Premier Li Peng took 
advantage of the situation to delay the talks and accused Britain of bad faith in the governor’s reform 
package. Two days later, Lu Ping declared at an urgently called new conference China’s decision to 
formally organize a “second stove” approach to implement the three agreements unilaterally – to fulfill the 
Basic Law’s purpose. Lu Ping held Britain constantly responsible for the breakdown of communication. 
Whether China would take over Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 would depend on whether Britain fully 
adhered to Joint Declaration. He made clear that China’s consistent position had always been in favor of 
cooperation and against confrontation. “If the governor fails to cooperate, China will be forced to follow 
the Basic Law and to prepare for the first post-97 SAR government and legislature…Democracy in Hong 
Kong will be implemented gradually…” Reports from Beijing soon revealed that Deng Xiaoping was 
concerned over possible “unexpected small British traps.”  
The next day after the gazette of the bill the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party held an emergency meeting on Hong Kong. Chairman Jiang Zemin told them: “never to 
hold any false hope from Britain. China must begin to organize our own stove.”752 During the meeting 
these few top leaders, whether influenced by Deng’s warning or not, agreed that Governor Patten had 
deliberately created this obstacle to influence the coming Sino-British talks. They agreed further to bring 
the matter before the meetings of National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference. Both were being held simultaneously at that moment in Beijing. Premier Li Peng 
therefore quickly reversed China position on the coming talks in his prepared text of Government Work 
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Report to NPC and CPPCC. 753
By this time the governor had been driven reluctantly to conclude that Deng Xiaoping did indeed 
regard his reform proposals as “part of a global conspiracy to destroy the last communist power”. This 
disposition on the part of the ailing “paramount leader” could only have been reinforced by the US decision 
to sell advanced F16 warplanes to Taiwan. 754
Looking to the future, London is apprehensive about the eventual departure of Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping from the scene. The feeling in London is that Deng’s exit is sure to cause “hiccups, hesitation and 
loss of momentum before the new leadership consolidates.”755 During the 17 rounds of negotiations Deng 
was still making the final decisions on the Hong Kong issue in spite of his weak physical conditions, which 
turned out to be the worst nightmare for the British. Patten could not help expressing his frustration over 
the negotiations, “In the 17 rounds of negotiations that we had with Chinese officials in Peking we made 
conditionally substantial concessions. I am afraid there were not any corresponding moves on the other 
side.” 756
Percy Cradock, the old China hand who had been dealing with the top Chinese leadership for many 
years pointed out sharply that the slow progress of the negotiations were due to the succession politics in 
China:  
 
This rigidity no doubt reflected the fact that they had been taken to the limit of their tolerance by the 
earlier negotiations: they had reached a political settlement and, as they had repeatedly warned, they 
were not prepared to reopen it. But it may also have reflected uncertainty in Peking about the 
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succession to Deng Xiaoping: no one had the confidence to be flexible. 757  
 
     In a speech in January 1993, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech on the Patten reform. He said, Britain’s 
plan to mess Hong Kong up was long planed and shrewdly designed. We should see very clearly the 
inevitability of this struggle. We should never shrink on matters of principle. We should never give up on an 
inch, even a mini-meter. Concessions can only force us into a more passive situation, and leaving the 
situation more complicated and chaotic. We will do whatever we can to make the situation in Hong Kong 
turn better, but at the same time we have to be prepared for all the worst scenarios in the final years of 
Hong Kong’s transition. Britain can tear up the Joint Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding, 
but China will firmly comply with the Basic Law, the one country, two systems idea. We have told the 
British government and the Hong Kong authorities that we hope they will act according to the Declaration 
and agreements; we should have less discord and more cooperation. But if the British government and the 
Hong Kong authorities really wanted confrontation, then we will have no option but play with them.758
Deng Xiaoping himself issued a warning (contained in a report from the Central Military 
Commission, published on 17 February 1993) that China might break its pledges on Hong Kong if Patten 
refused to withdraw his reforms. The Chinese leader was further quoted as saying that the proposals were 
part of a Western “plot” to wage a “new cold war” against China. He had ordered a harsh policy towards 
Britain because he believed London’s aim was to “internationalize” Hong Kong and to turn it into a 
political entity that could not be controlled by China. 759 
In an interview in 1994, Martin Lee Chu-ming had a brilliant remark on the dilemma for Chinese 
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officials over Patten’s reforms, he argued, “When the Communists are uncertain, the Golden Rule, as we 
say in Chinese, is that if you must err, err on the side of the left, not the right, meaning you take the hard 
line. If you take the hard line, when things settle down, you can always readjust your position. But if you 
take the soft position, you lose your job.”760 He continued, “Unless there is consensus in Beijing over Hong 
Kong, nobody would dare take the responsibility, because he would lose his job. So nobody is in charge, 
except Deng, and he’s so old, that you can’t expect him to follow anything.”761
In an analysis of the Chinese policy on free elections in Hong Kong, the book Red Flag Over Hong 
Kong had a brilliant account of the situation within the Chinese government, it argues that “facing 
international pressure Chinese foreign minister is the only consequential stakeholder expected to move over 
time toward great support for free elections. However, his dramatic shift in position has no effect 
whatsoever on the sentiments of other Chinese leaders. It may very well mark his political demise. He will 
find himself embroiled in a costly political conflict, which he probably loses”.762
Such an observation vividly described the dilemma for the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at 
the time. Wanting so much to reach an agreement while at the same time having to toe the party line, Qian 
appealed to Hurd in their talks that they should work hard to reach a consensus. In Qian’s memoirs he 
expressed his great wish to reach an agreement with the British. In a meeting with Hurd during the British 
Foreign Secretary’s visit to Beijing in July, Qian said he treasured the earlier agreements between the two 
countries and wished for continuity in the political system of Hong Kong. Later Qian stressed the important 
of the concept of the through train. He hoped the British side could treasure the fruits of years of 
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consultation. Qian told Hurd, the two parties of a country, like the Conservatives and Labor Parties in 
Britain, when they change the administration, there will be changes in all aspects. It was impossible for the 
two parties to discuss the “through train” of the administrations, however, on the Hong Kong issue, through 
train was possible despite the transfer of sovereignty. This is unprecedented work, very innovative. Hurd 
reasserted the British position that the through train needed a clear and objective criterion.763 The talks were 
unproductive.  
On 11 June 1993, when Deng Xiaoping was reading his talk with Thatcher in September 1982 to be 
published in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Deng said, “We should add longer and more detailed 
notes to the article. The note should show the process and contention points in the negotiations between 
China and Britain on Hong Kong. We should push it at an appropriate time to support our struggle with 
Britain. We should let them know it is the British who are not loyal to the agreement, but we are loyal 
implementers of them.” On 24 September, the People’s Daily published Deng’s remarks as the headline on 
the front page.764  
In July, Patten’s announcement that it would better for the British to take unilateral action made the 
Chinese government formally established a Preparatory Working Committee to initiate the second stove. 
On 9 July 1993, following “whirlwind visit” of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, Douglas Hurd to Beijing, Patten says it is better for Britain to take unilateral action on 
constitutional reforms in Hong Kong than surrender on principles.765 Patten’s announcement, designed to 
exert pressure on the Chinese side for concessions backfired as they helped the hawks in the Chinese 
government to triumph in the debate on China’s policy towards the British. One week later, Chinese 
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Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, formally inaugurated a 57 member Preparatory Working Committee for the 
Hong Kong SAR Preparatory Committee, although its implementation was suspended until its second 
plenary meeting later in December.”  
 
3. Zhou Nan’s Role in the Negotiations  
A recurring theme in the Chinese rhetoric followed a simple logic: that democracy in Hong Kong is a 
creation of the British, in a vain attempt to control Hong Kong after July 1st. Zhou Nan was a strong 
advocate of such an idea. What was so intriguing about the negotiations was that very gesture taken by the 
Governor was interpreted as hostile and with ulterior motives. The most intriguing case of China’s belief in 
British conspiracy theories was on Patten’s efforts to lobby for China’s Most Favored Nation status in the 
United States. With the arrival of Chris Patten as Governor, Beijing became increasingly suspicious of 
London’s motives, believing Great Britain sought to leave behind a destabilizing fifth column in 1997 and 
to “internationalize” a bilateral issue. The PRC became correspondingly more anxious about unwanted 
American intrusion into its internal affairs and the possibility of British-American collusion.766
Patten visited the United States in May 1993 to push for the renewal of Most Favored Nation status 
for China, thinking he was doing the Chinese a favour by promoting their cause, Patten departed for 
America although he was well aware that the Chinese were supersensitive about the United States, and that 
to invoke American support would open him to the charge of “internationalizing” the Sino-British dispute. 
767 Patten had argued in front of the Washington press corps during his visit to the United States in 1993 
that trade ought not to be treated as a weapon against China. Clearly thinking of the consequences that US 
sanctions would have on his territory, the governor maintained that if trade were restricted on China “you 
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reduce your communication and your ability to influence”.768
China reacted very negatively and one Chinese source in nearby Shenzhen attacked Patten as a 
“whore” who “wanted a monument erected to his chastity.”769 In May 1993, the Department of Propaganda 
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party delivered a document entitled “On the United 
States Plan of Confrontation against China,” the main theme of which is that Washington intends to 
infiltrate and subvert China through ideological and economic means. The document accuses the US 
government of attempting to “intervene in Hong Kong affairs publicly, openly support the changes of 
British government’s policy against China, and intend to turn Hong Kong into a place of international 
political confrontations and a springboard for Britain and United States against China.”770
Before the start of the negotiations Deng Xiaoping was concerned over possible “unexpected small 
British traps”.771 Zhou Nan had been enjoying finding these traps and reporting them to Beijing in his 
advocating of a tough approach towards the British. As a witty politician who was extremely good at 
spotting conspiracies in every move of the British,  
At this time of disorder in China’s handling of the Hong Kong issue, Zhou Nan stood firmly on the 
hardliner Premier Li Peng’s side and argued strongly against continuing dialogue with the British. Before 
the start of the formal start of the negotiations, Zhou Nan had wasted no time to push for a second stove to 
sabotage whatever had been established by the British government. He did not want the issue to be settled 
by negotiations and had been designing the constitutions of the shadow government. As early as 21 March 
1993, Zhou Nan had already mapped out the shadow government of the Hong Kong SAR. He announced 
that China’s “new stove” would be made up of Hong Kong Affairs advisers and Chinese experts and that it 
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would dove-tail into the 1996 Preparatory Committee.772
Zhou Nan characterized Patten’s reform proposal as conspiracies hiding ulterior motives of the 
British. His main arguments for supporting the charge are as follows: First of all, Patten’s reforms were a 
plan for the British to manipulate Hong Kong’s politics and use Hong Kong to achieve their evil plan of 
“peaceful evolution”. Zhou Nan explained the British mistakenly believed that “after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, China would also face the same kind of changes”. They thus wanted to “use proxies installed 
with their help to extend British colonial rule, turn Hong Kong into a semi-independent political entity, and 
unrealistically wish to influence political developments in China.”773 With such a goal, Britain may be 
working together with the United States in efforts to overthrow the Communist Regimes in China.  
Secondly, Zhou Nan argued that Britain’s democratic reforms in Hong Kong were aimed to give 
Hong Kong a semi-independent status to maintain their de facto sovereignty over Hong Kong after their 
withdrawal after 1997. Zhou Nan tried to search through the accounts of the British officials for evidence 
that they sought an independent status for Hong Kong. He was lucky to find one sentence from Thatcher’s 
Downing Street Years in her discussions with the advisers on policy options for the settlement of the Hong 
Kong issue. Zhou Nan wrote, In The Downing Street Years, Thatcher wrote she considered “to develop a 
democratic structure in Hong Kong so that when necessary they can achieve Hong Kong’s autonomy or 
independence through a memorandum in a short time.” Zhou Nan said Thatcher unintentionally revealed 
the real purpose of them to “develop a democratic system” in Hong Kong was to achieve “Hong Kong 
independence”.774 In this analysis, Zhou Nan ingeniously twisted the idea of Thatcher by quoting her words 
out of context. As Thatcher explained to her memoirs no one supported her ideas that she knew perfectly 
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well it was impossible for Hong Kong to become an independent entity.  
Zhou Nan also interpreted his understanding of the British to introduce democratic reforms in Hong 
Kong. He traced the democratic reforms of the Hong Kong government back to 1947. He argued that the 
Young Plan was designed to block Hong Kong’s return to the motherland. The British gave up their plan 
when they found China wanted to maintain the status quo in Hong Kong. “When the negotiations on Hong 
Kong’s future started, the British estimated they had to hand over Hong Kong to us, but they were reluctant 
to return the power to us and wanted to return to their proxies instead.”775 When they realized such an 
option was impossible, they cooked up this representative government plan as a strategy to maintain their 
influence and increase the autonomy of Hong Kong vis-à-vis the central government. In this description, 
Zhou Nan also described only part of the history of Hong Kong. Britain’s democratization plans did not 
start after the negotiations and the limited measures taken in the 1980s did not make much change to the 
political system of Hong Kong.  
Thirdly, Zhou Nan accused Patten as a dictator who wanted to mess up Hong Kong. In comparison to 
his predecessors, Patten really wanted to bring democracy to the Hong Kong people. He enjoyed more 
popularity than his immediate predecessor Wilson and his successor Tung. In a testimony before the 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Patten used some data to set the record straight on the charges from 
China that he wanted to mess up Hong Kong. He said the accusation that he wanted to create turmoil in 
Hong Kong was groundless. He proclaimed, “Wherever else is in a state of turmoil I do not think that can 
be said of Hong Kong, which continues to enjoy a growth rate, dare I mention it, of 5½ percent, to increase 
spending and to cut taxes and to give people an extremely satisfactory quality of living, I think said by The 
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Economist in a recent article to be the sixth best in the world”.776  
For people ignorant of the real situation in Hong Kong, Zhou Nan’s accusations sound so compelling. 
He wrote beautifully by making subtle twists of the situations which could hardly be identified by people 
unfamiliar with Hong Kong’s politics. From his memoirs we can have a glimpse of Zhou Nan’s reports to 
Beijing and how he tried to impress the leaders who were not in touch in the complicated political situation 
in Beijing. Zhou Nan’s British conspiracy theories partially led to the triumph of wild British conspiracy 
theories circulated within the CCP. At a critical juncture of the negotiations, Zhou Nan’s report 
strengthened Beijing’s decision to break up the Sino-British negotiations in November 1993.  
Michael Yahuda pointed out accurately during the negotiations on Hong Kong there was a tendency 
on each side to view the other as engaged in calculated coordinated acts as if playing out a carefully 
conceived and controlled plan of operations.777 The situation worsened when the relations between the two 
countries deteriorated when Chris Patten changed his negotiating style.   
China attributed the appointment of the senior politician Chris Patten, and the announcement of his 
proposals to an allegedly long-standing British practice of destabilizing colonies. Still others saw a link 
between Patten and his proposals on the one hand, and, on the other, the support given to them by Western 
governments, the arms sales to Taiwan by the French and the Americans, and even the election of President 
Clinton as evidence of a coordinated campaign to undermine communism in China. 778  
Whether to continue negotiations with the Chinese on the issue led to fierce debates within the 
Chinese government. The two key officials directly in charge of the Hong Kong issue, director of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong Zhou Nan and the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Lu Ping held 
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completely different views on the issue. Lu Ping was more interested in conducting negotiations with the 
British, while Zhou Nan argued that it was not necessary to talk with the British on this issue. Chris Patten 
had a brilliant analysis of Chinese politics during the discussions on Hong Kong’s political reforms:  
 
The Chinese, represented by a highly intelligent hard-liner in Hong Kong, Zhou Nan, and a 
politically weak career bureaucrat in Peking, Lu Ping, were immobilized by the politics of transition 
and of post-Tiananmen nervousness. With no one daring to take a risk, they had fallen back on what 
came most easily and naturally to them – struggle diplomacy. Every issue was turned into a long and 
debilitating fight, hand-to-hand combat from dawn to dusk and on to dawn again.779  
 
Zhou Nan had been arguing vehemently against reaching an understanding with the British, at this 
critical juncture of the negotiations his suggestions led to the break up of the negotiations. In his memoirs 
Zhou Nan recalled this special struggle with the British. He said “Some officials wanted to make this 
concession to Britain, but I argued: No more concessions! Otherwise the public opinion structures in these 
regions would all be controlled by the British.”780
Considering the sweeping victory of the democrats in the 1991 elections, Zhou’s argument sounded 
plausible at first sight. However, in 1995 the democrats were not as popular as years before and the clause 
to be added would not led to British control of Hong Kong’s politics. Zhou Nan’s on-the-spot accounts and 
his conspiracies theories successfully convince the Chinese government to breakup the negotiations and 
launch their second stove, which derailed the through train.  
Chinese officials in Hong Kong were meticulous in avoiding any encounters at official functions 
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which they would normally attend with the Hong Kong Governor and Patten was not invited to Chinese 
Government backed functions, where Governor Wilson had been a regular guest. Patten’s absence was 
most noticeable at a ceremony to celebrate the first note issued by the Bank of China of Hong Kong 
currency.781  
On one occasion, Patten did come face to face with Zhou Nan, at the inauguration of a giant Buddha 
at the Po Lin Monastery on the island of Lantau. Patten held out his hand to Zhou. Zhou refused to take it 
and used the Buddhist greeting of touching the fist of both hands with a slight bow. Zhou referred to those 
who violated the “three principles” as “sinners lost in the boundless sea of bitterness.”782
To add to the mood of pessimism in Hong Kong, a leading Xinhua News Agency official served 
notice that senior government official would not automatically be allowed to remain in office following the 
handover. The Basic Law stipulated that all civil servants would have the right to remain in service after 
1997, However, the Xinhua News Agency spokesman said, the mechanism by which this process was to 
have been achieved had been severely damaged by Patten’s insistence on pressing ahead with his 
constitutional reforms in defiance of China’s will. As a result, the first chief executive of the SAR would 
nominate senior officials who would be appointed by the central government of the People’s Republic. 783
 
IV. Setting up the Second Stove  
1. Breakup of Sino-British Negotiations  
After the breakup of the Sino-British negotiations, the Chinese government formally launched the 
second stove and refused further discussions with the British. The through train was derailed and the British 
lost their say on Hong Kong’s future. On 3 December 1993, a statement was made that China would “start a 
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new kitchen after 1997 in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law”. On 9 December, Xinhua 
accused Patten of lacking in sincerity and of trying to prolong British influence beyond 1997: “The real 
purpose of Patten in unfurling this beautiful banner of democracy,” the Chinese organ said, “is to try to 
make British rule last after 1997.”784  
On 11 December, Foreign Minister Qian revived Deng’s threat of an early take-over: “We cannot sit 
back and watch disorder in Hong Kong,” he said.785 On 20 December a Chinese commentary accused 
Britain of attempting to leave the colony in chaos before departure, stating that “It is well known that 
whenever the British have had to withdraw from its colonies it has either seized various interests or made 
trouble in the colonies so as to leave as many problems as possible.” This commentary also targeted Patten 
directly, stating that: “Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten has played an infamous role in the British 
territory.”786
On 27 December, China finally derailed the through train with an unsigned statement given out by 
the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office through Xinhua in Beijing, announcing that all here levels of 
Hong Kong’s constitutional system would be disbanded at the handover. A spokesman further stated that 
the three tiers of government would then be reconstituted according to the Basic Law, adding that it was a 
pity that no agreement had been reached in the negotiations, due to Britain’s deliberate sabotage.787 In 
contesting Patten’s reform plans so vehemently, China had a number of fears. Already, in the 1991-95 
Legco, there were signs of confrontation between the executive government and Legco.788
The breakup of Sino-British negotiations made it possible for the British to implement Patten’s 
reforms proposals in full and also led to the Chinese decision to set up their own stove. The Chinese 
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decided to abolish the Legislative Council which, in their view, had not been established in accordance with 
the Basic Law. Patten’s reforms led to the derailment of the through train. In mid-December, when Patten 
took part of his electoral reform package to Legco, Direct Lu Ping of the State Council’s Hong Kong and 
Macao Affairs Office declared that any person elected by Patten’s elections would have to step down on 30 
June 1997.789  
     Judged from a short term perspective, the British managed to promote further democratic reforms in 
Hong Kong and seemed to achieve their goal to retreat honorably from Hong Kong. However, from a long 
term perspective, the breakup of Sino-British negotiations meant that the British government had lost their 
say on the future political system of Hong Kong, especially the constitution of the future Legislature.  
Once the Chinese decided to derail the through train, there was nothing the British could really do 
about it. The main theme of Patten’s October 1994 policy speech emphasized mending relations with China. 
Patten worked very hard to express his good will to the Chinese government by stressing British 
commitment to the Joint Declaration. He said: “Whatever our disagreements, whatever our differences of 
perception and background, whatever the misunderstandings and the mistrust, I urge them to understand 
that we, too, are similarly committed.” Patten went on to say that Britain would “do everything that is 
honorable and sensible to cooperate with China “for the remaining thousand days of British rule” but 
“cooperation, however, is not a one-way street.” This rather ambivalent appeal for cooperation was not to 
be answered, as ensuing events would demonstrate.790
There were some expectations of the Governor’s policy speech in October 1994 regarding proposals 
to improve the atmosphere and re-establish dialogue for cooperation between Beijing and London on Hong 
                                                        
e i
789 Colin Mackerras, The New Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, pp. 169-170.  
790 John Flowerdew, The Final Y ars of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial W thdrawal, p. 154. 
 300
Kong. But Chris Patten indicated that the PWC was only an advisory body of the NPC, hence there could 
be no formal relationship between the PWC and the Hong Kong government. The latter’s position is that 
civil servants can neither join the PWC nor attend its meetings, including those of its sub-groups. The only 
concrete proposal offered by the Governor at this stage was that PWC members could take part in the JLG 
meetings as experts of the Chinese team. 791
The British Foreign minister responsible for Hong Kong, Alastair Goodlad, visited Beijing in 
mid-July 1994. There were hopes that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, would visit the United 
Kingdom in return for the visit of the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, to Beijing in July last year. 
It seemed that Qian had turned down the invitation, and insisted that China was looking forward to 
“comprehensive cooperation in all areas,” refusing to accept, as Alastair Goodlad had suggested, that the 
row over the constitutional reform in Hong Kong should be put aside. Strong suspicions remain, but both 
sides are adopting a damage-control strategy, attempting to avoid total diplomatic confrontation. 792  
The Chinese decision to set up a second stove led to criticisms of Patten’s change of negotiating style 
with the Chinese government. On 19 May 1994, Lord MacLehose and Lord Wilson in a House of Lords 
debate, add their voices to criticisms of Patten’s “mistake” in making China feel “deliberately tricked” over 
political reform in Hong Kong. 793  
On 2 September 1994, Sir Percy Cradock, former British Ambassador to Beijing accuses Chris Patten 
and his advisers of “misreading China,” taking “an enormous gamble with the interests of Hong Kong 
people” and urges the British government to accept that “a bad mistake” had been made over democratic 
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reforms. 794  
The Sino-British relations were soon repaired to ensure a smooth transition of Hong Kong. After the 
Patten passed his electoral bill through the Legco in 1994, the two countries reached agreement 
consecutively over the use of military lands and the financing of the airport. A further improvement of 
relations was achieved with Minister of Trade Michael Heseltine’s visit to China in May 1995. In late 
September, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited London and agreed on a package of links in months up to 
1997.  
     The renewed contact and cooperation may have had something to do with the new Foreign Minister, 
Malcolm Rifkind. Rifkind had replaced Douglas Hurd, who had decided the time had come to resign from a 
post which he had held for nearly six years. In addition, Michael Heseltine, a strong supporter of British 
business and trade, had growing influence, as he had become Depute Prime Minister. Foreign Minister 
Rifkind did not repeat Britain’s opposition to the provisional legislature to Qian, only reiterating his 
disapproval of it when prompted by journalists. Qian, when questioned about the provisional legislature, 
said: “this is a question that has already been resolved”; and when asked if the current Legco would cease 
in 1997, answered emphatically, “yes”.795  
Patten was marginalized in the negotiations and trade became the dominant issue in the Sino-British 
relations. Patten still made criticism on the Chinese policy but failed to have any influence on Chinese 
decisions. An invitation to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to visit Hong Kong that Patten had issued 
in one of his radio talks was described as “very cheap political propaganda by an insecure political without 
any diplomatic manner.” The fact that the invitation violated the normal diplomatic channels was proof that 
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Patten was merely “putting on a show.”796
In March 1996, during a conference of Asian and European leaders, British Prime Minister Major 
had a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng: a meeting which Major exuberantly described as “one 
of the best meetings” he had ever had, adding that, “The relationship undoubtedly has improved between 
the UK and China over the last year, economically and in terms of cooperation about matters of such vital 
importance to Hong Kong.”797
At a meeting between the British and Chinese Foreign ministers in The Hague, in April 1996, while 
Rifkind refused to cooperate with a request by China to assist in the setting up of the provisional body, 
Qian was still able to say that his talks with Foreign Secretary Rifkind in The Hague had shown there was 
no bar to a smooth transition. “I believe all Hong Kong problems can be said to have been settled. The 
smooth transition of Hong Kong can be a reality,” he said in one interview, using the more colorful phrase 
“The rice is cooked” in another.798   
Both parties may often be tempted to score political points off the other in negotiations of a purely 
technical nature, e.g., the tendering process of Container Terminal No. 9. As a result, negotiations at the 
JLG would be slow and painful, while agreements are to be reached on a piecemeal basis. In the autumn of 
1994, while the agreement on overall airport financing had been concluded, new controversies emerged 
concerning Container Terminal No. 9 and the proposed sewerage system.799  
The improvement of Sino-British relations culminated in a visit to London by Vice Premier and 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on 2-4 October 1995. Both sides professed to be pleased with the outcome of 
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the visit. Agreement was reached to provide an institutional form for enhancing their cooperation in the 
lead-up to 1 July 1997. The Hong Kong government would establish a liaison office to deal directly with 
the Preparatory Committee after its establishment in January 1996. However, within a month the new mood 
was soured by Beijing’s declaration through its nominees in the Preliminary Working Committee of its 
intent to modify the Bill of Rights on the grounds that it allegedly contravenes the Basic Law. Beijing also 
declared its intention to reintroduce six ordinances that had been on the books so as to deal with subversive 
and riotous challenges posed principally by leftists that the Hong Kong government had recently removed 
from the statutes. 
On 17 September 1995, the first general election for all the 60 member of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council took place. The elections were held according to Patten’s reforms proposals, but the elected 
legislature could not pass the threshold of 1997. Nearly half the population was eligible to vote. However, 
only approximately one-third of those eligible actually participated.800 Pro-democracy candidates swept 
seventeen of the twenty seats returned by universal suffrage and garnered over sixty percent of the popular 
vote. Democrats had a majority in the legislature for the first time.   
On 25 March 1996, the second plenary session of the Hong Kong SAR Preparatory Committee 
adopted a decision to establish a “provisional legislative council”, including detailed suggestions on its 
“formation, election, qualification of members, working time and other tasks of the council.” The “through 
train” a genuine concept worked out by the diplomats of the two countries, was derailed. 
 
2. Filling the Vacuum  
After the derailment of the through train, the Chinese argued that as the Legislative Council elected 
in 1995 could not pass the threshold of 1997, they should take measures to fill the vacuum by setting up the 
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second stove. The breakup of the negotiations accompanied the deterioration of the health of Deng 
Xiaoping, opening the way for a fast improvement of Sino-British relations.  
With his formal retirement in 1989, Deng Xiaoping’s intervention in Chinese politics tended to be 
conducted through his private office. As he aged, he came to depend increasingly upon his secretary and his 
daughters to mediate between him and others. Indeed, as he became incapacitated by his advanced age his 
personal direction of Hong Kong affairs became more of a liability than an asset. His interventions became 
more erratic, and, according to British side, there was a tendency for the lesser officials engaged in Hong 
Kong matters to take the “safer” approaches of either doing nothing or taking an unyielding “leftist” 
national line. Indeed, it was not until after Deng finally became politically inactive around November 1994 
that other senior leaders began to voice a public interest in Hong Kong.801  
While the Hong Kong Government was preoccupied with three sets of elections in 1994-1995, China 
was busy making its own plans and preparations for the dismantling of the three tiers of government which 
the Hong Kong Government was so busily setting up. 802 On September 30 and again on December 11, 
after the talks had apparently broken down, Chinese officials repeated the threat. “We cannot sit back and 
watch disorder in Hong Kong,” Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said.803   
But China’s greatest objections to British actions came with Governor Patten’s political reforms. In 
response to Patten’s initiatives, Beijing announced it would set up its own advisory body for Hong Kong, 
now known as the “Preparatory Committee”. In February 1994, China pledged to end the “through train” it 
had previously agreed to, and vowed to dismantle the current legislative structure of Hong Kong, including 
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Legco. 804  
On 30 June 1994, the Legislative Council approved Patten’s political reforms. The vote was a 
surprising 32-24, given outspoken opposition from China. The reforms substantially broadened the 
franchise for so-called functional constituencies, increased the number of directly elected seats, and 
replaced the remaining appointed members with representatives of the colony’s elected District Boards. 
General elections were scheduled for September 1995. 
At the end of August 1994, the Standing Committee of the NPC decided to dissolve Hong Kong’s 
existing political structures on 1 July 1997. This formally sealed the fate of the “through train”.805 In early 
September the National People’s Congress, passed a unanimous resolution to abolish the political structure 
based on Patten’s electoral reform package. Political continuity, expressed in the concept of the “through 
train” on which the members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council elected in 1995 would remain in office 
until the next scheduled elections in 1997, ceased. 
Although not willing to speak with Governor Patten, Beijing has been willing to resume its dialogue 
with Britain. From October 2-4, 1995, China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, met in London with British 
Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. The meeting appeared both cordial and productive. 806
The PWC met six times between July 1993 and December 1995 at approximately six-monthly 
intervals. It sat in Beijing, then after May 1994 also in Hong Kong. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen agreed 
that all issues of contention can be resolved except the “dissolution issue” of the newly elected Legislative 
Council. The HKSAR government, under provisions of the Basic Law, will come into existence before 1 
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July 1997. Beijing’s schedule for this is as follows:  
1. December 1995: termination of the Preparatory Working Committee.  
2. January 1996: creation of the Preparatory Committee, according to the Basic Law, to formally 
establish China’s Special Administrative Region in Hong Kong.  
3. April 1996: creation of a Nomination Committee by the Preparatory Committee. 
4. July-September 1996: recommendation of the SAR Chief Executive to China’s National People’s 
Congress for his or her approval or rejection and the final announcement, in December 1996, of all major 
administrative officials. 
5. Early 1997: the establishment of Hong Kong’s Provisional Legislative Council. 
6. 1 July 1997: official sovereignty transfer acceptance by China. 807  
The chairman of the PWC was Qian Qichen, but the day-to-day business of the PWC was run by Lu 
Ping. At the beginning of December 1993, Patten announced that he would present the first part of his 
reform package to LEGCO on 15 December. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, then announced 
that in this case, the PWC would immediately begin its discussions on the composition and election 
methods of the first SAR LEGCO, and would step up the pace of its work. The key decisions on this issue 
were prepared by the political sub-committee under the chairmanship of Leung Chun-Ying. 808 On the basis 
of the NPC decision of August 1994, the political affairs subcommittee began in its meeting on 7 October 
1994 to discuss the dissolution of Legco and the introduction of an Interim Legco from 1 July 1997. At the 
end of the fourth plenary session of the PWC in December 1994, 809 Qian Qichen announced a proposal 
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from the political sub-committee to establish the PC in January 1996. 810 The Preparatory Committee took 
up its duties in January 1996. The NPC Decision of April 1990 allotted to the PC the task of making 
concrete preparations in the course of 1996 for the change of sovereignty and the establishment of the Hong 
Kong SAR.  
Sir Percy Cradock, on the other side, argues in a Daily Telegraph article that Patten, in the end, 
harmed democracy in Hong Kong. “By carrying through unilateral electoral change he ensured that Hong 
Kong passed under Chinese rule with less democracy than could have been the case.” Sir Percy believes 
too, that any idea that there was a chance to promote democracy in the years before 1984 is unreal; the 
Chinese had made it plain that steps towards Westminster-style democracy would be totally unacceptable. 
“Honor, or competence, in the Hong Kong context lay in securing the highest level of democracy that 
would endure after 1997, not in making short-term gestures which were bound to provoke a Chinese 
backlash and leave the colony worse off. No one condones Chinese actions. But they were entirely 
predictable, with repeated warnings. To go ahead with unilateral changes in these circumstances was, at 
best, a wild gamble with the future of 6.5 million people.”811 On 11 April 1994, Beijing strengthens its 
United Front for Hong Kong by appointing 50 more Hong Kong Affairs advisers, increasing the total to 
141 and “widening the spectrum of views.”  
 
3. Zhou Nan’s Important Role  
Zhou Nan’s role as director of Xinhua-Hong Kong increased when China decided to set up the new 
stove. Zhou Nan and the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Lu Ping were directly in 
charge of organizing the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.  
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A prominent Hong Kong politician Allen Lee Peng-fei revealed that after the nomination of Patten, 
Zhou Nan established his image as a hardliner in Hong Kong; the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong 
became a bridgehead against the British government.812  
After the breakup of Sino-British negotiations, the through train was derailed at the last minute of 
British rule. The British government also started to restore relations with the Chinese government. The 
dispute over Patten reforms set all other issues on the smooth transition of Hong Kong into deadlock.  
As the top CCP official in Hong Kong, Zhou Nan argued strongly that the British government should 
not have any say on the future political system of Hong Kong. On 13 March 1994, Zhou Nan said that 
China can maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability beyond 1997 without British cooperation and will 
not tolerate attempts to turn it into an “international asset.” 813  
Zhou Nan’s rivalry with Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council of 
Lu Ping was known since the beginning of Sino-British relations. It was always believed that Zhou was 
more stubborn on the democratization of Hong Kong while Lu Ping was more sympathetic to the 
democratic needs of the Hong Kong people. After the breakup of Sino-British relations, the Hong Kong and 
Macao Affairs Office of the State Council and the Hong Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency became 
the two most important institutions in charge of the Hong Kong issue. These two institutions were directly 
in charge of choosing the shadow legislature of Hong Kong.  
Despite the disagreement between the two countries on the Hong Kong issue, Zhou Nan and Lu Ping 
stood firmly together when the British were trying to take advantage of the rivalry between the two men to 
achieve their policy objectives. The former, under its director Lu Ping, was perceived to be more moderate 
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and sympathetic towards the Colony than the latter, which was headed by Zhou Nan, a veteran diplomat 
and a hardliner. The British Hong Kong government thought that by manipulating the rivalry between these 
two agencies it would win some support from Beijing for its policies. In late 1994, when the government 
proposed an ambitious old-age pension scheme, it first provided Lu Ping’s office with a copy of its 
proposal, but left Xinhua in the dark. In this case, however, the tactic was unsuccessful. Both Lu and Zhou 
stood united in their objection to the plan.814
     After the breakup of the Sino-British negotiations, the through train could not pass the threshold of 
1997. It strengthened the role of the Xinhua News Agency as Zhou Nan was in charge of selecting the 
Political Advisers and the inclusion of Hong Kong members in the future Hong Kong legislature. Zhou Nan 
retired from his post as director of Xinhua-Hong Kong in 1997.  
   
V. Conclusion    
This case analyzes the Sino-British dispute on democratic reforms in Hong Kong during Chris 
Patten’s governorship. Chris Patten’s reform proposals were perceived as a violation of the earlier 
understandings between the two countries by the Chinese side. It led to a deterioration of bilateral relations. 
The two sides failed to reach any agreement in the 17 rounds of negotiations on electoral reforms in 1993. 
After the breakup of the negotiations, the Chinese government decided to set up their own shadow 
legislature to replace the 1995 elected Legislative Council in 1997.  
In Patten’s governorship, Deng Xiaoping still held the final say on the Hong Kong issue. The 
transition of politics in Hong Kong made Deng’s successors unable to make the decision to make 
concessions to Britain at the negotiating table. During the negotiations, the Director of Xinhua-Hong Kong 
                                                        
r814 Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-macro Linkage App oach, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 122.  
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was Zhou Nan. Zhou was a hardliner. He was the chief representative of the Chinese negotiating delegation 
during the negotiations on the Joint Declaration and won a reputation for being overly suspicious of Britain. 
Zhou was good at spotting British conspiracies in their every move and action and he did not get along with 
Governor Patten.  
Patten’s democratic proposals and the ensuing war of words between the two countries was the 
nastiest scenario in Sino-British relations in the almost two decades of bilateral negotiations. Sino-British 
relations drastically deteriorated after Patten announced his democratic proposals in his Legislative Council 
speech in October 1992. In the climax of the dispute, Patten was called “sinner of a millennium” by 
Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council Lu Ping.  
     Patten’s democratic proposal was a far cry from the Chinese interpretation of the Basic Law. It was 
also too radical for the Chinese that they believed it violated the spirit of the Basic Law which stipulates 
“gradual and orderly progress” in Hong Kong’s political system. Before Patten’s policy speech, he did not 
see the seven letters between the Foreign Ministers in 1990. After his refusal of the Chinese demand for 
consultations, the Chinese were furious and denounced his reform proposals as a “three violations” package 
for violating the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law and the past understandings between the two countries.  
     From April to November 1993, the two countries conducted seventeen rounds of talks on elections in 
Hong Kong in 1994 and 1995. The talks were the efforts of the two sides to ensure continuity in the 
political structure of Hong Kong, by working out a through train arrangements. The talks lasted 170 hours 
from spring to autumn. In November, the two sides were on the verge of signing a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Hong Kong’s political system. In spite of all the diplomatic efforts, the talks ended 
without an agreement on any issue.  
     After the breakup of Sino-British negotiations, the Chinese government carried out their threat that 
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once Patten put his proposals to gazette, the Chinese government would set up their new stove by 
disbanding the Legislative Council elected in 1995 after China’s resumption of sovereignty. Chinese efforts 
to fill the vacuum in Hong Kong marked the end of negotiations between the two countries and led to 
criticisms of the British from Hong Kong and Britain for misjudging the situation.  
     Zhou had been vehemently arguing against negotiating with the British on Hong Kong’s democratic 
reforms since the beginning. Through textual analysis of his memoirs, we can still find traces of his reports 
to Beijing in which he made compelling cases of British conspiracies. He argued that Patten wanted to 
topple the communist regime in China and leave Hong Kong in chaos. Zhou’s hawkish approach helped the 
triumph of hardliners in the Chinese government. During the seventeen rounds of negotiations, Zhou Nan’s 
report that concessions would mean that Britain would control all the grassroots political structure of Hong 
Kong led to the decisions of the Chinese government not to sign the memorandum of understanding with 
the British side. The breakup of the negotiations made all the efforts by the two countries to ensure 
continuity of the political system before and after the handover ended in vein.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation did four things. First of all, it examines the intriguing process of how Britain tapped 
into Chinese policies on the political systems of Hong Kong over the two decades of Sino-British 
negotiations. Secondly, it sheds light on the intricacies of Chinese politics by looking into debates within 
the Communist Party on democratic reforms in Hong Kong before the final decisions were made by the 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Thirdly, this is the first study of the role of directors of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong in the Chinese Hong Kong policy-making process. Fourthly, it is the first systematic analysis of the 
newly emergent primary sources which had not been fully utilized by scholars.    
 
I. Explaining Chinese Decisions  
In the Deng era, Chinese decisions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong were the outcome of 
debates within the Communist Party on the implications of the negotiations with the British, especially with 
regard to Chinese domestic politics. As the top CCP officials in Hong Kong the directors of Xinhua-Hong 
Kong played a crucial role in the policy-making process by making reports on Hong Kong’s political 
situation to Beijing and tailoring their positions in Hong Kong to the decisions at the top. When the Chinese 
decided to take measures to intervene in British reforms in Hong Kong, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong 
often voiced harsh criticisms on British reforms. When the negotiations were going smoothly, they often 
toned down their criticisms of British reforms in Hong Kong. Chinese decisions on democratization in 
Hong Kong can be best explained through assessing the role of these “Chinese shadow governors” in Hong 
Kong. 
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 1. Explaining Chinese Decision in the Case Dating from 1979 to 1984 
In 1984, the British had an unexpected success in inserting the clause that the future legislature of 
Hong Kong be constituted by elections and the executive be accountable to the legislature in the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration. The clause was a last minute deal in the negotiations and was inserted into 
the Joint Declaration by a letter from Foreign Secretary Howe to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian 
in September 1984.  
Hong Kong’s political system was a marginal issue in the negotiations as there were very limited 
demands for democracy in Hong Kong at the time and the British had taken only hardly noticeable steps on 
Hong Kong’s reforms. Xu was nominated at a time when the Chinese government had made the decision 
on “one country, two systems” and wanted a politician with resolve to be appointed in Hong Kong. Xu’s 
advice on the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group helped break the deadlock of Sino-British negotiations. The 
Joint Declaration came as a generous offer to the Hong Kong people to guarantee their future.  
As a veteran Communist Party member past retirement age, Xu was unfamiliar with Western customs 
and had little experience in diplomatic affairs. He quickly adapted to the situation in Hong Kong, the Hong 
Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency was upgraded in the Hong Kong policy-making apparatus with 
increase in staffs and was put under the direct leadership of the top leaders. Xu changed the past working 
style of Xinhua-Hong Kong by working hard to reach out to the society in Hong Kong.  
 
2. Explaining Chinese Decision in the Case Dating from 1984 to 1986 
In 1985, Britain took some initial steps to introduce electoral reforms in Hong Kong. These steps 
were taken mainly to have an honorable retreat from Hong Kong and to pass the Joint Declaration in 
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Parliament. The Chinese government changed their ambiguous stance on democratic reforms in October 
1985. In the same year China started the unprecedented practice of the drafting of the Basic Law. Under 
Chinese pressure, the British side announced that they agreed to the Chinese principle of convergence in 
1986, meaning that democratic reforms in Hong Kong should converge with the Hong Kong Basic Law.  
The Chinese official statements asking for convergence clarified the Chinese government’s stance on 
the clause on elections in the Joint Declaration, as the Chinese government’s original plan was to maintain 
Hong Kong’s political system at the time of the signature of the Joint Declaration basically unchanged. 
During the drafting of the Basic Law, the Chinese government became concerned that democratic reforms 
introduced at the eleventh hour of British rule would undermine the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong 
and increase the autonomy of Hong Kong relative to the central government.  
The drafting of the Basic Law was designed as a democratic process with the participation of Hong 
Kong people. The Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee worked very 
hard to solicit opinions from Hong Kong. Xu Jiatun was in charge of preparing the lists of the Hong Kong 
drafters in the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee. Though Xu’s 
selection of the lists covered most of the professions in Hong Kong, most of people he chose were from the 
upper level of society with very conservative ideas on Hong Kong’s democratization. Xu’s efforts to ensure 
wide representation showed his ignorance of democratic procedures.  
During the drafting of the Basic Law, Xu made a trip to Beijing with a report on the evil plans of the 
British in the democratic reforms. He stressed at the meeting on Hong Kong and Macao Affairs that the 
British government were planning a radical change in the Hong Kong political system. Xu reported that 
British were planing to turn Hong Kong into a base of subversion and use democracy to resist communism. 
Xu’s analysis of the British conspiracies reinforced the central government’s judgment that measures 
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should be taken to prevent democratic reforms from going too fast.  
After his report in Beijing, Xu accused the British for violating the Joint Declaration in his first press 
conference in Hong Kong in November 1985. His accusation of British policies was very controversial in 
Beijing but was finally endorsed by the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. After his press conference he 
contacted the senior legislators in Hong Kong and the British officials to force them to freeze the 
democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The two sides reached an agreement that the reforms in Hong Kong 
should mirror-image the Hong Kong Basic Law, the agreement on convergence was formally announced by 
British official Renton in January 1986.  
 
3. Explaining Chinese Decision in the Case Dating from 1988 to 1990 
In 1990, when the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was completed, the 
Chinese government agreed to an increase the number of directly elected seats in the Hong Kong 
Legislature in 1991 and the years that followed. The final clause in the Basic Law allowed more directly 
elected seats in the Hong Kong legislature than the draft Basic Law of February 1989.  
In the drafting of the Basic Law, though Deng Xiaoping were taking hold of the whole process and 
stressed that Hong Kong’s political systems should not completely copy the West, he did not deal with 
specific issues. The pace of democratization in Hong Kong was to be decided through votes in the drafting 
committee. The model for the political system of Hong Kong was passed first in the political small group 
and then passed by the Drafting Committee.  
Among the Chinese officials in charge of the drafting of the Basic Law, Xu Jiatun had a conservative 
idea on Hong Kong’s democratization and wanted to prevent the Drafting Committee from reaching a 
consensus on a faster pace of democratization in Hong Kong. Xu was a good friend of the head of the 
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subgroup on political structure, Louis Cha Leung-yung. He persuaded Cha to table a very conservative 
political model on the drafting committee, which became the basis for the political model in the draft Basic 
Law of February 1988.    
After the Tiananmen incident, Xu lost the trust of the top leaders for siding with Premier Zhao 
Ziyang in Hong Kong. At a time when he was on the verge of losing his job, Xu lobbied vehemently for a 
bicameral model which was rejected by the three main political groups in Hong Kong. Xu faded from Hong 
Kong’s politics in early 1990, when his successor Zhou Nan arrived in early 1990. At a time when the 
members of the drafting committee could not reach an understanding on Hong Kong’s political structure, 
the final decision on Hong Kong’s political structure in the Basic Law was reached by an agreement 
between China and Britain through the exchange of seven letters at the ministerial level. 
 
4. Explaining Chinese Decision in the Case Dating from 1992 to 1994  
     In 1994, after the breakup of the Sino-British negotiations, the Chinese government fulfilled their 
promise that once Patten’s democratic reform proposal was passed in the Legislative Council, they would 
set up their second stove. The through train agreement, which was an understanding reached through years 
of diplomatic efforts between the two countries, was aborted.   
The nomination of Patten signaled a change in the British policy in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
incident. Patten adopted a completely different approach in his negotiations with the Chinese. He was less 
careful about not making provocative statements to the Chinese side. Instead, he stressed the need to settle 
the issue publicly, and he was more unyielding than his predecessors. Patten’s approach were viewed as 
confrontational by the Chinese side and led to deterioration of bilateral relations. The two sides started 17 
rounds of negotiations on Hong Kong’s political reforms. After the breakup of the negotiations, China 
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decided to disband the Legislative Council elected under Patten’s unilateral reforms.  
     In Patten’s governorship, Deng Xiaoping still held the final say on the Hong Kong issue. The politics 
of transition made Deng’s successors unable to make the decision to make concessions to the British at the 
negotiating table. During the negotiations, the Director of Xinhua-Hong Kong was Zhou Nan. Zhou was a 
hardliner. He was good at spotting British conspiracies in their every move and action and he did not get 
along with Governor Patten.  
     Zhou had been vehemently arguing against negotiating with the British on Hong Kong’s democratic 
reforms since the beginning. Zhou’s hawkish approach helped the triumph of hardliners in the Chinese 
government. During the seventeen rounds of negotiations, Zhou Nan’s report that concessions would mean 
that Britain would control all the grassroots political structure of Hong Kong led to the breakup of 
negotiations between the two countries. The British lost their say on Hong Kong’s political system.   
 
II. Implications for Research on International Negotiations 
1. Insights on Chinese Negotiating Behavior 
Previous studies on Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue tends to focus on the role of 
Deng Xiaoping in their analysis of Chinese negotiating strategy, as Deng was the designer of Chinese 
negotiation strategy in Sino-British negotiations from 1979 to 1993. However, to focus their attention on 
Deng Xiaoping, the researchers were constrained by the documents offered by the Chinese government. As 
when Deng made public statements or when Deng’s instructions were written into Chinese archives, it was 
already the final decisions of the Chinese government. This approach left out the more intriguing process of 
how the negotiating behavior of the Chinese were shaped, especially how decisions were made through 
debates within the Communist Party.  
 318
This study shows that the posts of the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong was a key position within the 
negotiations. The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong, whose official titles were the directors of the Hong 
Kong and Macao Work Committee of the Communist Party were able to exert their influence on the final 
decisions by the Chinese government on the pace of democratization in Hong Kong. This influence is 
largely a result of these officials’ special positions in the Hong Kong policy-making apparatus. As the top 
Chinese officials based in Hong Kong, these officials were loyal defenders of the national interests of 
China. When the Chinese decided to take measures to intervene in British reforms in Hong Kong, the 
directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong often voiced harsh criticisms on British reforms. When the negotiations 
were going smoothly, they often toned down their criticisms of British reforms in Hong Kong.    
In the two failure cases, democratic reforms in Hong Kong were all interpreted as British efforts to 
create troubles for the Chinese governments during the debates within the Communist Party and measures 
were taken to prevent democratic reforms from going too fast. In these cases, both Xu Jiatun and Zhou Nan 
made harsh criticisms of British democratic reforms in Hong Kong. In the two success cases, the Chinese 
government was willing to make concessions to the British based on considerations on the Chinese 
domestic situation. The directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong did not exert much pressure on the British 
government on democratic reforms in Hong Kong.  
 
2. Path for Future Research 
     During the writing of my dissertation, I am very intrigued in solving the mystery surrounding 
Chinese decision-making on Hong Kong’s democratization during the Sino-British negotiations on Hong 
Kong’s future. I tapped into a goldmine on Chinese decision-making. Further research in this field is likely 
to yield positive results.  
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First of all, further research in the intriguing process of how the British tapped into Chinese 
policy-making on the Hong Kong issue will reveal interesting patterns of how Western powers changes 
Chinese policies on important strategic issues for China like the Hong Kong issue. Ever since the reforms 
and opening up of China, the rising power was adapting to the international system and learning from its 
exchanges with the West. The negotiations on the Hong Kong issue were typical instances of how China 
learned from the British experience of successful running of Hong Kong and its implications to Chinese 
domestic politics.  
Secondly, with the emergence of more first-hand materials on the issue, a more in-depth analysis of 
Chinese negotiating behavior on the Hong Kong issue will be possible. This dissertation takes advantage of 
the abundant newly-emergent primary sources on the Sino-British negotiating process which revealed the 
intriguing process through archives, official documents, accounts by Chinese officials, politicians from 
Hong Kong and the British officials and other primary sources. Though it was impossible at the present 
stage to have access to all the records of meetings of top Chinese officials, in each case I tries to sketch out 
the debates within the Communist Party on the Hong Kong issue. After the declassification of documents 
from the two governments on this issue, a more precise account of the Chinese decision-making on this 
issue was possible.  
     Thirdly, a follow-up research of the role of the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong after Britain’s 
withdrawal from the politics of Hong Kong will be interesting. After the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, 
though Zhou Nan expressed his strong desire to remain on the post of director of Xinhua-Hong Kong and 
strived for the maintenance of the status of Xinhua-Hong Kong as the official Chinese representation in 
Hong Kong, his efforts ended up in failure. The organ was renamed in 1999 as Liaison Office of the Central 
People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. A further study of the role of Zhou 
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Nan’s successors could reveal Chinese decisions on Hong Kong’s democratization after China’s resumption 
of sovereignty.  
 
3. Contribution to Research on International Negotiations 
The Western countries are always perplexed about the negotiating behavior of the Chinese at the 
negotiating table. Lots of research tries to reveal the interesting patterns of Chinese negotiating behavior. 
Most of the essential documents of the records of meetings and debates among the top leaders are locked in 
the dusty piles of the archives centers and may even remain to be inaccessible to the researchers after 
decades. As a result, it is really difficult for contemporary researchers to understand how the Chinese 
decisions were made and the role of different players in the decision-making process. Lucian Pye and 
Richard Solomon’s work on Chinese negotiating style is important work in this field.815 Due to lack of 
primary sources on how the Chinese reach the final decision at the negotiating table, research on Chinese 
negotiating behavior sometimes only describes the negotiating process, but fails to shed light on the debates 
within China before the final decisions were made.  
This dissertation shows that the Directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong were key officials within 
Sino-British negotiations. They were able to shape the final decisions of the Chinese government through 
their important role in the Chinese policy-making process.  
This dissertation reconstructed Chinese positions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong, and spelled 
out the roles of the top Chinese leaders in Hong Kong in shaping the final decisions. It challenges the 
stereotype idea which characterizes all the Chinese leaders as die-hard conservatives and reveals an 
                                                        
815 Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles, Westport: Quorum Books, 
1992. Richard H. Solomon and Charles W. Freeman, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through “Old 
Friends”, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. 
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intriguing process in which the there were different views among the top leadership and between the 
directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council. In this way 
it reveals the whole picture of a dynamic decision-making process of China.  
 
III. General Conclusions and Policy Implications    
This dissertation explains the crucial Chinese decisions on democratic reforms in Hong Kong in the 
transition period of British rule. It shows that the final decisions by the Chinese government were based on 
debates within the Communist Party on the implications of British reforms to the Chinese domestic politics. 
Assessing the role of the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong is an interesting approach to shed light on how 
the crucial decisions were made by the Chinese government. When the Chinese decided to take measures to 
intervene in British reforms in Hong Kong, the directors of Xinhua-Hong Kong often voiced harsh 
criticisms of British reforms. When the negotiations were going smoothly, they often toned down their 
criticisms of British reforms in Hong Kong.  
Despite all the twists and turns in Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue, the two 
countries successfully preserved the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, which was a win-win solution 
for both China and Britain. In 2007, the Fortune magazine published an article admitting that its prediction 
ten years ago that Hong Kong would be dead after 1997 was wrong. The successful handover of Hong 
Kong from Britain to China was in sharp contrast to the overwhelming doomsday predictions before the 
handover, and was a miracle for the fulfillment of the unprecedented idea of “one country, two systems”.  
On 28 December 1999, the State Council decided to change the name of the Hong Kong Branch of 
the Xinhua News Agency into the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong 
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Special Administrative Region.816 Allen Lee Peng-fei speculated in his memoirs, “I believe the directors of 
the office, is still the director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee. His missions include political 
affairs and leading the Chinese financial institutions in Hong Kong.”817
The research shows that during some critical junctures of the negotiations, the directors of 
Xinhua-Hong Kong sometimes had the chance to sway the final decisions on the negotiations through their 
reports to Beijing or through their interactions with the politicians in Hong Kong. They played a crucial 
role in the Chinese decision-making process.   
The research has important policy implications. Chinese government’s decisions on the 
democratization of Hong Kong were crucial to China’s vital national interest of maintaining stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong. Hong Kong plays a pivotal role in China’s modernization drive and is also a 
showcase of the unprecedented idea of “one country, two systems” designed to lure Taiwan back to the 
mainland. As a result, killing the goose that lays golden eggs is the worst nightmare for China throughout 
the negotiations. This dissertation tried to interpret how the Chinese policy-makers balanced the sometimes 
conflicting themes of prosperity, stability and winning the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong people. 
These issues are still under heated debates in China even today.  
The pace of democratization in Hong Kong has always been a tricky issue as the community was for 
the most of times divided on the issue and keeping the pace too fast or too slow were both detrimental to 
Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. The breakth-taking years of Sino-British negotiations on democratic 
reforms in Hong Kong and the Chinese decisions on this important issue offer invaluable food for thought 
even today.  
                                                        
816 “Guowuyuan guanyu Gengxin Xinhua Tongxunshe Xianggang Fenshe, Aomen Fenshe Mingcheng Wenti 
de Tongzhi” (Note on Changing the Names of the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong and Macao Branches), 
Guowuyuan Gongbao (Bulletin of the State Council), No. 6, 2000, p. 7-8.   
817 Li Pengfei, “Xu Jiatun Shuo Wo Shi Zhengzhi Baofahu” (Xu Jiatun Called Me a Political Upstart), Li 
Pengfei Huiyilu, p. 155.  
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